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Ever since the post-war years, home ownership in Hong Kong has been considered 
to be a desirable form of tenure. The ever-spiralling housing prices and the 
minimum government intervention in private housing market induce people to 
regard residential real estate as an important investment good. But, since the early 
1 9 9 0 s , s k y - r o c k e t i n g p r i ce s h a v e b e c o m e p u b l i c c o n c e r n . P r o p e r t y d e v e l o p e r s ' 
business behaviour and pricing strategies in the housing market are often claimed 
to be responsible for pushing up the prices. This dissertation employs Ball's 
'Structure ofhousing provision' concept to analyse the role of property developers 
in t h e p r o v i s i o n o f o w n e r - o c c u p i e d h o u s i n g in H o n g K o n g . 
T h e s t u d y r e v e a l s t ha t o w n e r - o c c u p i e d h o u s i n g p r o v i s i o n in H o n g K o n g is 
characterised by a relatively high level of market concentration. This 
concentration is the aggregate result of government intervention in land supply and 
planning control in housing development process. THe limited supply of 
residential land, particularly in urban areas, has induced developers to acquire land 
from private lots for re-development. Yet, the intricate and time-consuming lease 
modification procedures have favoured large developers, who have expertise and 
financial backing, to pursue large scale residential development projects. As a 
result, the government intervention in housing provision shapes the production 
regime under which developers operate. This, in turn, fashions the size, location 
and style of housing developments, and consequently the structure of owner-
occupied housing provision in Hong Kong. 
On the other hand, large developers in Hong Kong are more than a group of 
housing producers; they occupy prominent positions in Hong Kong's and China's 
political arenas. Using Tseung Kwan 0 as a case study to examine developers' 
pricing strategies, it failed to demonstrate that developers have ‘power，to 
determine housing prices. Yet, developers, by establishing network ‘internal, and 
‘external，to Hong Kong society, are able to exert immense influence in the 
decision-making process of Hong Kong. 
However, the changing economic and political environments of Hong 
Kong after July 1997 have transformed the structure of owner-occupied housing 
provision. The increased government intervention in direct provision of owner-
occupied housing at the bottom-end of residential market has pushed private 
developers to shift their production in the upper-end market. As a whole, private 
developers will continuously play a key role in the owner-occupied housing 
provision in Hong Kong, but their operations will change as new rules, resources 
and ideologies will be created to adjust the changing investment atmosphere in 
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Housing has a prominent place in current Hong Kong's political arena. In his first 
policy address on 1 July 1997, the ChiefExecutive Tung Chee-hwa announced his 
plan to increase the supply of new housing: an annual production of 85,000 new 
flats in the ten-year period from 1997/98 to 2006/07. However, the real issue is not 
one of many people without roofs over their heads as was the case in the 1950s and 
1960s. This is well documented in the Planning, Environment and Lands Branch's 
(1994) Report that states, 
The 1993 year-end population was estimated to be 6.02 million and 
the number of households 1.71 million. With a total stock of about 
1.8 million public and private permanent housing units, which is 5% 
more than the estimated number ofhouseholds, there should be no 
shortage of housing for the purpose of shelter. The notional 
surplus is accounted for by the existence of vacancies, second 
homes, smaller households, and a growing tendency for emigrants 
to retain their properties in Hong Kong, (p.3, emphasis added) 
Indeed, since the early 1990s, escalating housing prices have been Hong 
Kong people's top concern. The ridiculously high level of residential property 
prices has pushed home ownership beyond the reach of many aspiring households. 
For example, prices for all classes of private domestic properties rose an average of 
150 per cent between year-end of 1989 and 1993. Prices in respect of the more 
popular estate-type developments increased by more than 200 per cent (ibid., p.2). 
In November 1996, the average price for recorded transactions in the housing 
market was $4,534 per square foot (Lui, F.T. 1997, p.360). This means that a 
family purchasing a unit of 380 square feet had to spend more than half a million 
dollars for the down payment. If the family planned to repay the mortgage loan in 
20 years at an interest rate of nine per cent, it would have to pay more than $12,000 
2 
a month. In February 1996 the median household monthly income was $17,500 
(Census & Statistics Department 1997b). In other words, for a family whose 
earnings were at the median, more than 70 per cent of its household income would 
have to be spent on monthly mortgage payments if it decided to purchase a small 
flat. Thus, the high prices and prospects for further rises provoke a lot of 
controversy in the society. 
Public dissatisfaction with rising property prices has prompted the 
Government to introduce measures to curtail price increases. In response, since 
1991, the government has intervened in the pre-sale market for new housing units 
and the home mortgage loan market in order to suppress demand. The series of 
measures adopted are targetted at speculators and developers who are often 
believed by the public to be responsible for pushing up the prices. 
The commonly held view' that developers in Hong Kong have sufficient 
monopoly power to manipulate the residential housing market has had a long 
history, and has recently been intensified by the report published by the Consumer 
Council in July 1996. The report stated that 70 per cent of total new private 
housing was supplied by seven developers in the period from 1991 to 1994. 
Although the report did not conclude that there was monopoly or even oligopoly, it 
asserted that there was a high degree of concentration in the market. This 
allegation has raised a number of questions about the business behaviour and 
pricing policies of property developers. There is a suspicion that these practices 
harm consumers and should therefore be regulated or prohibited. 
Within this context, the primary aim of this study is to examine the factors 
that contribute to the high concentration in the residential housing market. The 
study involves a detailed comparison among various types of developers in the 
provision of owner-occupied housing. The study also attempts to assess the 
‘ A s this dissertation is to investigate the role of property developers in Hong Kong's owner-
occupied housing, for the role of speculators, see Wong, Chau and Lai (1996, p.127-134) and Lui, 
F.T.(1997, p.360-362). 
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present problem of the high housing prices and prospect of the growth of home 
ownership in Hong Kong. 
In so doing, this study addresses the following questions: 
(a) How property developers operate in the residential housing market? 
(b) What are the major problems in building residential units and how can they be 
overcome? 
(c) What are the relationships between the Government, financial institutions and 
major property developers in the economy? 
(d) What obstacles exist to the future expansion ofhome ownership in Hong Kong? 
The dissertation is organised along the following lines. 
Chapter 2 describes the performance of post-war residential housing market 
in Hong Kong. The brief historical outline indicates that Hong Kong housing 
market is characterised by its dramatic booms and busts. In fact, prices are always 
spiralling upwards. Such performance can be explained by the uniqueness ofHong 
Kong housing market 一 the high property yield, the minimum government 
intervention, and the simple legal, taxation and financial systems. 
The second half of the chapter outlines the growth of home ownership in 
Hong Kong. It illustrates what are the causes of the increasing home ownership 
rate. In comparison with other advanced capitalist countries, the Hong Kong 
government's policy on home ownership is restricted to providing assistance to a 
limited range of middle- and low-middle-income families. The main impetus of 
the growth of home ownership, however, is the high housing prices that increase 
the growing demand ofhousing as an investment goods. 
Chapter 3 reviews existing approaches to, and research on, housing 
provision. It argues that while these approaches 一 neo-classical economics, 
classical Marxism, and urban political economics 一 provide useful directions for 
4 
understanding the housing production, they lack the capacity to address a 
fundamental dimension of our understanding of how housing, particularly owner-
occupied housing, is provided, and why it has become as it is. As an alternative, an 
approach beyond Marxian political economy is introduced. This approach 
combines an understanding of structure and agency, focusing on resources, rules 
and ideology that actors acknowledge and deploy to realise specific investments in 
housing development. The chapter concludes that the ‘Structures of Housing 
Provision' concept can help to provide a theoretical framework in which a number 
of empirical studies, focusing on structure, agents and institutions operating in the 
housing provision, are undertalceii. 
The first half of Chapter 4 defines the role of property developers in the 
structure of housing provision, and examines the common types of developers 
operating within it. It then describes how Hong Kong property developers can be 
studied. Given that most of developers were inaccessible, the main sources of 
information were from secondary data published in annual reports of the property 
companies, articles in books, journals and newspapers, and unpublished 
d i s s e r t a t i o n s in un ive r s i t i e s . A l s o , i n t e r v i e w s w i t h s e l e c t e d i n d i v i d u a l s w h o a r e 
familiar with Hong Kong's housing market were conducted, and they were used to 
supplement the secondary data. In the second half of the chapter, various 
categories of Hong Kong property developers are examined. It shows that the 
economic and political changes in the territory have created a dramatic shift 
towards large Chinese producers over the last 15 years. At the same time, the types 
of owner-occupied housing provided are becoming more sophisticated in scale, 
style and quality. 
Chapter 5 explains the housing development process in Hong Kong. The 
process starts from land acquisition, planning permission, development designs, 
financial arrangement, housing construction, and marketing and selling. 
Throughout the process, the Government has implemented policies to monitor and 
regulate every stage. In fact, the ways Government intervened affect the structure 
of owner-occupied housing provision and in turn, the developers' operating 
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strategies in producing the housing. The outcome is the high concentration oflarge 
developers in Hong Kong's structure of owner-occupied housing provision. 
The first half of Chapter 6 outlines the level of developers' market power in 
Hong Kong housing market. It assesses the degree of developers' ability to 
influence housing prices. It then describes how developers changed their pricing 
strategies at different points of time in selling new units in Tseung Kwan 0 . The 
empirical findings cast doubt on developers' power in setting prices. In the second 
half of the chapter, the level ofdevelopers' political power in Hong Kong society is 
examined. It shows how developers form network relationships ‘inside，and 
‘outside，Hong Kong to sustain a high degree of influence in economic and 
political decision-making processes in Hong Kong. 
Chapter 7 examines various strategies proposed by the government ofHong 
Kong Special Administrative Region to further expand home ownership in the 
community. This is followed by a discussion of the possible effect on the structure 
of owner-occupied housing provision in Hong Kong. The high concentration of 
large developers in current structure will continue, but its content will change. The 
owner-occupied sector will be further demarcated: the Hong Kong Housing 
Authority dominates at the lower-end while major private developers at the 
upper-end of the housing market. The latter section identifies some of the 
obstacles to promote home ownership in Hong Kong. The chapter concludes with 
an examination of implications to Hong Kong economy under the new housing 
policies. 
Chapter 8 is the conclusion of the dissertation. It highlights the continuum 
ofhousing policies in responding to changes of external and intemal contexts of the 
structure ofhousing provision in Hong Kong. The evolution of the structure in turn 
induces transformation of rules, resources and ideologies each agent will be 
» 
employed within the structure. Finally, the chapter suggests topics for further 
research in coping with the continuous changes ofthis structure. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
HOUSING MARKET AND HOME OWNERSHIP 
Ever since the post-war years, residential real estate has become an increasingly 
popular and important investment in Hong Kong. The strong economic 
performance and the island nature ofHong Kong mean the price ofland is forever 
rising. In fiscal 1978 expenditure on building and construction, which amounted to 
$8,539 million, accounted for 13.4 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)', 
with over half of the total generated in the private sector (Tse, C.C. 1979, p.9). In 
the period 1980-87, an average of 68 per cent of investment expenditure was in the 
form ofproperty (Walker 1990, p.29). This trend has gained further momentum in 
recent years with the GDP contribution rate of the real estate business reaching 43 
per cent in 1994 (Maruya 1998, p.3). However, residential property market in 
Hong Kong, like elsewhere, is characterised by significant boom and bust cycles. 
In fact, one of the key features of property and construction cycles in Hong Kong is 
their high volatility. Even the unexpected shift in political and economic fortunes 
has often created strong demand and good appreciation. 
This chapter gives a brief review ofHong Kong residential housing market 
in the context of the social and economic changes that Hong Kong has experienced 
in the course ofrapid economic development and restructuring since the 1970s. It 
also examines the differences in its characteristics and performances with other 
countries. Lastly, it describes the growth ofhome ownership in Hong Kong and its 
causes in relation to the high housing prices and government intervention. 
‘Uni ted Nations (1997, Table D) define GDP in purchaser's values is the total of the gross 
expenditures on the final uses o f the domestic supply of goods and services valued at purchaser's 
values less imports of goods and services valued compared, or the sum of the compensation of 
employees, consumption of fixed capital, operating surplus and indirect taxes, net of residents 
producers and import duties. 
7 
The Hong Kong residential housing market 
The booms and slumps 
From the end of the Second World War in 1945 to the reversion of Hong Kong to 
China in July 1997, Hong Kong has experienced eight property cycles, namely 
1945-51, 1952-58, 1959-68, 1969-74, 1975-84, 1985-89, 1990-95, 1996-present. 
The average duration of the cycle was eight to nine years, ranging from the shortest 
six to seven, to the longest nine to ten years (Yang 1993, p.360). 
(a) 1945-51 
With the return to peace in 1945, Hong Kong was faced with severe housing 
depletion. A survey carried out in 1946 showed that almost 8,700 domestic units 
had been destroyed and some 10,300 damaged (Pryor 1983, p.23). At the same 
time, refugees and former residents flooded into Hong Kong, so that the local 
population increased from about 0.6 to 2.1 million people between 1945 and 1951. 
As a result, huge squatter settlements sprang up virtually overnight. 
To solve the housing shortage problem, the major government action was 
to impose rent control on pre-war housing in 1947. Under the Landlord and Tenant 
Ordinance, rent on these units could not be raised unless a tenant vacated his/her 
premises. For the provision of new housing, the responsibility was entirely left to 
private enterprise. The land price at that time was cheap, but the world-wide 
shortage ofbuilding materials raised the construction cost so high that most private 
developers could not meet. Furthermore, the imposition of rent control severely 
limited the incentive for private developers to undertake housing re-construction. 
So, although the economy grew rapidly after Hong Kong resumed its entrepot role, 
the housing market was weak. 
In 1951, Hong Kong economy was in crisis. Due to the intervention of 
China in the Korean War, the United Nations imposed an embargo on trade with 
the mainland. This action marked the end of Hong Kong's entrepot trade. As a 
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consequence, the property market experienced the first slump since the post-war 
years. 
(b) 1952-58 
Fortunately, among the refugees arriving in Hong Kong were industrial capitalists 
from Shanghai. This group of migrants not only brought their fortunes with them, 
but also some time prior to the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 
1949 had been diverting new capital equipment 一 specially textile machinery — 
away from Shanghai to safekeeping in Hong Kong (Wong, S 1 . 1988). Thus at the 
beginning of the 1950s, refugee capital using a large pool of cheap labour began the 
Hong Kong's industrial revolution. By the end of the 1950s, domestically 
produced exports, particularly textiles and apparel, had surpassed re-exports, 
making Hong Kong the first of the ‘Four Little Dragons' (the newly industrialised 
economies) to enter export game. 
However, the supply of new housing remained stagnant until the disastrous 
squatter fire at Shek Kip Mei on Christmas Eve 1953. The great fire made 53,000 
persons homeless that triggered the Government's direct intervention in the 
provision of housing". The housing situation was further improved after the 
amendment of the Landlord and Tenant Ordinance on 17 August 1955. The 
conditions to evict tenants for urban re-development were relaxed. Later, on 21 
December 1955, the Building Ordinance of 1935 was amended to permit 
construction of taller buildings. These two amendments led to a surge of re-
development that reached a peak in 1959, when some 12,000 private housing units 
were built (Pryor 1983，p.26). As a result, the sudden increase of supply within 
such a narrow span of t ime pushed down the property price, and caused the second 
slump of the housing market until 1961. 
2 There are a lot of debates about the reasons why Hong Kong government started to build public 
housing blocks in 1954. Most critics appear to have reached the consensus that the impetus for 
direct provision ofhousing lay largely in the financial burden imposed upon the Government in the 
provision o f re l i e f to the victims of the squatter fire. The Government apparently found that in the 
long run the costs of resettling these homeless squatters permanently were lower than the costs of 
relief (Hopkins 1971,p.296). 
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(c) 1959-68 
The rapid surge of building activities in late 1950s resulted in serious urban 
congestion. To help obviate the problem, new regulations were introduced in 
September 1962 to scale down the permitted density of development. A plot-ratio^ 
amendment was enacted to take effect in 1966, restricting the ratio of gross floor 
space to the area of the site. However, the amendment included an escape clause 
that allowed any landlord who could apply for re-construction with a plan before 
the end of 1965 was exempted from these new restrictions. Thus, during the 
‘period of grace’ between 1962 and 1966, intense re-development occurred in the 
context of the 1956 regulations. Over the period 1963-66, for example, 93,570 new 
private domestic units were built, representing an average annual production of 
23,390 units as against about 10,000 units per annum over the period 1958-62 
(Pryor 1978, p.270). As a consequence, by 1966, there were 18,000 vacant 
domestic units in the private sector. The housing market became once again vastly 
over-supplied. 
Furthermore, the first banking crisis since the post-war years was occurred 
in February 1965. A series of bank runs caused a retraction of investment in 
private housing. This economic setback was closely followed by the Star Ferry 
riots of 1966 and the civil disturbances, which were lasting from May 1967 to 
January 1968, caused by a spill-over of the Cultural Revolution (1966-76) from 
China. Thus, starting from 1965, the housing boom collapsed into a deep 
depression that lasted until 1970. 
(d) 1969-74 
Hong Kong returned its social order by 1969, and its economy was again on the 
upward swing. In 1971, Sir Murray MacLehose was appointed the Governor of 
Hong Kong. In his first speech to the Legislative Council in October 1972, 
MacLehose devoted 80 per cent of his speech to social policy, with particular 
3 The plot ratio ofabui ld ing is obtained by dividing the gross floor area o f the building by the area 
o f t h e site on which the building is erected. 
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emphasis on housing. His Ten Year Public Housing Program^ signified the first 
decisive element in the performance and orientation of housing policy in Hong 
Kong5 (Castells, Goh & Kwok 1990, p.l36). 
However, the supply of residential and non-industrial lands fell to a very 
low level ill the several years following the banking crisis. The supply did not 
resume the 1965 level until 1970 (Wu 1983, p.l5). The acutely short supply no 
doubt contributed to the subsequent recovery of the property market at the end of 
1968 through slowing the supply of housing. The recovery continued until the 
stock market crash in March 1973. The Hang Seng Index of share prices fell from 
1,700 in March to 150 in December 1974. Also, the oil crisis in 1974 and then the 
deepest post-war world recession further pushed the market into a severe trough. It 
was estimated that the land price dropped by 90 per cent (Hsieh 1992，p.247). 
(e) 1975-84 
Despite most of the industrialised world verging on stagnation in early 1970s, 
Hong Kong still managed a high rate of growth. Manufacturing industries 
underwent product diversification and up-stream production. As a result, the 
sector saw a flourishing of garments, plastics, electronics, and the toy industries. 
At the same time, Hong Kong became a major world financial centre. Table 2.1 
shows that the growth of GDP averaged at 7.7 per cent in the period of 1970-75. 
Under such strong economic growth, the property market began to pick up in late 
1976. The construction of the mass transit railway line and its adjacent residential 
developments and the implementation of the Ten Year Public Housing Program 
boosted up the building and construction activities. 
4 The Ten Year Public Housing Program aimed to accommodate 1.8 million people in public 
housing at a minimum standard of3 .3 sq m per person in the 10-year period of 1973-82. 
5 Castells, et al. (1990, p. 140) claimed that such reform was a deliberate move to pacify and stabilise 
the colony after 1967 riots. Also, the reform could create a solid basis for negotiating with China by 
building up local political legitimacy on the basis of social programs and limited democratisation. 
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Table 2.1 The growth of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in selected countries, 1970-95. 
Annual growth rate o fGDP (%) 
Countries 1970-75 1976-81 1980-90 1990-95 
Hong Kong 7 7 vTo ^ s I 
Denmark 2.2 2.1 2.4 2.0 
USA 2.8 3.1 3.0 2.6 
Belgium 4.1 2.3 1.9 1.1 
Japan 5.0 5.0 4.0 1.0 
Singapore 9.8 9.0 6.4 8.7 
South Korea 9.8 7.2 9.4 7.2 
Taiwan 5.3(a) - 6.3(b) -
Notes: (a) 1961-73 
(b) 1974-87 
Sources: 1. All countries except Taiwan, 1970-75 and 1976-81: United Nations (1982) 
p.148-153. 
2. All countries except Taiwan, 1980-90 and 1990-95: World Bank (1997) 
Table 11. 
3. Taiwan: Amsden (1992) Table2.1. 
But, the most significant impetus to the property market was the launching 
in 1978 of ' four modernisations' by the People's Republic of China. China's open 
door policy revived the entrepot trade with China, and enhanced the confidence of 
investors and end-users. Low interest rates and the willingness of the banks to 
provide mortgage finance to developers and the home-buyers^ hastened the 
euphoric prices rises, especially the small domestic units. The price of small 
residential premises had trebled from $3,200 per square metre in 1978 to over 
$10,000 in 1981 (Wong, W.Y. 1994, p.8). This upward momentum was greatly 
attributed to the tempo of demand of the prospective home purchasers and 
particularly the speculators?. The rampant speculative buying pushed the mass 
residential prices up the peak to $11,383 per square metre in 1981 (Rating & 
Valuation Department 1982). The vacancy rate at that time was 5.9 per cent (or 
6 For example, in the 2 years 1979 and 1980，banks and deposit-taking companies lent an additional 
$12,000 million to developers and $6,000 million for private residential mortgages and thus 
increased their commitment to the property sector by roughly 150% (HKSBC 1981). 
7 The speculative appeal of dealing in properties has been greatly facilitated by the practice of 
forward sales of flats in the course of development. For a speculator, he/she pays only a small down 
payment, and sell his/her entitlement at a substantial profit. As a result, he/she is rewarded with the 
appreciation of the full value of the premises in which he/she invests only a fraction of the equity. 
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29,700 units) indicating that the residential property market was dominated by 
hoarders and speculators. 
The price of residential property started to fall from the third quarter of 
1981, as mortgage rate escalated from 6.5 per cent in early 1978 to 21 per cent in 
October 1981. The rapid rise in the interest rate and housing price eroded the 
purchasing power of home buyers. High interest charges also imposed a heavy 
financial burden to speculators who were forced to sell their units in the secondary 
market. 
Later, the visit of Mrs Margaret Thatcher to Beijing in October 1982 
brought the Sino-British stalemate over the Hong Kong future to the surface. The 
diplomatic negotiations that followed shortly between China and Britain on the 
Hong Kong question immediately touched off a confidence crisis, as evidenced by 
emigration and 'currency substitution' (i.e., extensive switching from local to 
foreign currency deposits) on a massive scale. The price of mass residential 
premises dropped by 36 per cent in 1982. 
Furthermore, starting from September 1982, Hong Kong experienced the 
worst economic crisis in its history. The collapse of property market brought two 
large property firms, Eda Investment Co., Ltd. and the Carrian Holdings Ltd., into 
financial difficulties that in turn brought several financial institutions on the brink 
of insolvency. By early 1983, seven licensed deposit-taking companies failed8. 
The banking crisis was exacerbated on 'Black Saturday', 24 September 1983, 
when the Hong Kong dollar plunged to a record low of US $1 = HK $9.6. As a 
result, the Hong Kong government suffered three consecutive years of fiscal 
deficit. Thus, Hong Kong in the autumn of 1983 was simultaneously hit by three 
crises: currency crisis, banking crisis, and fiscal crisis. 
On 15 October 1983, the Government announced a two-point currency 
stabilisation scheme, including the linked-exchange rate system that fixed the rate 
8 For details oft l ie banking crisis in 1982-86, see Jao(1988). 
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of u s $1 = HK $7.8. The Hong Kong economy became stabilised. However, it 
was still caught up with the world-wide economic recession and the confidence 
crisis. The overall residential price index dropped further 20 per cent from 1982 to 
1984 (Wong, W.Y. 1994, p . l l ) . 
(f) 1985-89 
After the promulgation of Sino-British Joint Declaration in September 1984, the 
anxiety about Hong Kong's future was dissipated. The property market then 
recovered in 1985. The full recovery was attributed to the fall of mortgage rate, 
from 12.5 per cent in 1984 to 8 per cent in mid-1985. This reduction spurred an 
increase of demand for residential premises and the housing mortgage loans. 
Furthermore, some ofthe banks offered more favourable terms for borrowers, such 
as lengthening the repayment period up to 25 years, and reduced the loan-to-
valuation ratio from 90 per cent to 80 per cent in late 1985. Thus, the growth rate of 
total mortgage loans kept pace with the buoyancy ofhousing price. Lending to the 
residential property rose by 24 per cent from 1984 to 1985. 
Approximately after 1985, there was massive re-location of labour 
intensive manufacturing production processes to lower cost countries, such as 
China and Thailand. Hong Kong gradually shifted from a manufacturing base to 
an international financial centre. The high economic growth, an over ten per cent 
growth in per capita GDP in 1986-87 (Fig. 2.1), attracted an influx of international 
funds, particularly those from Japan. To the Japanese investor, Hong Kong 
offered a host of attractions because local properties were relatively cheap in yen 
terms, and offered higher yields than could be achieved in Japan. Also, there has 
also been active foreign investment activities from countries in Southeast Asia, 
mainly by the overseas Chinese there, as well as from Australia and New Zealand^ 
9 Hongkong Bank (1988) reported that Japanese investors bought property worth $1.6 billion in 
1986 and $5 billion in 1987，making Japan the largest overseas investor in Hong Kong real estate 
market. Also, it estimated that Australians and New Zealanders spent over $2 billion in 1987 on 
Hong Kong real estate, while Mainland Chinese and Taiwanese each reportedly invested about $1 
billion. 
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Figure 2.1 The average growth o f G D P in Hong Kong, 1982-97. 
Sources-. 1. 1982-93: United Nations (1997) Table D. 
2. 1994-97: Census and Statistics Department (1998b) Table 1. 
Although the overseas investment concentrated mainly on the commercial 
sector, it indirectly created an investment climate for local people in buying 
residential premises. The tight labour market and double digit economic growth in 
1986 (see Fig. 2.1) led to a respectable rise in real income. For instance, between 
1981 and 1986, the median family income rose from $2,955 to $5,160. The 
proportion of households earning $10,000 per month or more rose from 5.5 per 
cent in 1981 to 18.4 per cent in 1986 (Census & &atistic Department 1986). This 
greatly enhanced their purchasing power and enticed them to enter up into the 
housing market. Even the world-wide stock market crash in October 1987 could 
not deter people from queuing outside the sale offices of property companies. The 
very active property market continued to flourish until June 1989. 
Shocked by the June-Fourth massacre in Beijing, the residential property 
market faced the brunt of this political unrest. The property market could be 
divided clearly between pre- and post-Tiiianmen Square events. The total value of 
private domestic property stock was estimated to fall from $457,249 million on 1 
April to $381,041 million after 4 June (at 1988 market price; Walker 1990, Table 
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3.1). Real estate and land prices further dropped by 30-50 per cent within the next 
two months (Jao 1995, p . l l l ) . Facing with the bleak economic outlook, the banks 
curtailed the loan-to-valuatioii ratio to 80 per cent or even 70 per cent in order to 
minimise their risks in the downturn property market. Virtually, property sales 
activity was reduced dramatically and almost stagnated. 
(g) 1990-95 
The property market crash following the events at Tinaiimen Square was brief. In 
September 1989, the market started to rebound. Developers cut down the price of 
the pre-completed flats for about 10-15 per cent to provoke buying interests. 
Banks also relaxed their mortgage lending policies and offered 90 per cent advance 
to the home purchasers, so that they could purchase flats with a smaller amount of 
down payment. So, property prices returned to their pre-crash levels by the end of 
1989. 
The buyers' contidence was further boosted following the swift victory by 
the Allied forces in the Gulf War in March, 1991. In July, the announcement of the 
M e m o r a n d u m o f U n d e r s t a n d i n g on the C h e k L a p K o k A i r p o r t b e t w e e n t h e 
C h i n e s e a n d B r i t i s h g o v e r n m e n t s g rea t ly p u s h e d the p r o p e r t y p r i c e s to a h i g h l eve l . 
The negative real mortgage rates, because of accelerating inflation due to the HK-
US dollar linked-exchange rate system, acted as an added impetus'". Prices of all 
small- and medium-sized flats increased for about 10-15 per cent (Wong, W.Y. 
1994, p.23). The property market was now fuelled by the demands not only of 
end-users but also of speculators. 
10 The linked-exchange system means that Hong Kong follows United States' interest rates even 
though Hong Kong's higher growth rate might merit tighter credit. That situation produced chronic 
inflation and low, even negative, real interest rates that sent property prices into the dizzylingly 
high. For example, inflation rose from 4-5% in 1986 to 10-11% in 1991, while the best lending rate 
rose moderately from 6.5-7.5% in 1986 to 8.5-10.5% in 1991. As a consequence, the real interest 
cost on home mortgages went from being positive to negative (Wong & Staley 1992, p.326). 
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The rampant speculative buying raised public concern". In response to the 
public calls over speculation, the Government then introduced new measures to 
combat the speculative activity on 6 November 1991. These included the request 
ofdevelopers to hold lotteries in the pre-sale ofnew housing units to the public, the 
extension of stamp duty levies to transactions in the pre-sale market and the 
enforcement of a more vigorous application of the inland revenue code to collect 
profit tax on short term trading in the property market. 
However, these measures were unable to dampen down the property heat, 
and property prices continued to surge unabated. In reducing the exposure to the 
property market, banks tightened their credit policies, and decreased the mortgage 
ratio from 90 per cent ofaproperty value to 70 per cent in November 1991. Soon 
afterwards property prices began to fall. 
While the price of small- and medium-sized flats dropped in 1992, the 
luxury sector was very active at that time. This was due to the Mainland Chinese 
investment on luxury apartments. The sudden surge of Chinese activities in Hong 
Kong was the result of the highly publicised visit by Deng Xiaoping to Guangdong 
in the Chinese New Year of 1992 in support of accelerated reforms'l Since then, 
the level of investment from China was estimated to total US $20 billion or HK 
$ 156 billion in 1992 (Maruya 1995, p. 133), surpassing that from either Japan or the 
United States and making China the leading investor in Hong Kong. In the real 
estate sector, the Chinese investment jumped from $7,270 million to $20,000 
million in 1992, an increase of 175 per cent (Hastings 1995, Table 5). Since the 
purchasers of the luxury units were not influenced by the 70 per cent mortgage 
ceiling, and the supply of luxury units had declined since 1989, the price of these 
丨丨 At the beginning the major public concerns centred around two issues. First, triad members 
wishing to turn a quick profit often used strong-arm tactics to jump the queue making it difficult for 
genuine buyers to acquire units directly from the developer. Second, final users who waited in 
queues on the announced date ofpublic sale often found that many o f the choice units had already 
been privately sold ahead o f t ime to property agents or speculators. Many buyers were therefore 
compelled to pay a considerable premium in order to acquire their units from property agents or 
speculators. 
12 In his visit to Guangdong during the Chinese New Year in 1992, Deng Xiaoping proposed that 
Guangdong should catch up with the Asian ‘Four Little Dragons' within the next 20 years. See 
Deng Xiaoping's 'Southern Speech' that was widely publicised in China after his tour. 
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units increased approximately 33 per cent in 1992 (Wong, W.Y. 1994, p.25). Thus, 
in this year, there was a diverging trend of small- and medium-sized flats and the 
luxury units. 
In order to overcome the hurdle of the 70 per cent mortgage limit, 
developers offered their own private mortgage schemes to potential purchasers that 
were above the mortgage ceiling. This received a good response from home 
buyers, and all the units in the pre-completion schemes were sold out within a few 
days. Such response stimulated the housing market, and the mass residential 
property market rebounded at the beginning of March 1993. The luxury sales 
market continued its upward trend. The over-heated luxury property prompted the 
banks further tighten the screw on mortgage lending and drop the maximum 
lending ratio to 60 per cent for loans on homes worth more than five million 
dollars. Despite the mortgage restrictions of the financial institutions, the prices of 
luxury flats further rose by 10-15 per cent. Overall, the mass residential house 
price surged by 80 per cent from 1991 to 1993 (Tse, R.Y.C. 1996, p . l l5) . 
In view of the continued surge of residential property price, the then 
Governor, Sir Chris Patten, established an Anti-Speculation Task Force in March 
1994. In late March, the Government announced a second round of measures to 
curb speculation that included reducing the quota for 'internal sale，by developers 
from 50 per cent to 10 per cent, banning the re-sale of uncompleted flats, restricting 
pre-sales to nine months before completion, doubling the deposit for units to 10 per 
cent, and raising the forfeiture amount included in an estate contract from 3 per 
cent to 5 per cent. Such high profile measure severely dampened speculative 
activities. The residential property price started to drop and reached its cyclical 
trough in October 1995. 
(h) 1996 to present 
In March 1996, the residential property price revived again. From their lows 
reached in October 1995, prices of flats in popular housing estates increased by 
18 
more than 25 per cent by October 1996. Prices in the luxury sector rose even more, 
with some units recording gains of more than 50 per cent (Hang Seng Bank 1996). 
The main force to push up the price was the keen competition among the banks for 
mortgage business that led to interest rate concessions. At that time, the mortgage 
rate offered to most new home buyers could be as low as around 0.75-1.25 
percentage points below the standard mortgage rate. 
Moreover, speculative activities resumed, but took a new direction. Buyers 
now set up companies to purchase properties from developers to circumvent 
government regulations that prohibited the re-sale of uncompleted flats by 
individuals. The re-sale of uncompleted units involving registered companies rose 
from 9-10 per cent in 1995 to 18 per cent of total transactions in November 1996 
(Ming Pao, 9 December 1996). Such activities alarmed the Government and urged 
developers to adopt self-regulatory m e a s u r e s ' ; . Also, on 29 January 1997, the 
Hong Kong Monetary Authority requested banks to tighten mortgage criteria for 
homes worth more than $12 million and reduce mortgage ceiling from 70 per cent 
to 60 per cent for luxury flats. Though the speculative activities in the luxury 
sector quietened down, the mass residential prices showed no sign of falling. The 
return of people's confidence on Hong Kong smooth re-unification with China 
boosted up the buying and speculative interests. 
So far, the Government adopted measures to cool the private residential 
market by curbing the demand for flats artificially. But, starting from 26 March 
1997, the Government introduced policies to increase the supply ofhousing units. 
The new policies included the relaxation of pre-sale period for private domestic 
units from 12 months to 15 months and that of subsidised owner-occupied units to 
24 months. This immediately increased the supply of an additional 18,000 units 
including 13,000 subsidised ones. Also, the Government imposed further 
13 The main measures adopted by property developers since mid-January 1997 are: (i) for the 
registered companies who register in the pre-sale projects, change ofpersonal in the directorship is 
not allowed before the signing of the transactions; (ii) only 15% ofsa le units will be allocated for 
the registered companies to buy; (iii) the total number of sale units available in the projects must be 
known to the public; (iv) the 10% units for internal sales must be allocated to the genuine end-users; 
and (v) drop-box method vWll be used to avoid queues outside sale offices. 
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regulations on developers' selling practices, that is, all units must be sold within six 
months after the issuance of the occupation permit, and the number of units sold in 
each phase must not less than 20 per cent of the total units provided in the project. 
Moreover, the Government urged developers, solicitors and estate agencies to issue 
internal regulations to discourage their members to participate in speculative 
activities. The concerted efforts by the Government and the private sector pushed 
the housing price drop rapidly in April. 
The residential housing price was further pulled down after Leung Chun-
ying's, the top aide to the then Chief Executive-designate, announcement in June. 
He made a strong recommendation to the new government of the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) to take tough action in stamping out 
property speculation. The market was then filled with uncertainty of Tung Chee-
hwa's, the Chief Executive, action on the high housing price. On 1 July 1997, 
Tung declared his ambitious plan to supply 85,000 units per year. The effects of 
Tung's and Leung's statements significantly weakened the buyers' interests who 
anticipated further drop of prices. As a result, the property transactions declined by 
32.6 per cent in August {SCMP, 4 September 1997). 
The market was further dampened after the upheaval of the Asian economic 
turmoil in October 1997. At the time of writing (June 1998), property prices have 
fallen 30 to 40 per cent since their 1997 peak {SCMP, 21 May 1998). The main 
reason for the rapid drop in property prices is the imbalance of supply and demand. 
The demand has significantly dropped as people are uncertain about Hong Kong's 
economic outlook. There are signs, too, that interest rate and unemployment rate 
will move upwards and will impinge on the property market. To stimulate the 
buying incentive, developers were being forced to cut prices of new units to 
achieve sales and maintain cash flow. The price war among developers in mid-
Mayi4 was described a s the most intense since 1 9 8 2 {SCMP, 2 7 M a y 1998) . A s a 
14 The price war was started on 11 May 1998 when Cheung Kong announced a lower than expected 
$4,147 per sq ft for flats in Tierra Verde, Tsing Yi. On the following day, Sun Hung Kai announced 
a 12% cut in prices to $3,750 per sq ft for the remaining units of its Mount Haven development in 
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result, buying interest was totally absorbed by the primary market while the 
secondary market had almost come to a standstill. The market was hit further by 
the disappointing government tender of a 75,950 square feet residential site on the 
Aldrich Bay Reclamation, which sold for only $1.67 billion 一 more than 40 per 
cent below the land price paid for a residential project in nearly Siu Sai Wan early 
last year. 
To reduce the further decline in property prices, HKSAR government 
announced a rescue package on 29 May 1998. Nearly all anti-speculation 
measures, with the exception of issues related to taxation, imposed in March 1994 
(mentioned above) were suspended'^ Nevertheless, the downward trend of 
property prices will continue as it is anticipated that more new housing units will be 
put onto the market within this year. Most importantly, the supply of mortgage 
finance has become more constrained because lenders, facing continued high levels 
of default, exercise greater prudence. It is estimated that it will take at least a year 
for the property market to show signs of recovery. 
As a whole, Hong Kong has experienced eight property cycles. Four of 
them resulted from the direct or indirect effect of external influences. They were 
the United Nations embargo on entrepot trade in 1951, the oil crisis and world 
recession in 1974, the June-Fourth massacre in Beijing in 1989 and the Asian 
financial crisis in 1997. The others arose from the internal economic and political 
problems and the 1997 issue. Nevertheless, Hong Kong property market was quick 
to recover. Every recovery had its own distinctive characteristics and as far as 
residential premises were concerned, the prices at each peak surpassed those of the 
previous one. Real property prices rose at an average annual rate of 11 per cent 
between 1984 and 1996 {Ming Pao, 19 June 1997). Such strong performance 
Tsing Yi. Later, other developers, including Henderson, Sino and Wheelock, also have joined in 
the price war. 
15 The rescue package includes: (i) to extend the pre-sale of uncompleted flats from the present 15 
months to 20 months; (ii) to suspend the prohibition on re-sale of uncompleted flats before 
assignment; (iii) to suspend the limitation on flat sales to companies to the last 15% of each batch 
for pre-sale; (iv) to suspend the requirement that developers have to put all flats for pre-sale onto the 
market within 6 months of the date of consent given; and (v) to suspend the requirement that 
21 
inevitably attracted a lot of players, locally or internationally, pouring their funds 
into the property market. The following section describes the characteristics of 
Hong Kong residential property market that contribute its great volatility. 
Characteristics ofthe residential housing market 
While the United States, the United Kingdom and Japan have been in a housing 
slump since 1990(6, |^^ g Hong Kong's housing prices still persistently remain at a 
high level. The reasons for such contrasting performance lie in the fundamental 
differences in political interest, economic policies and community values between 
these countries. Ho (1990, p.74-77) points out the following favourable factors for 
the Hong Kong market: 
(a) the island nature ofHong Kong where the supply of land is in great shortage; 
(b) growing affluence and rapidly expanding economies where GDP growth in the 
past two decades has averaged between 6 to 12 per cent per annum (see Table 
2.1 and Fig. 2.1); 
(c) immigration and the flow of capital mainly from China, Southeast Asia and 
Japan; 
(d) in the commercial sector, even unfavourable political factors, such as the 
hostility between China and Taiwan, can create a boom. For example, the 
Taiwanese have recently been acquiring more commercial properties in Hong 
Kong in order to consolidate their own presence, in anticipating of being 
discriminated against after 1997; 
(e) availability of lower labour and material costs and year-round construction 
activities; and 
(f) efficient legal, financial, transport and communication systems and a 
hardworking labour force with little political or social unrest. 
developers have to put onto the market not less than 20% of flats approved for pre-sale for each 
batch of flats for pre-sale. 
16 For example, the values ofhouses in Los Angeles in 1994 were down 30% from their 1990 peak. 
The return on housing has lagged well behind that of stocks and bonds during the last decade (Spiers 
& S c h i f f l 9 9 4 ) . 
22 
Another reason for the hyper-active real estate market in Hong Kong is its 
simplicity. Because development primarily involves new construction, it can 
proceed immediately after complying with the prescribed requirements in the 
Outline Zoning Plan (details of the development process will be discussed in 
Chapter 5). This simple form of development means that anyone with the 
necessary capital can enter the game with a reasonable chance ofsuccess. In North 
America, because ofthe diversity in forms of development that can take the form of 
land re-zoning, sub-division, renovation, rehabilitation, new construction and 
property trading among others, the game requires much professionalism (in 
addition to capital) and is not for everyone (ibid., p.77). Also, the Hong Kong 
simple tax system favours the property investment activity, and most importantly, 
Hong Kong has no capital gains tax. 
Financing property development or making purchases in Hong Kong is 
made simple in order to facilitate transactions. For development, a company can 
easily obtain a specific project term loan from financial institutions. The financial 
burden can be relieved shortly by pre-sales of the uncompleted units, a form of 
futures option. As mentioned earlier, banks in Hong Kong offer attractive 
mortgage package. The Government, some semi-government institutions and 
private companies also extend low interest housing loans to their staff. As a result, 
mortgages in Hong Kong are simple, competitive but with all risks placed on the 
investor. However, the high yields (will be discussed below) often mean that the 
return is higher than the cost of borrowing, which is another reason why 
investments in Hong Kong properties are so attractive. In other words, financial 
institutions in Hong Kong are basically to facilitate speculation or investment, by 
placing all risks ofany increase in interest on the buyers (ibid., p. 79). 
The fmal characteristic that distinguishes Hong Kong real estate market 
from other countries is its high property y i e l d " Tse, R.Y.C. (1996, Table 1) fmds 
17 Property yield is the conventional way to measure return on real estate. It is also called the 
capitalisation rate o f the rent-to-value ratio that measures incomes yield ofproperty. However, the 
internal rate of return on capital, the true measure of return, includes income yields as well as 
growth ofcapital values of property (Tse, R.Y.C. 1996). 
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that property yields ranged anywhere from 8 to 10 per cent from 1980 to 1990'^ 
and Ho (1990, p.79) reports that the appreciation gains over 1984 to 1989 was 
doubled or tripled. These two factors, when put together, have achieved a sort of 
golden formula for investors, that is, high yields and a strong appreciation on a 
cyclical basis. Thus, timing is a major determining factor that allows investors 
'ride' with market and take advantage of the upswings in these cycles to 
~ accumulate great wealth over short periods. 
The above characteristics can be attributed to the strong performances of 
Hong Kong property market. As a consequence, Hong Kong residential real estate 
has become an increasingly popular and important investment. It inevitably results 
in a strong preference for home ownership in the community. The next section 
therefore describes how the home ownership rate grows in Hong Kong, compares 
its performance with other countries, and identifies the key factors that contribute 
to its growth. 
Growth of home ownership 
The home ownership rate 
While Hong Kong is hailed as having the world's second largest public housing 
programme after Singapore, the public housing in the 1990s is no longer the 
dominant tenure in the territory. This is evidenced in Figure 2.2. In a period o f 2 5 
years, the percentage of owner-occupied households jumped from 18.1 per cent in 
1971 to 44.5 per cent in 1996. Indeed, starting from the 1980s, property has 
become a major store of value for Hong Kong. In April 1989, the total value of 
private domestic property was $457,249 million and, by April 1993, it rose to 
$1,375,325 million (Wong, Chau & Lai 1996, Table 4.5). 
丨8 In Japan, property investment traditionally generated a 3% yield before the collapse of Japanese 
financial market in 1989 (Shreeve 1992, cited in Leyshon 1994, p.l36). 
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Figure 2.2 Trend o f h o u s i n g tenure in Hong Kong, 1971-96. 
Sources: Census and Statistics Department, summary results of population censuses. 
But, in comparison with advanced capitalist countries, the home ownership 
rate performance is not impressive. Table 2.2 shows that nearly all advanced 
capitalist countries have an over 50 per cent home ownership rate, with the 
exception of Sweden, Switzerland and The Netherlands'^ Among the newly 
industrialised countries (Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong and South Korea), the 
rate of Hong Kong is the lowest. However, despite its relatively low level, it is on 
the rising trend, while some countries, like the United States and South Korea, have 
experienced a declining owner-occupation rate. 
19 However, there is a difference in owner-occupied housing in developed and Third World 
countries. Home ownership in rural-based societies as Bangladesh is not like the type of home 
ownership in urban-based societies, ln fact, owner-occupied housing in rural societies is self-
provided with low quality, while that in urban societies is provided in a capitalist way. 
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Table 2.2 The percentage of owner-occupation in selected countries. 
Countries 1970s 1980s 1990s 
Scandinavian countries 
Denmark 48 .6(1970) 54 .0 (1980) 52 .0 (1990) 
Finland 60 .4(1970) 65 .0 (1985) 78 .0 (1992) 
Norway 52 .6(1970) 60 .0 (1988) -
Sweden 35.0 (1971) 55.0 (1986) 55.0 (1991) 
Western Europe 
Austria - - 50 .0 (1990) 
Belgium 55.9 (1971) - 65.0 (1991) 
France 47 .0 (1978) 54 .0(1988) 54 .0 (1990) 
Greece* - - 78 .0 (1990) 
Spain* - - 78 .0 (1990) 
Switzerland 27.9 (1971) - 30 .0 (1990) 
The Netherlands - 44 .0 (1981) 47 .0 (1993 ) 
United Kingdom 50.1 (1971) 58.0 (1981) 68 .0 (1994) 
West Germany 37.0 (1978) 38.0 (1987) -
Other Western countries 
Australia 68.7 (1971) 70 .0 (1986) 70 .0 (1994) 
Canada 60 .2 (1971) 63 .0 (1986) 63 .0 (1991) 
USA 62 .9 (1971) 65.6 (1980) 64 .0 (1992) 
Asian countries 
Hong Kong 18.1 (1971) 27 .9 (1981) 44.5 (1996) 
Japan - 61 .4 (1988) 60 .0 (1993) 
Singapore 21.0 (1975) 71 .0 (1988) 79 .0 (1991) 
South Korea 68 .2 (1971) 58 .6 (1980) 50 .6 (1990) 
Taiwan 74 .6(1979) 79.8 (1989) -
Thailand - 88.6 (1981) -
Third world countries 
Bangladesh - 90.0 (1981) -
Brazil 60 .4 (1973) 62.0 (1980) -
Mexico - 68.0 (1980) -
* The large owner-occupied sector in these countries have high proportions of rural households 
where the traditional tenure has been owner-occupation. 
Sources: 1. 1970s' data for Denmark, Finland and Norway and 1980s' data for Sweden - Wood 
(1990) Table 2. 
2. 1970s' data for Australia, Belgium, Canada, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and 
USA-Kemeny(1978) Table 1. 
3. 1970s' and 1980s' data for Denmark, France, Norway, Sweden and West Germany -
Haiioe(1988a) Cli.2. 
4. 1990s' data for Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Spain and Switzerland - McCrone 
(1995) Table 4. 
5. 1990s' data for Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Japan, Sweden, The Netherlands 
and United Kingdom - Freeman (1997) Table 1. 
6. 1980s' data for Finland - Ruonavaara (1990) p.l29. 
7. USA-Stegman(1995). 
8. 1970s' and 1980s' data for Canada - Choko (1993) Table 1.1. 
9. Hong Kong - Census & Statistics Department, various years. 
10. Singapore and Taiwan - Sai (1995). 
1 1. 1980s' data for Japan - Hirayama & Hayakawa (1995). 
12. Bangladesh, Brazil, Mexico, Thailand and South Korea - Yoon (1994) p.31. 
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Explanations for the growth ofhome oMmership 
In the western world, a number ofauthors have attempted to explain levels ofhome 
ownership through theoretical models or through specific causal factors. 
Summarising the most common theoretical models, Duncan (1982) posits six 
categories ofexplaiiations: 
(a) cultural: in which culture is an external structure greater than and influential 
upon individual decision makers who produce and consume housing; 
(b) structural Marxist: in which the active force is the mode of production; 
(c) modernisation functionalist: in which an evolution in housing is an adaptation 
to industrialisation and its needs; 
(d) psychological and sociobiological: in which home ownership is a 'universal' 
human need; 
(e) neo-classical and behavioural: in which home ownership is a result of 
individual attitudes, motivation, and desires, within the context of national 
economic choices; and 
(f) manipulated city/conspiracy: in which a power elite of capitalists and 
government officials that intentionally manipulates the market. 
Similarly, in explaining the dominance of owner-occupation in Finland, 
Ruonavaara (1990) suggests four types of explanation for home ownership levels. 
They are: 
(a) consumer choice: in which there is a strong consumer preference for owner-
occupation; 
(b) producer choice: in which the real choice that can be exercised by consumers is 
constrained by conditioning they have received at the hands ofproducers; 
(c) housing policy: in which crucial choices are made not by consumers or 
producers but by politicians and other public policy makers, not necessarily in a 
conspirational manner; and 
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(d) a systemic explanation: in which the housing system has developed into a state 
where owner-occupation is the optimal solution to the functional requirement 
of satisfying the housing needs of the population. 
Ruonavaara also mentions the possibility that explanations may vary over 
time. For example, the factors behind owner-occupation growth in the 1950s could 
be different from those behind the rise in the 1970s. 
In shor t , e x p l a n a t i o n s o n the g r o w t h o f h o m e o w n e r s h i p h a v e l a rge ly b e e n 
a r o u n d t h r e e i s sues : c o n s u m e r s ' g a i n s in b e c o m i n g h o m e o w n e r s , t h e r o l e s o f 
government in promoting home ownership and the way of producers in supplying 
owner-occupied housing. As the last one will be discussed in later chapters, the 
following section will only look at how the first two can be applied to explain the 
growth of home ownership in Hong Kong. 
Consumers，gain in becoming home owners 
To become an owner-occupier, a person can acquire psychological and economic 
benefits. In regard to the psychological value to owners, Saunders (1990, p.280) 
points out that the property rights associated with owner-occupation provide 
people with a degree of control over their homes that can never be matched by 
rental arrangement no matter how enlightened they may be. The increase in control 
then contributes in turn to a more general sense of control over important life 
events. Thus, owning a home will enhance self-worth. Seen in this context, 
Saunders even suggests, ‘home ownership is one expression of the search for 
ontological security, for a home of one's own offers both a physical (hence 
spatially rooted) and permanent (hence temporally rooted) location in the world， 
(p.293). In the same vein, Marcus (1987，p.251) suggests, ‘home ownership is so 
widely favoured, because, at a quite deep psychological level, it is a means by 
which individuals seek to overcome a sense of alienation in their lives as a whole’. 
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However, in Hong Kong, the Chinese demand for housing differs 
considerably from that of the westerner. Traditionally, Chinese people take 
housing and land as an important heritage or property. Housing has thus played an 
important role both socially and culturally for the Chinese families. But, 
Goodstadt (1969, p.259) finds that the Chinese in Hong Kong do not seem to attach 
a very high priority to living in accommodation o f a standard that westerners would 
consider as essential for health and comfort. This attitude to housing, to some 
extent, merely reflects the general problem of finding decent accommodation of 
western standard in Hoiig Kong. Nevertheless, it is true to say that the Chinese 
people spend a large part of their day outside their home. Chinese social life is 
carried on largely in restaurants where Chinese entertainment for guests is taken 
place. It is not usual for any but the closest friends of Chinese to be invited to the 
home for entertainment. For this reason, the Chinese home does not provide the 
same opportunities for prestige as does that of the westerner (Topley 1969, p.l95). 
Furthermore, in early days, two Hong Kong-based academics, Drakakis-
Smith and Dwyer claimed that Hong Kong citizens had no incentive to spend on 
housing. Drakakis-Smith (1971, p.l25) believed that it was the result of both 
political uncertainty and past experiences in China and Hong Kong (the local 1967 
riot and the Chinese socialist government). Dwyer was even more pessimistic? He 
found that people in 1960s were too poor to buy, not to mention that they were too 
poor to pay the minimum rent for a private housing unit. He estimated that rapid 
population growth would make three-quarters of the families in Hong Kong into 
the poverty trap in 1968 despite Hong Kong's prosperity (Dwyer 1975, p.155-156). 
Today, both Dwyer's economic pessimism and Drakakis-Smith's concern 
about political uncertainty and lack of investment incentive have proven to be 
inappropriate. Hence, it is obvious that people in Hong Kong sought home 
ownership is not for the fulfilment of their psychological well-being. Rather it is 
the investment value that attracts people to be home owners. 
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Table 2.3 Domestic savings rate of selected Asian economies. 
Gross domestic savings as percentage of GDP 
1993 m4 1995 
Hong Kong* 3 4 5 ~ \ TTo 
Singapore 48.5 51.3 55.6 
China 41.5 41.4 42.2 
Malaysia 35.4 37.6 37.2 
South Korea 35.4 35.5 37.0 
Indonesia 35.3 35.3 36.0 
Thailand 35.0 35.2 34.2 
Taiwan 27.0 25.8 26.3 
Philippines \ 3 ^ [ ^ 14.7 
* estimates by Hongkong Bank. 
Source: Hongkong Bank (1997). 
Traditionally, Hong Kong has high domestic savings rate. Table 2.3 shows 
that Hong Kong's savings rate, expressed as a percentage of GDP, averaged around 
33 per cent in 1993-95, and during the ten years to 1996, it was averaged as high as 
35 per cent (Hongkong Bank 1997). Also, Hong Kong people experienced a major 
income growth. The annual average growth of income per head was over 5.5 per 
cent in the period of 1970-95 {Express News, 3 September 1997). As described 
earlier, the growth of property prices has been rapid and continuous since 1970s. 
Hence, home purchase comes to constitute an investment strategy as a defensive 
mechanism to prevent home buyers' earnings and savings being eroded by soaring 
property prices. Furthermore, Hong Kong lacks a well-established bond market 
that can provide an option for investors to have a less risky and stable return of 
investment. Under these circumstances, property also acts as a substitute for 
bonds. A significant proportion of home buyers therefore decide to purchase their 
properties more on the grounds of protecting themselves from being further 
jeopardised by market buoyancy than that o f a search for 'ontological security'. 
Thus, in buying property, Hong Kong people are concerned more with potential 
price increases and re-sale values than housing qualities. It is, therefore, a security 
mainly in the economic sense of the term (Lui, T-L. 1995, p.l22). Moreover, 
throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, the mortgage interest rates have been kept at 
low levels. This was achieved by the HK-US dollars liiiked-exchange rate system 
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and the fierce competition among banks. When house price inflates, the real value 
of the mortgage debt falls over time with inflation. As a result, home owners have 
been able to finance an appreciating asset with a depreciating debt. In this climate, 
'a family may gain more from the housing market in a few years than would be 
possible in savings from a lifetime of earning' (Pahl 1975, p.291). The 
attractiveness ofhousing as an investment is further exacerbated by the fears about 
its future affordability. In plain language, people buy houses because it may be 
‘their last chance to buy’. They fear that, with continued housing price inflation, 
they soon will be priced out of the market. Thus, the potential increase in the value 
of a house gears to the rapid escalation of demand for owner-occupied housing in 
Hong Kong. 
On the other hand, it is true to say that the capital gains associated with 
home ownership are illusory, or merely paper gains. Kemeny (1981) argues, for 
example, that '... the capital gains made in owner-occupied housing do not 
generally accrue to anyone: they are simply passed from one owner to another' 
(p.37). Ball (1983) also casts doubt on the accessibility of the capital accumulated 
in the owner-occupied housing stock by arguing in effect that they are not 
realisable gains. Only by trading down (i.e., owners move and buy a cheaper house 
without themselves incurring any mortgage debt) or by opting out of ownership 
can these gains be realised. However, Hays (1993) points out that if one looks at 
home ownership from the perspective of households operating in the context of 
markets in which it is already the dominant choice, like that in the United States, 
Australia and Hong Kong, capital accumulation still affords important advantages 
over renting. 
Recently, housing inheritance has been promoted as an another form of 
capital gain in being a home owner. Munroe's (1988) research, for example, 
confirms that substantial sums of money are indeed passed within families as the 
result of an inter-generational transfer of housing wealth. However, the growth of 
home ownership in Hong Kong lags behind that of most western countries. But 
given the age distribution of home owners and the rapid increase in home owning 
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among middle aged people in 1990s, they do not rule out the possibility that there 
may be a greater degree of filtering down in the future. For example, other things 
being equal, new wealth will be enjoyed by the beneficiaries of at least a half 
million households over the next 30 years，。. 
However, a study of the 'Indicators of Social Development' in 1992 cast 
doubt on the beliefthat there is a strong desire for home ownership in Hong Kong. 
Lee, J. (1992, p.59) found that not all Hong Kong people gambled their money in 
property. Only 12.6 per cent of respondents reported that their prime motivation to 
buy houses was for investment and financial security. A majority (42.5%) opted 
for home ownership because that was the only way to meet their housing needs. 
Thus, the findings suggested that there was a possibility that high motivation for 
owner-occupation might be a result of limited housing alternatives. In such 
context, the following section examines the role of Hong Kong government in 
promoting home ownership and compares its performance with other countries. 
The role ofgovernment in promoting home ownership^^ 
In most countries, the supply of o w n e r - o c c u p i e d housing has been deliberately 
stimulated by government policies. Part of the motivation for these policies can 
be attributed to the notion of giving the electorate what it wants. But home 
ownership has also become a key element in Keynesian macroeconomic policy. 
The labour-intensive nature of residential construction, together with the multiplier 
effects of house construction, transportation and domestic equipment, makes it an 
effective mechanism through which the economy can be regulated and stimulated. 
20 According to the report of the 1996 Population By-census (Census & Statistics Department, 
1997b), 824,184 households were home owners. 
21 The meaning of government can be distinguished from that of the state. The term 'state， 
generally refers to a set ofphenomena that are more inclusive than government. The state includes 
institutionalised authority, laws and patterns of domination, including those resting on force, 
politically manipulated incentives and reigning ideas. Benjamin and Duvall define the state as ‘the 
enduring structure of governance and rules in society' (1985, p.25). Defined in this way, the state 
does not ‘do’ anything in the standard sense. The state is not an agent or actor — governments are 
(Wendt & Duvall 1989). 'Government', on the other hand, refers to agents, differentiated 
organisations and rules that are embedded in the state. 
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Political and social stabilisation have also been a major motive for government 
intervention in promoting home ownership. As our Chief Executive observes, 
Owning one's home ... is crucial for nurturing a sense of belonging 
and maintaining social stability. Housing cost also has a strong 
bearing on the economic vitality of Hong Kong (HKSAR 
Government 1997a, p.l5). 
In sponsoring home ownership, Kemeiiy (1981, p.71-75) and Martens 
(1988, p.95) identify the role of governments can be divided into three main 
categories: long-term legislative facilitation of home ownership, the provision of 
financial benefits for home owners and the direct funding of building for home 
ownership. 
(a) Long-term legislative facilitation of home ownership: Here is a stream of 
legislative activity designed solely to foster the growth and security of a home 
ownership finance market. This was particularly marked in the first half of the 
twentieth century. In this period, governments had spent a considerable effort 
to enhance the conditions for mass home ownership by the development of the 
financial infrastructure to provide loans to households. The most notable 
elements of this infrastructure included the setting up of state saving banks 
specifically for the finance ofhome ownership (most notably the State Savings 
Banks in Australia), guaranteeing loans by specific finance institutions to 
low-income earners (the USA), encouraging the growth of building societies 
(the UK), and directly financing loans for target groups of middle-income 
households (Singapore). 
(b) Provision of financial benefits for home owners: Here is a series of taxation 
policies, a kind of 'subject subsidies' (Oxley 1987, p.l66), to reduce the costs 
of borrowing for home owners. In Britain, for example, interest payments on 
all personal borrowing were exempt from taxation until 1969, when the relief 
was abolished with the exception of housing loans (Martens 1988, p.99). 
Similarly in the United States, the tax code allows home owners to deduct their 
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mortgage interest and their local property taxes from the federal taxes^^ Apart 
from the United States, unlimited reliefs on mortgage interest payments also 
exist for home owners in Denmark, France, Japan, Singapore^^ and The 
Netherlands. Indeed, direct subsidies to owner-occupation have played a major 
role in the expansion of home ownership in many advanced countries. 
(c) Direct funding of building for home ownership: This includes production 
subsidies or ‘object subsidy' (Oxley 1987, p.l67) for owner-occupied house 
building, or the government construction of the dwellings itself. Production 
subsidies generally take the form of capital grants or premises, either lump 
sums or with payments spread over a number of years, or of below market 
interest payments for mortgage loans (or even a combination of the two as 
occurred in France; Martens 1988，p.98). In many cases, object subsidies come 
with specified criteria restricting the price, type or size of the dwelling, or the 
type of consumer. But, in Singapore, the major means of sponsoring home 
ownership is direct government building. The direct massive provision of 
owner-occupied flats by the Housing and Development Board, a state-owned 
housing provider, has played a decisive role in the remarkable achievement of 
the extraordinary high home ownership rate in S i n g a p o r e � < (79% in 1991, see 
Table 2.2). 
However, the above strategies to promote home ownership represent only 
one aspect ofpackage. Kemeny (1981, p.76-78) identifies another major tool that 
can maximise the effectiveness of subsidies in moving households into home 
ownership is the stigmatising of public renting. For instance, governments in 
Australia and the United States build low quality and relatively unattractive public 
22 In fact, in 1990, the cost of the direct supply to the federal government in uncollected taxes of 
home owners was estimated at US $78.4 billion, in contrast to $ 18.3 billion in direct outlays for low 
income housing assistance (Hays 1994, p.300). 
23 For example, in Singapore, property tax is payable on properties on the basis o f ' annua l value', 
that is, their annual rental for properties. 36% was levied on urban premises in 1978, but 23% on 
owner-occupied residential premises in order to encourage home ownership. This tax was reduced 
to 23% in 1983 and 1984. Since 1 July 1990，property tax has been adjusted to 16%, while 
owner-occupied dwellings have been taxed at a concessionary rate of 4% (Zhu 1997, footnote 2). 
24 In fact, the Housing and Development Board provided 85% of total owner-occupied housing 
units in the early 1990s (Chau, B.H. 1991,p.26). 
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housing units, and apply harsh means-testing to select the poorest of the poor. 
Thus, the limited access to public renting by those who can afford other tenures is 
clearly aimed at preventing public renting from becoming a competitive alternative 
to home ownership. 
Furthermore, in expanding home ownership opportunities for low-income 
people, nearly all governments in western countries have tried to sell off public 
housing stock into owner-occupation at discount prices and with cheap finance. A 
typical example is Britain. Between 1980 and 1991, there was an 11 per cent 
increase in the proportion of dwellings that were owner-occupied ——57.4 per cent 
in 1980 to 69.1 per cent in 199l ' ' (McLaverty & Yip 1994, Table 1). Much of the 
increase in owner-occupation was due to council tenants buying their council 
dwellings under the provisions ofthe right-to-buy scheme introduced in 1980. The 
discounts offered initially were up to a maximum of 50 per cent of the market value 
of the council dwellings, later they were increased to a maximum of60 per cent for 
a council house and 70 per cent for a council flat (Forrest & Murie 1988). As a 
result, around 1.3 million council dwellings were sold in England over the above 
period, of which more than 1.1 million were sold to sitting tenants. Thus, the 
public housing sales policy has been a significant effect to move households out of 
public renting and into home ownership. 
In sum, the growth of home ownership in Australia, Singapore, Western 
Europe and the United States has been the consequence of major government 
intervention. However, when compared with commitment to the extension of 
home ownership, the Hong Kong government's performance is limited. Hong 
Kong has no tax advantages of home ownership. The major incentive helping to 
shape owner-occupied housing markets is tax exemptions on capital gains made on 
house sales by individual home owners. The direct involvement in the promotion 
ofliome ownership only started in the mid-1970s. 
25 The dramatic increase of home ownership rate was also due to the decline of public rental sector 
through reducing or halting new building for public rental, and demolishing units in public sector. 
For example, in 1981, 118,000 publicly owned dwellings were sold, but only 66,000 new public 
dwellings were constructed (Forrest & Williams 1984，p.l 171). 
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Table 2.4 The percentage distribution of domest ic households by monthly household 
income, 1971，1976and 1981. 
Monthly household income 1971* 1976* l9Sl 
(HK$) W W (%) 
under 1,000 W 4 FT1 ^ 
1 ,000- 1,999 43.4 32.6 19.0 
2 ,000 - 2,999 19.1 23.7 22.3 
3,000 - 4 ,999 10.3 18.0 26.2 
5,000 - 6,999 2.9 6.5 11.2 
7,000 - 9 ,999 2.1 3.0 6.4 
10,000 and over j J ^ 5.4 
Median income (HK$) 1,600 2,132 2,955 
* at 1981 prices 
Source: Census and Statistics Department (1982). 
Since 1973, the Hong Kong economy had undergone spectacular growth. 
The level of household income was increasing. Discounting the increases in 
consumer prices, the median household income rose by 33 per cent from 1971 to 
1976, and by 39 per cent from 1976 to 1981, giving real income growth at annual 
rates of 5.4 per cent and 7.4 per cent for the respective periods (Table 2.4). The 
general increase in income among a greater proportion of the population resulted in 
a greater urge for improvements in housing quality and for home ownership. The 
strong demand was also sustained by the change of the demographic structure. 
Since the 1970s, the proportion of the population aged 25 and 44, the marrying age, 
increased steadily from 23 per cent in 1971 to 27.4 per cent in 1981 (Table 2.5). 
The strong aspirations of this group to home ownership generated a firm demand 
for residential property. Thus, in addition to the provision ofbasic shelters to those 
with housing need:(), the Hong Kong government introduced new measures to cope 
with the changing needs and the housing demands of the growing number of these 
new middle-income households. 
26 The social concept of 'housing need’ has to be distinguished from the economic concept of 
'housing demand’. 'Housing need' refers to the inadequacy of provision of accommodation when 
compared with a socially acceptable norm. It takes no account of ability to pay. 'Housing demand’ 
relates to the accommodation for which people are able and willing to pay. Households that 
represent effective demand for housing may or may not be in need ofhousing from a social point of 
view. On the other hand, households living in overcrowding housing units represent a housing 
need, but i f they do not have the ability to pay the price, they do not represent housing demand. 
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Table 2.5 Percentage distribution of population by age, 1961-96. 
Age group 1961 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 
under 15 4 0 l J H 3 0 l 2 4 ^ ~ \ 2 0 ^ 18.5 
15-24 11.8 19.4 22.0 23.0 18.8 15.2 14.0 
25-44 30.5 23.0 23.9 27.4 32.3 38.5 38.1 
45-64 14.1 17.3 18.5 18.2 18.2 17.7 19.3 
65 and over 2.8 4.5 5.5 6.6 7.6 8.7 10.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Median Age 
23.2 21.7 23.9 26.0 28.6 31.5 34.0 
Sources: 1. 1961-86: Census and Statistics Department(1986) Table 6. 
2. 1991-96: Census and Statistics Department (1997b) Table 3. 
In 1978, the Home Ownership Scheme (HOS) was introduced whereby 
flats for sale were built by the Government for purchases by families from the 
private sector with incomes not exceeding $3,500 per month. However, preference 
was given to households already living in public rental housing (PRH). This 
preference was aimed at encouraging those whose income had improved to vacant 
rented units, thus releasing units for lower-income households in need. Later, the 
Private Sector Participation Scheme (PSPS) was introduced in the same year as a 
supplement to the HOS. Under this scheme, sites are offered for sale to property 
developers on the condition that the flats produced are sold at a fixed price to 
purchasers nominated by the Government. Then, in 1980, the Middle-income 
Housing Scheme was introduced for families with incomes between $5,000 and 
$10,000 per month. This scheme was as an extension ofPSPS but in 1982, it was 
discontinued since market conditions had returned to a level in which such housing 
could be supplied by private developers at affordable prices. So, during the late 
1970s to mid-1980s, the Government's contribution to home ownership was 
confined to direct provision of owner-occupied housing. It was not until 1987, the 
announcement of the Long Term Housing Strategy (LTHS), covering the years 
between 1985 and 2001, that home ownership has been placed major emphasis. 
LTHS has both expanded existing home purchase assistance schemes and 
introduced new ones to boost home ownership. The Home Purchase Loan Scheme 
(HPLS) was introduced in 1988 to families who meet the income and other criteria 
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for the purchase ofHOS/PSPS flats to have an alternative of an interest-free down 
payment loan for the purchase ofa new private flat. Unfortunately, the scheme was 
introduced at a time when the housing price was escalating fast, rendering the loan 
insufficient for paying the down payment and other initial costs. Given the 
apparent failure ofthe HPLS, another home ownership scheme, the Sale ofFlats to 
Sitting Tenants was proposed in October 1990 to attract public tenants to be home 
owners. However, the scheme failed due to the high selling prices??. 
So far, the home purchase assistance schemes were intended only to help 
better-off tenants of PRH estates and the lower-middle-income households in the 
general public. But, starting from 1993, the assistance extended to the so-called 
‘sandwich class，，that is, families whose income exceeds the income limits for 
home purchase subsidy schemes but is insufficient for the purchase of private 
housing. The new Sandwich Class Housing Scheme (SCHS) comprises an interim 
loan scheme28 and a main scheme, ln the main scheme, the Hong Kong Housing 
Society, an independent and non-profit making organisation, is delegated to build 
SCHS flats for sale. 
In the recent review of the LTHS (Hong Kong Government 1997a), 
covering the years between 1995 and 2006, new strategies were proposed to widen 
the access to home ownership. Two of them could exert significant impact on the 
growth ofhome ownership among PRH tenants. The first one was the introduction 
of means-test to the child of a deceased tenant who wanted to inherit the tenancy. 
The second one was to increase the median rent-to-income ratios to 15 per cent and 
18.5 per cent for different classes of estates^^ These two strategies would limit the 
security of tenure and make PRH less attractive than owning and in a way compel 
sitting tenants to buy flats. 
27 The Sale of Flats to Sitting Tenants was first proposed to sell off 7 5-years old estates as a trial 
scheme in late 199 丨 .This pilot scheme was failed and revised. Concessions on the sale price were 
made by reducing the price from 40% to 20-30% of the market price. However, the revised 
proposal was vetoed by the Executive Council as the selling price was too low {Ming Pao, 25 March 
1993). 
28 Up to March 1997, there were totally 22,500 loans granted to families buying their own homes 
through the HPLS and SCHS loan schemes (Hong Kong Housing Bureau 1997, p.l7). 
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Apparently, Hong Kong government aims at achieving a high rate ofhome 
ownership with a minimum government intervention. Most of the housing policies 
in promoting home ownership target at encouraging PRH tenants to become 
assisted home owners. It is not surprising that the increase in home ownership rate 
among public housing residents was impressive, rising from 8 per cent in 1985 to 
16 per cent in 1990 and to 23 per cent in 1995 (HKHA 1996a). But, the overall 
home ownership rate in 1996 was below 50 per cent (see Fig. 2.2) that failed to 
achieve the LTHS's target 一 60 per cent by 1997. Indeed, Hong Kong in the last 
two decades has relied heavily on private sector to provide affordable owner-
occupied housing. The consequence of such a policy has resulted in the private 
housing market being given the greatest boost in its development. 
Conclusion 
From the preceding discussion, it can be seen that Hong Kong stands in stark 
contrast to other countries in its housing market performance and its growth of 
home ownership. While the housing markets in the western world suffer from 
problems centring around falling price and demand, Hong Kong housing price is 
ever-spiralling upwards. Such performance is the end-product of the interplay of a 
host of factors: an increasing population, fast economic growth, the simple 
property market structure and the Government's housing policies. With the 
population becoming richer and its easy access to mortgage finance, the escalating 
housing prices cause significant changes in people's aspirations and attitudes 
towards housing. Hong Kong people now place more importance on the 
investment value rather than the ‘use value’ of the flats, ln other words, it is the 
strong desire for property ownership rather than home ownership that boosts the 
home ownership rate in Hong Kong. 
Although Hong Kong government has expanding its commitment to assist 
lower-middle- and middle- income households in becoming home owners, there is 
29 However, the Housing (Amendment) Ordinance was enacted by the former Legislative Council 
on 28 June 1997, which keeps rent rises to no more than 10% of the median household income. 
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some doubt about such assistance schemes can further increase the home 
ownership rate at the existing level of housing price. Given the limited access to 
assisted owner-occupation and public housing, a majority of households have to 
seek their accommodations iii the private housing market. As Hong Kong's policy 
011 home ownership is by its nature inclined to minimum intervention, a large 
number of households, particularly the newly forming households, are unable to 
meet their housing needs. In such context. Hong Kong people often put the blame 
ofinaccessibility to home ownership on developers who are believed to be capable 
of exerting a decisive influence on house prices and supply. Before addressing this 
issue, it is necessary to fiiid out how property developers provide owner-occupied 
housing in Hong Kong. The next chapter will examine how the production of 
owner-occupied housing has been approached by researchers. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
STUDYING HOUSING PROVISION 
The significance of domestic property ownership in recent years has been the 
subject of widespread academic debate and political concern. In academic circles, 
many analyses of owner-occupied housing concentrate almost entirely on the 
consumption effects of housing. Their emphasis is not surprising because when 
looking at home ownership, the most obvious place to start is where the problems 
look most pressing and where they seem open to remedial action by the 
government. The most pressing housing problems concern the accessibility and 
affordability of home ownership. Yet, presenting housing problems in this way 
leads to the specification of a particular approach to looking at them. Ball (1983, 
p.l3) labels this approach as 'the consumption-orientated approach to housing'. In 
this approach, there are two basic conceptual categories, households and the state; 
households have limited means by which to satisfy their housing needs, and the 
state has the power and the means to deny or satisfy those needs via its housing 
policies. The linkage between these two conceptual pillars is therefore the effect of 
state policies on households' consumption ofhousing. Housing provision, in this 
sense, is seen essentially as a distributional issue. 
A ‘demand-side，approach to understanding the origins of housing tenure 
assumes there is a symmetrical relationship between producers and consumers of 
housing. In a market situation, the relationship between producers and consumers 
is a reciprocal one (neither can function without the other), and both sides of the 
‘market，influence the actual outcome. But it should be emphasised that housing is 
structured in specific ways by the requirements of or constraints upon those agents 
and institutions concerned with the supply of housing, rather than the product of 
consumer choice or demand. This means that the key decisions about what form of 
housing is produced, where and for whom lie with housing producers 一 builders, 
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developers, landlords, financial intermediaries, housing departments, policy-
makers, etc. — and not housing consumers. In other words, an understanding of 
housing provision should start with housing production, not housing consumption. 
ln this chapter, attempts will be made to clarify the different perspectives 
adopted by the 'supply-side' approach of housing in the mainstream literature. It 
first reviews the approaches of neo-classical economics, classical Marxism and 
urban political economy. This is followed by an illustration of an alternative 
approach that goes beyond Marxian political economy. Finally, it will explain how 
'Structure ofHousing Provision' (SHP) thesis in providing an important theoretical 
construct for examining the political economy of housing provision. 
Neo-classical economics 
Put at its simplest terms, neo-classical economics views society as a collection of 
individuals whose nature is assumed to be given. The realisation of individual 
preference shapes the form of the economy and the nature of society. Put in an 
over-simplified fashion, neo-classical economics considers two sectors: 
households and firms. Households demand goods and services in the amounts and 
proportion that best satisfy their preferences, that is, they attempt to maximise their 
utility (or satisfaction). Firms supply goods and demand land, labour and capital in 
the amounts and proportion that maximise their factors of production — land, 
labour and capital. According to the marginal productivity theory, each of the three 
factors will be used until the cost is greater than the value they produce. The price 
of any factor is determined at the margin. Under equilibrium conditions, each of 
the factors will be paid according to their contribution to output. 
Regarding the housing market, Maclennan (1982, p.36-37) identifies nine 
assumptions that neo-classical economists use: 
(a) There are many buyers and sellers. 
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(b) In relation to the aggregate volume of transactions, the sales or purchases of 
each household are insignificant. 
(c) There is no collusion amongst or between buyers and sellers. 
(d) There is free entry into and exit from the market for both consumers and 
producers. 
(e) Consumers have continuous, transitive and established preferences over a wide 
range of alternative choices of housing and non-housing goods. 
(t) Consumers and producers possess both perfect knowledge with respect to 
prevailing prices and current bids and perfect foresight with respect to future 
prices and future bids. 
(g) Consumers maximise total utility whilst producers maximise total profits. 
(h) There are no artificial (non-price) restrictions placed on the demands for 
suppliers and prices of housing service and the resources used to produce 
housing service. 
(i) The market is assumed to be in equilibrium. 
As a consequence of this framework and the particular emphasis on 
equilibrium conditions, neo-classical economists analyse the relative success and 
failure in providing housing based on economic calculation, with emphasis placed 
011 efficiency and choice. As traditional economists normally view 'the market, as 
natural, pre-given and essentially unchanging and quite distinct from the rest of 
society, the invisible hand of the price mechanism — if left to itself — will 
efficiently and effortlessly organise production and exchange. 
In an econometric study of the United Kingdom housing market, 
Whitehead (1974, p.59-60) argues that the housing market is inherently 
imperfect. However, she suggests that it is difficult to measure the nature and 
extent of such imperfections because purchasers routinely trade off different 
attributes of dwellings, such as size, type, location and price. She also points out 
that the supply of housing cannot increase rapidly because new building is usually 
only a small proportion ofthe total dwelling stock. Hence there are lags, especially 
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ill supply. Finally, she reminds economists that governments intervene in housing 
markets in many ways, and that this should be taken into account when analysing 
housing. 
Furthermore, Le Grand (1991, quoted in Barlow & Duncan 1994, p.24) 
finds that markets will normally be inefficient in three ways. First, 'production 
efficiency', where the production ofacommodity at the minimum possible cost, is 
unlikely to be achieved and resources will be wasted. Second, 'allocative 
efficiency', where consumer wants are met as effectively as possible, will not be 
reached. Third, it is highly unlikely that 'dynamic efficiency', where firms and 
economies plan, innovate and develop for the maximum efficiency over the long 
term, can ever be possible in free market systems. Markets will be sub-optimal, 
and firms will survive through economic sense, hence, they are unlikely to be 
socially efficient in a wide social sense. For all these reasons, government 
intervention has been historically necessary to make markets work better. 
The conventional economic approach is, therefore, unlikely to reflect the 
realities of housing provision. Conventional economics see a given, optimising 
and distinct market, but the reality is one of socially created, sub-optimal market 
institutions that are supported and maintained by organisational structures 
including government action. The best housing economists, such as Whitehead 
and Maclennan, are well aware of the limitations of neo-classical economists, and 
continually remind readers that economic analysis can only give a partial account 
of how consumers and producers actually behave in housing markets. 
Classical Marxism 
In essence, Marx's theory is to explain the casual mechanisms that generate ,,the 
structures ofdifferent modes ofproduction and the capitalist mode of production in 
particular. These casual mechanisms are explored in terms of the interactions 
between certain theoretical entities that are themselves not directly observable 
(Basset&Short 1980, p.l59). 
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In focusing on the economic structure ofsociety, Marx rejects any approach 
that pictured individuals with given needs and preferences interacting only through 
the anonymous mechanisms ofbuying and selling in the market place. For Marx, 
human needs and preferences are historically contingent and cannot be given 
independently o f the social and economic structure that shapes them. There are no 
objectively given economic laws that define relations between things 
(commodities, capital and labour, etc.) independent of the historically defined 
social relations that underlie them. 
According to Marx, a capitalist economy is not so much a mechanism for 
maximising the private welfare of individuals generally as it is a means of 
facilitating the capitalist's appropriation of surplus-value and accumulation of 
capital. Using Marx's well-known formulas, Marx distinguishes capitalism 
instituting two relationships between production and consumption. The first one is 
the simple circulation of commodities, that is，an individual owns his or her 
labouring capacity but wants to buy housing, food and clothing; he or she sells 
labour (power) for a wage (money) and buys the things needed with it. 
C (labouring capacity) — M (wages iii form of money) — C (means of consumpt ion) 
The second circuit reverses the terms of commodity circulation as 
previously stated. This reversal characterises the circuit of capital: 
M ~> C — M ' 
Unlike the circulation of commodities, the circuit of capital has money rather than 
useful things as its objective. The capitalist advances money (M) in the hope and 
expectation that his or her investment (capital) will return to him or her with a 
profit (M' - M), which Marx terms the ‘surplus-value，. For Marx, then, the market 
has two purposes to serve in a capitalist setting. It provides a mechanism for 
circulating commodities so that these commodities can find their way into the 
hands of those who need them (C - M - C); and it provides a mechanism for using 
money to make money or accumulating capital (M - C - M'). 
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ln the process of capital accumulation, a definite mode of production is 
constituted out of a totality of relations of production. These relations of 
production correspond to the social positions in which individuals find themselves 
in the economy. At the simplest level of exposition, Marx identifies two social 
positions, or social classes, according to the condition of owning or not owning 
means of production, that is, the capitalists and the workers respectively. In other 
words, each mode of production is characterised by a dominant class using the 
means of production and ruling through the wealth and power that such ownership 
entails. In such context, the relations of production are ultimately class relations. 
In fact, the concept of class is central to Marxian theory. 
For the role of the state, Marxists regard it as an instrument to help create 
the economic conditions for accumulation, and define and defend a social order 
including a set of 'riiles of the game’ for the pursuit of private interest. Within 
these rules, the interests of the dominant class are protected. As Marxists view 
housing as a commodity and a source of surplus value for a particular sector of 
industrial capital, Marxian housing analysts reconstitute the links between 
households and the state in housing provision. For instance, Engels rejects the 
notion that the provision of owner-occupied housing for the working class is to 
give workers economic independence and a stake in society, and ultimately 
promote social stability. Instead, Engels argues that home ownership would tie 
workers more firmly to particular factories and employers and reduce their 
bargaining strength, also the resulting lower housing costs would simply mean 
lower wages being paid by capitalists (Engels 1970, cited in Bassett & Short 1980, 
p.l67). The state, who acts 'on the behalf of the capitalist class, promotes home 
ownership, in one way helps to reproduce a stable capitalist society by encouraging 
conformity and respect for authority, the another way reduces the cost of 
reproducing a labour force. Thus, in essence, the Marxist researchers ignore the 
role of state intervention. They tend only to question the functions of state 
involvement in housing rather than criticising the means through which il is 
undertaken (Ball 1988,p.21). 
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Urban political economy 
While the 1960s saw a spate of interest in Marxism, the assumption that economic 
society is polarised into separate classes was under serious attack. During the 
1970s, a new perspective emerged in urban studies that has come to be recognised 
generally as political economy. 
Although the term political economy may have its origins in structural 
Marxism, it has come to have a much broader application. Many scholars whose 
works were originated from the critics of Marxist capitalism have become the 
mainstay of this new perspective. At the same time, many of those who in the 
1970s operated within the Marxist paradigm have moved away from it during the 
1980s, their work becoming a broadly derived mix of Marxist and non-Marxist 
elements. Consequently, political economy continues to refer to the work of 
Marxists. This has led to some confusion, especially for critics, as to precisely 
what is and what is not political economy and how it relates to Marxism. 
The assumption that unites political economists in their approach to urban 
studies is the idea that the urban arena is a physical extension of market factors 
supplemented by government policy (the state). Political economy often also 
extends to consideration ofother political forces in the city, including coalitions of 
influential elites and the collective actions ofother citizens. Although it is difficult, 
given the diversity contained within the perspective', Ilchman and Uphoff (1969) 
briefly summarised it: 
Political economy may be described as the analysis of the 
consequences of political choices that statesmen {sic) and other 
persons make involving the polity's scarce resources. The political 
economist wants to know, ‘Given the resources ofthe regime, now or 
potentially, what political choices are possible and what might be 
their cumulative effects' (p.26-27). 
The study ofpolitical economy is as relevant to the choices made by 
revolutionaries as it is to those made by authorities, as relevant to the 
‘In the book of Theories ofPolitical Economy, Caporaso and Levine(1992) identifies 8 approaches 
to political economy. They are: classical, Marxian, neo-classical, I<,eynesian, economic, power-
centred, state-centred and justice-centred. 
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choices made by various sectors of the population as it is to those 
made by the government itsell; as relevant to choices aiming at 
political chaos as it is to those that seek to achieve political stability 
(p .29) . 
Applied to urban studies, political economy guides researchers to ask 
questions about the ways in which policy has articulated with economic forces to 
produce particular kinds of urban environments, with particular costs and benefits 
for different elements ofthe urban population, eliciting particular popular reactions 
from citizens. In general, it is an invitation to extend the use of broader ideas to 
examine the dominant political and economic structures of society (Flanagan 
1993). Also, it recognizes the role of supply-side factors in contributing to 
metropolitan development (Gottdiener 1994). 
Although the body of work that may be included within the political 
economy perspective is today undergoing challenges and revisions, it has come to 
constitute a major paradigm in housing research since 1980s. The following 
sections present an overview of the development of the political economy 
paradigm within housing, particularly its emphasis on housing provision. The 
review is roughly chronological, beginning with adaptations of Marxist theory, 
followed by an account of the movement away from Marxist ideas that have 
characterised the more recent work. 
Harvey 's capital switching model 
In explaining the dominance of investment within the built environment% 
undoubtedly, the most famous work among the Marxian political economists, is 
Harvey's capital switching model. The roots ofHarvey's works can be traced to 
Henri Lefebvre (Harvey 1973, p.312-313; Soja 1989, p.94-102; Gottdiener 1994, 
p.183-194), who made a distinction between 'the real estate sector’ (speculation, 
construction and real estate development) and 'the industrial sector’ (production), 
2 The built environment comprises all buildings, structures, and land forms that have been created 
for human use and appreciation. 
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and suggested that, in times of economic crisis, capital flows into the real estate 
sector. He also proposed a thesis that the real estate sector has supplanted the 
industrial sector in importance (Lefebvre 1972, quoted in Haila 1991, p.346). 
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Figure 3.1 Harvey 's capital switching model of the primary, secondary and tertiary 
circuits o fcap i ta l . 
Sources: Harvey (1978) and (1985b). 
Harvey (1978) develops these ideas further and constructs a cyclical model 
of investment in the built environment. In Harvey's general model (Fig. 3.1), he 
recognises the tendency on the part ofiiivestors to divert funds from the production 
of commodities — the primary circuit ofcapital (the industrial sector) — when the 
profit rate falls. According to Harvey (1983, p.l2), this tendency towards over-
accumulation is invariably associated with over-production, the under-utilisation 
of plant or a downturn in consumption. 
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Harvey suggests that the logical response of investors to over-accumulation 
in the primary circuit is to switch capital into the secondary circuit of capital (the 
real estate sector) by converting the under-employed funds into capital asset such 
as factories, warehouses, shopping centres, or offices, or into the capital stock in 
which consumption is concentrated (i.e., housing and household equipment). 
Alternatively, surplus funds can also be switched into the tertiary circuit (research 
and development, skilling and re-training, social wages) as a way of improving 
future productivity or the quality of labour. 
Ill turning to a consideration of the timing and spatial patterning of 
investment in the built environment, Harvey (1981, p.96-97) finds that the state is 
an investment coordinator between the circuits of capital. It not only acts as the 
agent of the ruling class, but also the partner ofaparticular fraction of the capitalist 
class — financial capital. The role of financial institutions is essential as it ensures 
that capital flows into city building and maintains its value. However, Harvey 
(1985b) stresses that although financial intermediaries are capable of successfully 
transferring funds from the primary to the secondary circuit in the normal course of 
events, the capitalist system is inherently crisis] prone, that is, the tendency of the 
rate of profit to fall; and it is this that ultimately dictates the rhythm of investment 
in the built environment. 
Using historical data on construction activity, Harvey (ibid.) points out that 
the most significant surges of capital formation in cities tend to coincide 
historically with crises of over-accumulation and a falling profit rate in the primary 
circuit^ But once capital is switched into the secondary circuit, there is similarly 
'pervasive tendency towards overinvestment and chronic overproduction' (p.l2). 
The familiar symptoms of over-capitalisation in cities include excess residential 
3 According to Harvey (1978), crisis can take a variety of forms including ‘partial’ (restricted to a 
particular sector, region or set ofmediating institutions), 'switching' (capital re-adjusts by shifting 
between sectors, circuits or regions in pursuit of improved returns) or ‘global，(where all sectors, 
circuits and regions are likely to be affected). 
4 The hypothesis that crises ofcapitalism were preceded by the massive ofcapital into investment in 
the built environment can be supported by statistics from the US economy between 1818 and 1925. 
These show that 'the peak in land values is reached 12 to 24 months before the economic 
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and commercial construction, rising building vacancies, and declining real estate 
prices. 
In essence, Harvey accounts that the investment in the built environment is 
derived from ‘forces emanating from the primary circuit of capital' (ibid., p.24), 
and the capital switching into the secondary circuit 'appears as a godsend for the 
absorption of surplus, overaccumulated capital' (1982, p.236). His over-emphasis 
on the circuit (or capital) switching is dependent upon conditions within the 
sphere of production inevitably invites a lot of criticism. 
One main kind of criticism relates to Harvey's pre-occupation with 
economic determinants at the expense of 'political' or ‘cultural，agents of urban 
transformation (Badcock 1992，p.218). King (1989a, p.451-452) observes that. 
Although there is some emphasis oii the role ofmediating institutions 
ill determining whether capital switching will be accomplished 
relatively smoothly or alternatively in the course of a crisis, there is 
little room in the theory for the role of individual agency, non even 
for consideration of how mediating institutions came about in the 
first place. 
It is increasingly recognised that financial capital, rather than industrial 
capital, dominates within late capitalism (Beauregard 1994, p.719). For instance, 
Feagiii's (1987) study of the office-building construction in Houston, Texas in the 
1980s found that the source of development capital was not the oil industry but 
finance capital: large banks outside of Houston, Houston-based banks that served 
as conduits for local and external capital, real-estate syndicates, and foreign 
investors. This led him to conclude that the fixed-capital real-estate sector was ‘a 
major outlet for surplus capital of all types' (p.l87, emphasis added). 
Thus, in contrast to interpretations ofHarvey 's original thesis, it becomes 
apparent that the secondary sector has a distinctive dynamic that is strongly 
recession ... The peaks in the building cycle follow the peaks in land values and precede general 
economic recessions' (Harrison 1983, cited by Haila 1991, footnote 3). 
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influenced by changes in financial markets (Beauregard 1994; Fainstein 1994). 
Investment in the built environment reflects the extent to which property has both a 
use value and an exchange value. Indeed the distinction between the occupier and 
investor markets is largely based on this duality. However, this relationship is not 
static: ‘during boom periods ofthe property cycle the exchange value ofall types of 
property asserts itselfas an increasing tendency on the part of residential occupiers 
to move and of financial investors to trade，(Coakley 1994, p.699). 
In sum, the writings of Beauregard (1994), Feagin (1987), King (1989a, 
1989b, 1989c) and Haila (1991) confirm that the secondary circuit is not simply the 
‘safety valve’ of the primary circuit. In addition, these scholars suggest that 
primary-circuit capital may not switch to the secondary circuit but may seek other 
outlets: stock speculation, overseas markets, government bonds, or the tertiary 
sector. Even Harvey's later works (e.g., 1989)5 have acknowledged the social, 
political and cultural forces can influence the production of the built environment. 
The housing system 
While the urban political economists in the United States followed the Marxist 
structuralist tradition in urban studies, a group of researchers at Birmingham 
University's Centre for Urban and Regional Studies developed the concept of the 
housing system in the early 1970s. This approach in political economy had 
expanded to incorporate an ever greater emphasis on the role of the state and public 
policy. The development of this new perspective merely reflected the uniqueness 
5 In his book, The Condition of Postmodernity, rather than characterising capital switching as a 
‘safety valve’ functioning to avert capitalist crises, Harvey argues that the shift of capitalism to 
flexible accumulation and away from Fordist forms of mass production is unique in its previleging 
of the financial circuit. 'The new financial systems put into place since 1972 have changed the 
balance of forces at work in global capitalism, giving much more autonomy to the banking and 
financial system relative to corporate, state, and personal finance’ (1989, p.l64). The search for 
profitable investment opportunities outside the sphere of production, then, is not a temporary 
response to over-accumulation, but a new strategy to combattendencies to a falling rate ofprofit. In 
addition, financial circuits have become less dependent on the production sphere: 'the financial 
system has achieved a degree of autonomy from real production unprecedented in capitalism's 
history’ (p.l94). Thus, by his recognition of financial intermediaries and derivative claims of an 
autonomous secondary circuit, he establishes a case for the cyclical behaviour of construction 
investment to occur independently of conditions in the primary circuit. 
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of Britain, where governments have played a much larger direct role in housing 
provision than that in the United States or Australia. 
Murie, Niner and Watson (1976) elaborated the concept of the housing 
system in their book, Housing Policy and Housing, System, and used this idea to 
organise a subsequent program of research. Their work commenced with a series 
of studies of various aspects ofhousing; but they saw a need to place these studies 
within a systematic analytic framework, especially focusing on ‘the relationship 
between dwellings and households' (xvii, emphasis in the original). 
They proposed that housing should be conceptualised in terms o f a ‘system’ 
made up of various parts and of regular relationships and interactions between 
these constitute parts, ln the housing system, there are seven components: 
consumers, dwellings, producers, exchange professionals, financial institutions, 
investors, governments, and statutory authorities. Also, four kinds ofrelationships 
between its constituent parts can be identified: 
(a) legal relations - the legal relationships between people (or companies) and their 
rights in dwellings; 
(b) market relations - the relationships between individuals and corporate 
organisations, including governments, as buyers and sellers of housing (or 
housing services); 
(c) power relations - the relationships that exist in many forms, for example, 
between members of a household, between landlords and tenants, or between 
citizens and the state; and 
(d) social relations - the relationships between various parts in satisfying the 
‘wants' of individuals in domestic, familial and even cultural phenomena. 
Also, they emphasised that the housing system is the outcome of many 
interacting variables and relationships. In addition, they argued that the concept of 
housing system is particularly useful for the analysis of housing, 
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First, just as the different ‘parts，of the housing system are linked, 
with the emphasis falling on interrelationships, so ‘housing’ too must 
be seen within a framework of wider relationships. Housing matters 
can never be seen in isolation. Second, the importance of 
interconnections within the system emphasises the dangers of a 
situation where the major institutions of control are distinct and 
largely independent bodies, each operating in part of the system only. 
Finally, the importance of linkages helps to explain why policies 
introduced for specific purposes have side effects which are often 
unforeseen (p.249). 
Indeed, Kendig and Paris(1987), in their discussion ofhousing in Australia 
by using the concept of the housing system, find that the housing system can be 
considered as a 'secondary phenomenon' because ‘the kinds of dwellings, housing 
tenures and costs are largely influenced by wider processes of social and economic 
change, (p.9). 
However, the housing system approach has some problems (Paris 1993, 
p.31). First, it can easily become descriptive and static because it does not contain 
any assumptions or arguments, either about the development ofhousing systems or 
their likely directions of change. Second, the definition of the 'parts' of a housing 
system is essentially arbitrary. The nature of the parts and their relationships may 
vary enormously between countries and over time, and thus there are limits to the 
use of this approach for comparative analysis. Third, Murie, Niner and Watson's 
idea of the housing system had an almost exclusive focus on consumption 
(including access to and distribution) ofhousing. They had little to say about either 
housing production or investment on housing provision. Finally, they focused 
heavily on government policies, and under-emphasised the continuing importance 
of market relations within housing provision. 
In sum, the housing system approach can perhaps best be considered as a 
‘system approach' to housing. It is a non-theoretical concept because it neither 
specifies the nature of the parts nor the factors influencing relationships. But, 
despite such shortcomings, it widens the scope of study by focusing housing within 
contemporary societies. It draws our attention to a range of phenomena in 
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interaction, and requires further specification of the nature of those elements and 
that interaction. 
Kemeny 's cultural explanation in housing provision 
In using the concept of housing system, Kemeny attempts to provide a theoretical 
basis for explaining the variations in the provision of owner-occupied housing in 
western and Scandinavian countries. First, Kemeny (1981) carried out a 
comparative analysis of home ownership in Australia, Britain and Sweden. He 
focused on the different ways in which home ownership have been ‘sponsored’ by 
governments. He distinguished that Australia has a mono-tenurial housing system 
with only home ownership is the major form of housing. Sweden has a dualist 
system with equal importance of sociaf and private housing. Britain is floating 
between these two extremes. 
Later, Kemeny (1992) explained that such divergence in the means of 
housing provision is the result of the different forms of social structure in these 
countries (p.l l3). He distinguished that the United States and Australia represent 
examples of highly privatised social structures, while Sweden, The Netherlands, 
West Germany and the former state socialist societies of Eastern Europe represent 
examples of societies with varying high degrees of collectivism. In between these 
lie a large number of societies, like Britain, which combine collectivist and 
privatist elements in various proportions and which fall somewhere between these 
two forms. 
ln Sweden, a society of a high degree of collectivism, a well-developed 
welfare state is formed resulting in a highly developed collective transport based on 
a high density urban form derived from a dominance of rental and co-operative 
flats. The public and private rented sectors are integrated, with public rental 
housing being the lead element, and are allowed to compete with owner 
6 Social housing refers broadly to all housing directly subsidised by governments or institutions, but 
including conventional public housing (Bourne 1981, p.215). 
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occupation. By contrast, in Australia, there has evolved a high degree of privatism, 
as reflected in a poorly developed welfare state, low residential densities deriving 
from privatised dwelling type and housing tenure. In such context, private and 
public rented housings are distinct, and the public sector is prevented from 
competing effectively with owner occupation. This leads to a residual public sector 
centring largely for the poorest of the population. Britain represents an 
intermediate form ofsocial organisation, with a welfare state more developed than 
Australia but less so than Sweden, more social housing than Australia but less than 
Sweden, predominantly semi-detached and terraced housing rather than either 
freestanding villas as in Australia or apartments as in Sweden. Thus, it is the 
culture and political choices that are the major influences on the form of housing 
system (Kemeny 1995). 
In essence, Kemeny recognises that the means of provision — the context 
and organisation of housing tenures — is socially constructed, and can be seen in 
each country to be the product o f a specific inter-relationship of political, economic 
and ideological factors (Harloe & Martens 1984, p.266). However, Kemeny, like 
other housing analysts, has focused too much on the role of state in distribution of 
housing, thus paying insufficient attention to the ways in which it is produced. In 
addition, the emphasis on political choice leads to a tendency to exaggerate the 
extent to which political actors have a clear goal in mind. Clapman's (1995) 
analysis of the East European housing systems shows that decisions have often 
been made primarily for pragmatic, short-term reasons such as the desire to control 
state expenditures (p.693). Also, Ball (1982) comments that, 
Kemeny sees tenures as immutable in terms oftheir finance and their 
effects. Yet tenure is only an aspect ofthe social relations in forms of 
housing provision. Distinct types of finance, construction and land 
acquisition, for example, are found associated with different tenures 
and these combinations vary between countries. Moreover, the place 
of these tenure-related forms of provision within the wider social 
structure varies over time and also between countries. Surely, such 
developments and inter-country differences must be central to an 
analysis of the growth of specific tenures in different countries 
(p.293). 
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So, Kemeny's study seems to suffer a theoretical inadequacy that merely 
classifies housing systems in terms of three distinct and neatly defined ‘types’ of 
the state. Yet, in theory, this political economy approach of housing accepts the 
structural determination ofinequality, and involves the examination of the ways in 
which capitalist accumulation differentially structures market developments and 
policies according to specific national histories ofclass struggle. Also, by focusing 
housing as a commodity and a basic means of reproduction rejects the myth of the 
'benevolent state’ (Harloe & Martens 1984, p.267, emphasis in original). Such a 
perspective should be able to provide analyses of housing policy which are more 
penetrating than most of those which have appeared so far and which do not 
ultimately resort to 'explaining' housing provision on a purely form of radical 
functionalism, that is, the development of housing market and of housing policies 
is only in the interest ofcapital. 
Beyond Marxian political economy 
While there has been a growing amount of work that focus on the interaction 
between housing development and state agencies in Europe, particularly in the 
United Kingdom, a new paradigm is emerging in North America. There is a 
growing movement towards a more humanistic theory of social change where the 
ideas ofindividuals, collective sentiments and deliberate action play a greater role. 
The most important figure in introducing this new theory and drawing political 
economists' attention away from structural interpretations is Anthony Giddens, the 
formulator of structuration theory. 
Structuration theory addresses the way in which everyday social practices 
are structured across space and time. lt accepts and elaborates Karl Marx's famous 
dictum that human beings ‘make history, but not in circumstances of their own 
choosing’ (Knox 1995, p.218-219). Given that, Giddens (1984) argues for a 
relational approach between structure and agency in which 'structure' is 
established by the way agents operate: deploying, acknowledging，challenging and 
potentially transforming resources, rules and ideas as they frame and pursue their 
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own strategies. Structure, in terms of the framework within which individual 
agents make their choices, may be seen to inhere in the various resources to which 
agents may have access, the rules that they consider govern their behaviour and the 
ideas that they draw upon in developing their strategies. In everyday language, this 
new theory means that the qualities of society and the individuals that comprise of 
continuously inter-penetrate and give shape to one another. 
Returning to the housing provision, fractions of financial, industrial and 
commercial capital all combine with the state to provide an organised structure for 
the property sector, ln this structure, there are various agents interact in the 
property market. Thus, the critical task for the housing analyst seeking to 
understand the process of production of housing is ‘cm examination ofhow [such 
structure] is reflected in and affected by the way individual agents determine their 
strategies and conduct lheir relationships as they deal with specific projects and 
issues, and as they consider their future stream of activities' (Healey & Barrett 
1990, p.90, italics original). 
ln terms ofresearch strategies, Healey and Barrett (ibid., p.93-94) suggest a 
new framework to combine the insights derived from the traditions of institution 
analysis^ with the neo-classical analyses of the operation of urban land markets 
and Marxist approaches to the way capital flows through the built environment. 
So, the research should emphasise on: 
(a) the resources for development, as channelled via the financial system and the 
inter-relation of supply and demand; 
(b) the politico-juridical rules that limit the construction of development 
opportunities; and 
(c) the ideas and values people hold about what they should build, what they 
would like to occupy and what kind of an environment they seek. 
7 Institution analysis concentrates on the way individual firms and agents inter-relate in the 
negotiation of particular development projects and how, through these transactions, land and 
property 'markets' are constituted and built environment investment decisions made. The 
institution research also draws attention to the complex interplay between structural driving forces 
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To summarise, Giddens' structuration theory and Healey and Barrett's 
interpretations draw our attention to the production of the built environment is not 
only the result of social, economic and political processes, but also the consumer 
demand for and investment returns from land and property development can be 
translated into supply, with the various agencies involved in directing and realising 
the strategies of many of the agents involved. Also, all human actors, even the 
most powerful, are constrained by the social, economic and political rules, roles 
and institutions in which they find themselves. Thus, in the real world, 
[the] built environment is the result of conflicts, in the past and 
present, between those with different degrees of power in society — 
landowners, planners, developers, estate agents, local authorities, 
pressure groups of all kinds, insurance companies, and so on. As the 
balance of power changes and ideologies rise and fall so the built 
environment is affected. It is a continuing situation, with the past 
constraining the present and together binding and limiting the future 
(Pahl 1975,p.l51). 
In understanding such a wide spectrum of interactions between structure 
and agents, Ball has suggested a tool to look at how housing is produced, via the 
interests and strategies ofagents and the rules and resources upon which they draw, 
to the dynamics of the wider structure of economic and political organisation that 
these practices both constitute and reflect. The following section therefore 
illustrates Ball's ‘ Structures of Housing Provision' (SHP) thesis. 
Structures of housing provision 
The concept of SHP was developed out of debates from within political economy 
perspectives on housing. In his book, Housing Policy and Economic Power: The 
Political Economy of OMmer-occupation, Ball (1983) specifically formulated the 
idea of SHP to get away from consumption-oriented analysis ofhousing, especially 
regarding owner-occupation, 
that shape individual behaviour and the strategies and interests of individual agents engaged in 
development activity (Healey 1992). 
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Instead ... of simply being one way in which housing may be 
consumed, owner occupation has become associated with a particular 
way in which housing is provided; and with all the forms of land 
ownership, building, finance and market exchange that exist there. 
There is consequently a particular set of social relations involved in 
the current structure ofowner-occupied provision (p.l7). 
Ball also argued that there are varying SHPs between countries. He 
explained that SHP is ‘a historically given process of providing and reproducing 
the physical entity housing: focusing on the social agents essential to that process 
and the relations between them，(1986, p.l58). So the research primacy of the SHP 
approach is given to social agents who dominate housing provision and their 
dynamic inter-relationship in a historically evolving structure. The agents consist 
of those involved in consuming and providing owner-occupied housing: the 
owner-occupiers themselves, the building societies, estate agents, housebuilding 
firms, building workers, planners, landowners and yet others participating in the 
construction and selling of owner-occupied housing. The immediate relations 
between them are schematically described in Figure 3.2. 
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Figure 3.2 The structure of owner-occupied housing provision in Britain. 
Source: Ball(1983) Figure 1.2. 
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Later, together with his co-authors, Ball subsequently developed a more 
general definition ofthe concept of SHP, which moved away from his earlier focus 
on tenure-specific structures, 
A structure of housing provision encompasses the interrelations 
between all the agencies involved in the production, exchange, 
finance and consumption of housing in a particular way. Generally 
they are related to particular tenures, although tenures can be 
associated with more than one structure of provision. Each housing 
tenure in a country has a structure of provision (or more than one) 
which differs from that of other countries, to a greater or lesser 
extent. International variations in forms of provision help to explain 
the different experiences of housing tenures and why they have 
developed in different ways (Ball, Harloe 8i Martens 1988, p.5). 
This approach provides a broad organisational perspective on housing 
within which issues of production and consumption can be analysed. It 
incorporates an awareness of both structural relations and of change within 
structures. In fact, one of the features of the SHP approach is that it suggests that 
SHPs embody tensions leading to change (Yoon 1994, p.lO). It is commonly 
believed that wider social, economic and political processes outside the housing 
sphere (e.g., demographic factors, class struggle and social conflicts, and so on) can 
force SHPs to change. But, it is the internal dynamics of social agents in SHPs 
(e.g., contradictions between builders and building workers, between builders and 
developers, between state and developers, and so on) can lead to the change. Ball 
argued that, 
it is contradictions arising from struggles between social agents 
operating in these spheres (production, exchange and consumption) 
that are the motor of change (1986, p.l62). 
So, the SHP approach is very concerned in identifying the historically 
specific factors that determine what makes SHPs as they are and what causes the 
changes. As the context in which housing is produced, exchanged and consumed 
varies between countries, and so SHPs are 'nationally (or in some cases, locally) 
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specific，(Harloe 1988b, p.l99). The variety of the context leads Ball to a 
conclusion on owner-occupation that, 
owner occupation is a historical product of a series of struggles 
between unique but changing sets of social agents. No country has 
the same constellation of financiers, builders, landowners, owner 
occupiers, housing markets, exchange professionals, and others 
associated with owner occupation. What owner occupation means, 
not surprisingly, varies considerably between different countries 
(1986,p.l57). 
Also, the emphasis on the external and internal pressures on SHPs creating 
changes does not mean that contexts and scale of the pressures are same in every 
society. They are different between times and between places. Therefore, the 
concept of SHPs is empirical and descriptive, like the idea of housing system, 
rather than deriving from theoretical propositions about relationships within any 
definite structure. 
Actual structure of provision ... are empirical constructs and cannot 
be theoretically deduced, although obviously theory has to be applied 
in their analysis (Ball 1988, p.29). 
Criticisms ofthe SHP thesis 
Criticisms of the SHP thesis have centred on a perceived housing production bias. 
Kemeny (1987) argued that the ‘supply side’ political economy of housing is a 
useful additional component of housing analysis, but new building only comprises 
a small part of the total stock in most countries. Thus, he suggested a need for 
more, rather than less, work on housing consumption, but that what was needed 
was ‘theorised consumption analysis' and the integration of consumption and 
production within a coherent theoretical framework (p.253). So, Kemeny (1992) 
labelled SHP thesis is a non-statist and under-theorised perspective. 
In some ways, this criticism is surprising. Indeed, Ball (1986) has strongly 
disclaimed in the first place that SHPs are not production-orientated perspectives in 
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which housing issues are reduced to production problems. The 'provision' in SHPs 
encompasses production, exchange and consumption altogether. Also, SHPs are 
not meant to be viewed as a part o f a comprehensive theory ofhousing. Given the 
complex social, economic and political milieu in which housing is situated, any 
theory ofhousing is likely to promote a totalising discourse (Murphy 1995, p.l38). 
Rather, SHP is ‘an operational theoretical concept that is of use in empirical 
research' (Ball & Harloe 1992, p.9). The approach ‘gives research primacy to the 
institutions and agencies active in a particular way of providing housing and the 
dynamic interrelationships between them by asserting that unless research is aware 
oftheir inter-relation false conclusions may be easily reached' (ibid., p.7). Hence, 
SHPs are a middle-order concept that may be used to bring a wider political-
economy perspective to bear on a specific system, without recourse to overt 
functionalism (Murphy 1995, p.l38). 
Support for this perspective is growing. Gore and Nicholson (1991) believe 
that the ‘SHP approach promises much richer insights into the variety and 
complexity of the [housing] development industry' (p.726). Barlow (1993) claims 
that 'an understanding of the SHP also allows a better integration of speculative 
risk-taking behaviour as it emphasises the strategies of the various parties 
(landowners, developers, owner-occupiers and so on) involved in the development 
process' (p.l 130). Knox (1993) suggests a broader perspective in which ‘design 
professionals, construction workers, ... consumers' are important elements within 
any SHP. Knox also stresses (p.9) the role of the state 'as an important agent in its 
own right and as a site of conflict or cooperation between other agents'. In 
assessing the perspective, Paris (1993) regards the approach as, 
a usetlil, not overarching, conceptual device. Its primary aim is to 
enable a focus on housing without fetishising one or other aspect of 
it. Neither 'production', nor 'consumption' stand alone, and housing 




Clearly, there is no unified ‘theory of housing'. This review of different 
approaches in housing provision, however, has indicated some ways in which a 
coherent framework can be developed to examine the diverse range of factors, 
processes and relationships affecting the ways housing is produced in a particular 
social, economic and political situation. 
The preferred approach adopted in this study incorporates aspects of 
different approaches discussed above: the neo-classical economics emphasis on 
commodity relations and transaction; the Marxian political economy focus on 
housing development as a means ofcapital accumulation; the housing system focus 
011 actors and relationships; Kemeny's focus on the state and its cultural ideology; 
Giddens' emphasis on the interaction between structure and agencies; and the SHP 
focus on how housing is produced. The SHP approach, finally, provides a coherent 
analytical framework in which all the different perspectives can be integrated to 
determine how structure and agents, and agents within the structure interact with 
each other. The next chapter will illustrate how the SHP can be used in this study 
to examine the ways property developers behave and also clarify the extent to 
which particular local developers affect structure and performance of home 
ownership in Hong Kong. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
HONG KONG PROPERTY DEVELOPERS 
The previous chapter illustrates the benefits of using the concept of the 'Structures 
ofhousing provision' (SHP) in addressing the interrelationships within the housing 
market that determine the outcomes of housing provision. This chapter examines 
how this concept can be adopted in this study, lt also describes who are the property 
developers in Hong Kong and their characteristics. 
Roles of property developers 
In simplified terms, three main types of agents — developers, investors and users 
— p l a y a central role in the property development process, though other agents 
such as planning authorities and landowners will also play a part. Yet, the profits to 
be made from property development give developers a strong incentive to assert 
themselves as key actors at the centre of structures of building provision, or in 
residential development, the centre of the SHP. This incentive is intensified by 
their interest in the speed of operation because they have to finance land 
preparation and construction long before receiving income from the sale of 
completed projects. Figure 4.1 shows the role of property developers is pivotal: 
It is the developers who initiate the development process 一 by 
recognising an opportunity to profit from a perceived demand for 
certain types ofbuilding in particular locations. They negotiate with 
landowners for the acquisition of development rights to sites, either 
purchasing a freehold or leasehold interests in the property or 
entering into joint development agreements to share development 
profits with the site owner. It is the developers who arrange the 
short-term financing for construction. They commission architects 
to devise a scheme, within certain cost constraints, which will be 
acceptable to the planning authorities. It is also they who engage the 
builders and use estate agents to seek suitable tenants or purchasers 
for the completed development... developers might appropriately be 
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regarded as the impresarios of the built environment (MacLaran 
1993, quoted in Knox 1995, p.l32). 
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Figure 4.1 The role of property developers in the property development process. 
Source.. Knox (1995) Fig. 4.7. 
Thus, developers are placed in the interface between the cycle of 
production and the cycle of consumption of a dwelling' (Cardoso & Short 1983, 
p.923). They have commonly cast themselves as the conceptualisers, organisers 
‘ln the life time of a dwelling, it is possible to differentiate 2 cycles: the cycle ofproduction and the 
cycle of consumption. The cycle of production of a dwelling spans from the beginning of the 
construction process until the dwelling is sold. The cycle of consumption includes the successive 
exchanges and progressive consumption of the dwelling. The cycles are interrelated, but separate to 
the extent that the processes and agents involved in the 2 cycles are different (Cardoso & Short 
1983,p.920-921). 
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and supervisors of real estate development projects. Their principal concem is to 
enhance either the use value or the exchange value of the land and buildings. 
Types of property developers 
Property developers can be further sub-divided into the following categories 
depending on their different objectives, preferences and styles of dealings: 
(a) Commercial property developers 
Commercial property developers are mainly in the form of property 
development companies, which are in a variety of forms and sizes from one-
man-bands to multinationals. Their purpose is usually clear-cut: to make a 
direct financial profit from the process ofdevelopment 一 in the same way that 
any other private sector company operates. The main difference between 
development companies is whether they operate primarily as traders or 
investors. 
For property trading companies, they treat the business as a production process 
(Chan 1987), that is, they purchase materials, produce the product and finally 
sell the product to the customers. They seldom keep properties for long-term 
investment because they have to maintain a high cash flow to facilitate their 
production process. They usually maintain a large volume of land as stock, 
and invest in properties with less fluctuation, both in terms of demand and 
price, that is, they invest in relatively lower-end products. As they do not have 
the capital resources, they sell their products as quickly as they can so that they 
can maintain a high cash flow and re-invest in land. Their product strategy is 
to build up up-to-standard quality building and never search for excellence. 
Also, they spend relatively little effort on building management and 
maintenance. This is especially true for private individual developers and 
small property development companies. Overall, their revenue is less 
influenced by market performance because their products are lower-end. They 
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tend to buy land at low price and keep the development cost down so that they 
will be more competitive in the market. 
At the other end ofthe scale, there are large development companies — in term 
of capital assets 一 which do hardly any new development at all. For these 
property investment companies, the return on investment is equal to the rental 
received for their properties on the amount invested. They plan for longer 
term, such as the economic performance of the economy, the growth potential 
of the project, and the demographic changes for local living quarter and 
industries, etc. They concentrate their investment in prime locations, and pay 
special attention to building design, facilities, layout and the environment. 
They spend much more effort in building management and maintenance to 
maintain the value of the properties. Since they build high quality buildings, 
the initial yield to companies is low, therefore, only large companies can 
afford this low initial earning. This is especially true in a declining market. 
Overall, their revenue depends on the performance of the market. They are 
content to manage their portfolio and undertake only refurbishment and re-
development work. 
In residential development, developers operate almost solely as traders as the 
market is heavily biased towards owner occupation. Usually, many developers 
in the decade after World War 11 started as relatively small entrepreneurs and 
used early profits to move into one land enterprise after another. Even today, 
the real estate entrepreneur has frequently been seen as the crucial risk taker, 
the one who seeks to invest and re-invest in new business enterprises. 
However, in recent decades, as is true with many other sectors of the advanced 
economy, even the most visible entrepreneurs have developed large-scale 
development companies, the bureaucratised operation has come to dominate in 
real estate development. 
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(b) Public sector development agencies 
In most countries, either in capitalist or socialist countries, the public sector is 
actively involved in direct development. It is mainly in the form of quasi-
development companies and often funded by the government in providing 
affordable owner-occupied housing units to low-to-middle income 
households. These property agencies are normally identified as a non-profit 
making body, whose production depends upon allocation of adequate housing 
lands by the government. 
(c) Institutions 
Building societies, educational and religious bodies are all examples of this 
category. They are usually the future end-users of the new buildings, and 
profit-making is, in these cases, not exactly relevant. For this reason, demand 
for developments of this type tend to be very stable, and are least affected by 
the ups and downs of the property market. 
In Hong Kong, it is obvious that its property market is dominated by the 
first type. The Hong Kong commercial property companies are usually specialised 
entrepreneurs whose differences are based largely on management, that is, the 
Chinese and non-Chinese styles. These large developers have come to represent a 
powerful lobby: so powerful, in fact, that they have been able to shape the nature 
of many of the government programmes affecting housing and urban 
development, ln such context, it poses challenging problems in finding empirical 
data using the concept of the SHP as a research tool. 
The research agenda 
In Chapter 3 it has been argued that the provision of owner-occupied housing may 
fruitfully be approached by adopting SHP and linking this to various theories to 
explain the relation between developers and structure of Hong Kong housing 
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market. This emphasises the inter-relation between the two, rather than a 
deterministic relation between structure and agency. Given the researcher's 
available resources and short time-frame, four interesting themes are centred in 
this study: the first addresses the relation between the developers as a whole and 
investment in land and development processes; the second explores the way the 
resources and rules ofeconomic organisation constitute the types and strategies of 
developers involved in land and property development processes; the third 
assesses the way Hong Kong government structures the land and property 
development process through its contribution to the constitution of rules and 
resources; and the fourth evaluates the outcomes ofthese processes. 
Clearly, research under such an agenda raises problems of research 
methods and data sources. It involves arenas where many powerful actors operate, 
where secretive strategies are part of the battle for competitive success, where data 
are scarce and produced in ways that are often difficult to penetrate, and where 
publicly available documentation and public talk are often deliberately distorted 
for the purposes ofcompetitive advantage. Nevertheless, there is a range of source 
materials that can be used. 
In this study, the major source of data was from housing and construction 
statistics, either from public and private agencies; land registers; reviews by the 
major property companies and real estate firms; the property press; company 
reports; unpublished dissertations; and published biographies on Chinese property 
tycoons. Also, a limited number of interviews were conducted with selected 
individuals who were actively involved in housing market in Hong Kong. A 
complete list of people consulted is given in Appendix I. 
The aim of these interviews was focused on the people's experience on 
Hong Kong housing market. They also provided their views of how owner-
occupied housing was provided, the problems and issues relating to the 
development process, and many insights into how the housing market works. 
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Partially structured interviews^ were carried out over two intervals from 
May to August and November to December 1997. Thirteen individuals were 
interviewed. The time taken for each interview varied between thirty minutes and 
one hour. These interviews were not tape-recorded, but main points of discussion 
were recorded. 
A number of constraints imposed limitations on the selection of 
individuals to be interviewed, and these were: the limited time-frame for the 
research project and the small group ofpeople willing to be consulted. Because of 
these difficulties, a methodological awareness of the problems involved is a pre-
requisite for interpreting the results ofthis study. Clearly, no one piece of research 
could address the above agenda. What is important, however, is that this study 
should increase our understanding of contemporary processes of the production 
and transformation of the structure of owner-occupied housing in Hong Kong. 
More specifically, this study should add to our understanding of the roles of 
developers and the Government in the housing development process. Yet, before 
tackling these two issues, the next section will first describe the historical 
development of Hong Kong property developers and their characteristics. 
Historical development of Hong Kong property developers 
The existence of a property development industry is a relatively recent 
phenomenon. Before the Second World War, there were very few large property 
companies. Instead, development was undertaken by individual businessmen or 
by firms developing buildings for their own occupation. According to records 
from the Hong Kong Registry, there were only two registered property companies 
in 1900s (Feng 1996, p.51). One of them was the Hong Kong Land. 
After the war, the situation changed rapidly. Property development 
companies proliferated along with the growth of the Hong Kong economy. 
2 In partially structured interviews, area are chosen and questions are formulated but order is up to 
interviewer, and interviewer may add questions or modify them as deemed appropriate. Questions 
are open-ended, and responses are recorded nearly verbatim, possibly taped. 
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Currently, there are about 4,000 property development companies in Hong Kong 
(Yang 1993, p.359), of which 103 developers are listed on the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange. Within these listed companies, the ten largest are Henderson, 
Hopewell, Sino, Swire, Wharf, Cheung Kong, Hang Lung, New World, Hong 
Kong Land and Sun Hung Kai. They accounted for 70 per cent of the total market 
capitalisation ofthe construction and development sector in the 1980s (Table 4.1). 
Table 4.1 Top ten listed property companies and their market capitalisation. 
S o u r c e ~ ~ 1 2 / 1 9 7 9 Source 7/1983 
Companies of Market Companies of Market 
capital capitalisation capital capitalisation 
# $ billion # S billion 
The Hong Kong Land Ltd. B 7 1 l he Hong Kong Land Ltd, “ B 9 2 
New World Development Co. Ltd. C 3.2 Swire Properties Ltd. B 4.0 
Cheung Kong (Holdings) Lld. C 2.8 Cheung Kong (Holdings) Ltd. C 3.7 
Sun Hung Kei Properties Ltd. C 2,8 Siiio Land. 0 3.4 
Swire Properties Ltd. B 1.9 Sun Hiing Kei Properties Ltd. C 3.4 
Hopewell C 1.2 New World Development Co. Ltd. C 3.1 
Haiig Lung Development Co. Ltd. C 1.1 International City - 2.2 
Tai Cheong C 1.0 Henderson Land Development Co. Ltd. C 1.8 
Hutchison* B 0.8 Hysan Development Co. Lld. C 1.6 
Mei Hong Enterprises Lld. - 0.9 Hopewell C 1.2 
Total 22.95 7 ^ 33.40 
Total as % ofcunstruct ion and development 
capitalisation value 72.62% 71.00% 
Total as % ofovcra l l stock market 
capitalisation 20.34% 18.78% 
Sourcc"""5/1988 S o u r c e ~ ~ 5 / 1 9 9 3 
Companies ol' Market Companies of Market 
capital capitalisation capital capitalisation 
# $ billion # $ billion 
The Hong Kong Land Ltd. B i T 9 Sun Hung Kei Properties Ltd. C 7 ^ 1 
Cheung Kong (Holdings) Ltd. C 16.0 Cheung Kong (Holdings) Ltd. C 62.4 
Sun Hung Kei Properties Ltd. C 15.7 Wharf(Holdings) Ltd. C 45.4 
New World Development Co. Ltd. C 12.1 Tlie Hong Kong Land Ltd. B 43.8 
Wliarf(Holdiiigs) Ltd. C 11.8 Henderson Land Development Co. Ltd. C 37.8 
Kai Wang International C 8.9 New World Development Co. Ltd. C 35.4 
Henderson Land Development Co. Ltd. C 8,1 i lopewell C 22.8 
New City C 6.9 Amoy Properties Ltd. C 18.8 
Hopewell C 5.4 Hang Lung Development Co. Ltd. C 16.1 
Hang Lung Development Co. Ltd. C 6.0 Hysan Development Co. Ltd. C 15.7 
Total 109.78 ToM 374.00 
Total as % of construction aiicl development 
capitalisation value 68 .96% 48 .20% 
Total as % of overall stock market “ 
capitalisation 20.74% 20.38% 
* I(.S. Li took over Hutchison in September 1979 by acquiring 22.4% shares of stock and became the chairman on 
1/1/1981. Therefore, Hutchison was still regarded as British-controlled firm in 12/79. 
# B: British 
C: Local Chinese 
0 : Overseas Chinese 
Sources.. Hong Kong Economic Journal Monthly, various issues. 
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In addition to the above 103 listed companies, there are a number of very large 
public companies that do not fall into the above group and yet a substantial volume 
of their business is related to the property development industry. The obvious are 
Hongkong and Whampao Dock, Mass Transit Railway Corporation (MTRC) and 
Kowloon Canton Railway Corporation (KCRC). 
Table 4.1 also shows that, over time, there is a profound shift in the nature 
of property developers, that is, a switching from British-controlled property 
companies to the local Chinese-controlled entrepreneurial firms. This transition, 
described as below, reflects the broad social, economic and political changes in 
Hong Kong. 
Development in 1950s 
In the 1950s, the property market, or more precisely the Hong Kong economy, was 
dominated by four British-controlled hongs, namely, Hutchison, Jardine 
Matheson, Swire Pacific and Wheelock Marden. Hong Kong Land, the property 
arm of Jardine Matheson\ was the owner of first class commercial properties in 
Central District and Causeway Bay. ln residential development, this group of 
developers confined their investment to luxury apartments at Mid-levels. 
For the mass residential sector, most of the developers were small in size, 
and some of them were associated with building contractors. They were mainly 
Chinese family businesses, ln fact, in the 1950s, the outdated building regulation 
imposed a low plot ratio for building sites, making it almost impossible for 
developers to construct high density buildings. Residential development in the 
1950s was therefore confined to low-rise tenement flats^ in urban areas. The 
projects were usually small in size, mainly financed from the developer's own 
3 The association between Jardine Matheson and Hong Kong Land is very close. In fact, the 
chairman of Hong Kong Land is also the chairman of Jardine Matheson. 
4 In general, tenement housings were 3-5 storeys high, they were built on long narrow lots that 
varied in width from 4-4.5 m, with a length to breath ratio of roughly 3:1 (Yuen 1995). The 
majority of tenements was leased by floor, and each floor was sub-divided into cubicles for sub-
letting. As a result, living conditions in tenements were poor and unhealthy. 
7 3 
resources, bank loans and proceeds received from pre-sale of the property under 
construction. When a developer could not make ends meet, he or she simply 
disappeared. Consequently, developers of the 1950s did not command much 
respect nor confidence from the public. 
Development in 1960s 
In December 1955, the Building Ordinance that set the parameters for property 
development iii Hong Kong was amended to provide for much higher plot ratio 
than before. This paved the way for the construction ofhigh-rise buildings. Also, 
in the early 1960s, the strong export performance in the manufacturing sector 
provided an abundant supply of finance from the banking sector. Simultaneously, 
there was the emergence of a well-to-do middle class who had both the desire and 
financial resources to acquire properties to improve their living conditions. Under 
such circumstance, land as well as property prices increased dramatically over a 
short period oftime. This laid a firm foundation for rapid growth in the following 
decade. At the same time, radical changes were taking place both in the nature of 
the developer and the size of the development projects undertaken. 
While the developers of the 1950s were mostly individuals of limited 
resources, the developers of the 1960s were substantial companies with sizable 
capital and financial support from banks, ln fact, the relationship between 
developers and their financiers often appeared too close. In some cases, the bank 
managers, who realised a golden opportunity to make a quick profit,jumped on the 
bandwagon, and became financier-cum-developers. The lack of regulation in the 
banking industry allowed the banks to over-extend themselves that finally led to 
the banking crisis in 1965. 
Unlike the 1950s, the relaxation of 1953 Building Ordinance allowed the 
restriction of residential height increased from five storeys to 8-10 storeys. This 
initiated a gradual but important change in the private housing. Single or 'pencil' 
high-rise residential housings were erected between low tenement buildings. 
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Also, whilst small flats^ and tenement floors together continued to account for 
almost 90 per cent of all domestic units built each year, self-contained flats 
became much more important, and tenement floors declined as a proportion of the 
overall total from 75 per cent in 1965 to 48 per cent in 1971 (Drakakis-Smith 1979’ 
p.75). 
For the first time, big and high density development projects were 
undertaken by Chinese developers. The pioneer was the Goodyear Property 
Development Company, a Southeast Asian Chinese-controlled property firm, 
which started a massive middle income housing development in Ferry Street in 
Kowloon in mid-1960s. The project was developed in stages with completion of 
the last stage by the end of the 1960s. This was also the first majofproject that 
stood the test of a boom and a slump (the banking crisis in 1965). To a certain 
extent, it did show the changing mantle of the developers. They became more 
experienced, organised and financially resilient than their counterparts in the 
1950s. 
Development in 1970s 
In the 1970s, the Hong Kong property development industry came of age. This 
was made possible by parallel developments in the security and the banking 
industries, both of which revolutionised the conventional methods of property 
development finance in Hong Kong. 
Before 1972, the Hong Kong Stock Exchange was the only stock exchange 
in Hong Kong. The companies that were traded in the Exchange were mostly 
controlled by British interests, apart from a number of utility companies that were 
locally based. But, in 1972, this state ofaffairs was changed by the arrival in Hong 
Kong of corporate raiders from the United Kingdom. The most famous (or 
infamous) ofwhom was Jim Slater ofSlater Walker (Cheung 1987, p.22). A spate 
5 During the period from 1963 to 1974, the Rating and Valuation Department defined small flats as 
independent premises properly partitioned as living rooms and bedrooms with separate kitchen and 
bathroom, having an effective area of more than 300 sq ft but not exceeding 650 sq ft. 
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of company floatations, take-overs, reverse take-overs and mergers fuelled the 
booming stock market. In addition, three new stock exchanges were established 
and commenced trading in shares of companies. Many private real estate 
developers took advantage of this new source of finance and went public in the 
exchanges(). During the stock market boom of 1972, more than 100 property and 
property related companies were floated at the four stock exchanges (ibid., p.24). 
Despite the disappearance of many, a major proportion had remained and 
prospered. Among the notable ones that were floated in the 1970s were Cheung 
Kong, Hang Lung, New World Development and Sun Hung Kai. 
Also, the 1970s saw a new development in the banking industry. 
Following the banking crisis in 1965, the Deposit-taking Companies Ordinance 
was enacted in 1976 that enabled deposit-taking companies to conduct, under 
certain restrictions and limits, most of the business hitherto conducted by licensed 
banks. This meant that international banks could now set up deposit-taking 
companies and to participate in the growing financial market of Hong Kong. 
Consequently, the number of banks and deposit-taking companies increased 
dramatically from 74 and some 200 to around 130 and 355, respectively, in 1978 
(Leung, S.C-T. 1986, p.44). Together with their financial expertise, they brought 
with them their contacts and access to the vast resources of international financial 
markets. As a result, these resources were brought within the reach of local 
property developers, ln fact, finance for major property developments in the late 
1970s were usually arranged by a syndicate of international and local banks. 
Hence, Chinese developers were able to develop much bigger projects than before, 
and their companies switched from the entrepreneurial family business to the 
modern organisational style. 
6 For example, Cheung Kong, New World Development and Sun Hung Kai absorbed a large amount 
of funds by offering shares to the public in 1972. First, in July 1972, Sun Hung Kai offered 20 
million of shares at $5 per share, the par value being$l per share. Then, in October, Cheung Kong 
offered 10.5 million shares to the public. Later, in November, New World Development offered 
96,750,000 shares to the public, at $2 per share, the par value being $ 1 per share (So, L. 1982). 
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Development in 1980s oriM>ards 
Starting from the early 1980s, there was a drastic change in the Hong Kong 
property development industry. To start with, the number of small developers 
greatly decreased. These small private companies with assets of one or two 
development sites had a hard time to seek support from the financial institutions 
during the period of property slump. Since then, large local public property 
companies flourished, and secured an increasingly powerful place in the property 
market. 
First, ill January 1977, Cheung Kong bid down Hong Kong Land, and won 
the contract to develop properties above the Central and Admiralty Mass Transit 
Railway (MTR) stations. Second, in September 1979, Cheung Kong, with the 
assistance of the then Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HKSBC, 
now known as the Hongkong Bank), used $6.39 billion to take over Hutchison 
Whampao. Third, in June 1980’ Wharf, another property arm of Jardine 
Matheson, was taken over by another Chinese entrepreneur, Y.K. Pao^ Later, 
Y.K. Pao raised $20 billion to take over one of the four British hongs, the 
Wheelock Marden^ Hence, two of the four British-hongs were vanished in 1985, 
with Jardine Matheson and Swire still operating today. The dominance of 
British-based firms in Hong Kong property market and also the Hong Kong 
economy was ceased. 
At the same time, a small contingent of Southeast Asian developers has 
emerged in Hong Kong since the 1970s. The most prominent one was Sino. Also, 
as described in Chapter 2, new players arrived at Hong Kong in the mid-1980s 
7 The takeover of Wharf by Y.K. Pao in fact involved another 2 intermediaries. First, in 1978, 
Cheung Kong acquired enough shareholding in Wharf to gain control of the company's valuable 
land assets that were located primarily at Tsim Sha Tsui. Under the influence of the HKSBC, 
Cheung Kong sold its accumulated shares to Y.K. Pao at a substantial profit. At that time, Y.K. Pao 
was the deputy chairman of the HKSBC, and it was widely believed that the takeover was financed 
by HKSBC, or its subsidiary (Wong, G. 1996, p.l01). 
8 Because of the confidence crisis in 1983’ Wheelock Marden retreated its investment in Hong 
Kong's properties, and shifted its emphasis in expanding the business in sea transport. However, 
the world-wide recession hit hard on sea travel, and the company suffered a huge loss. So, the 
company had to sell its shares to a Southeastean tycoon. Later, Y.K. Pao began his takeover plan, 
and used $25 billion in February 1985 completely take control of the firm (Feng 1996，p.263). 
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giving the Hong Kong property development industry an international flavour. 
They were Mainland Chinese, Japanese and Australian. 
In term of products, the 1980s saw a considerable expansion of a whole 
variety of increasingly sophisticated private residential schemes. They included 
one to two blocks of high-rise deluxe apartments, small-scale low-to-medium 
density villas(), and large-scale private housing estates'". And the most popular was 
the private housing estate. In fact, large scale private residential estates increased 
from one in 1976 to 12 in 1985, provided accommodation for approximately 
400,000 people (Lee, A.W-C. 1987). Table 4.2 shows some of the typical examples 
in 1980s. These private housing estates are established to be self-sufficient 
community where the residents can buy almost all of the daily necessities there 
without having to shop elsewhere. Inside the estates, schools, clinics, restaurants, 
supermarkets, shopping centres, carparks as well as other amenities such as 
swimming pools and children playgrounds are found. Also, the guaranteed good 
property management and maintenance have made consumers have a strong 
preference for them. 
Despite the dominance of large developers in the development of private 
housing estates, many smaller developers began to emerge in the boom of the 
1980s. These small- to medium-size firms have secured viable niches in 
producing small-scale development, and are able to capture 50 per cent of the 
9 The first large scale low-density housing development for the middle-income families was 
Fairview Park at Tai Shang Wai near Yuen Long, lt was started in 1974 and constructed by the 
Canadian Overseas Development Co. It accommodated about 30,000 people with commercial and 
community facilities provided within the site for its inhabitants. Other major ones included Hong 
Lok Yuen at north of Tai Po, Discovery Bay on Lantau Island, Red Hill in Tai Tam, and so on. 
These private housing schemes are usually found on the south side of Hong Kong Island and in the 
Sai Kung and Clearwater Bay Districts of the New Territories. 
10 The large scale housing estate design was first introduced in the public housing development of 
Wah Fu Estate near Aberdeen in 1968 by the HKHA. This design was so successful that private 
sector followed it up in the design for Mei Foo Sun Chuen at Lai Chi Kok, the first private large 
scale residential estate in Hong Kong (Bristow 1989, p.257). Generally, large scale residential 
estates are referred to those private housing estates that can accommodate a population of 15,000 
people or above and contain more than lOblocks ofhigh-rise residential buildings with more or less 
the same architectural design. The blocks are arranged in an orderly way, giving the estate a highly 
uniform appearance (Lee, A.W-C. 1987). 
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Table 4.2 Examples of large scale private residential estates in Hong Kong, 1966-85. 
Number 
Name Year Location Developer of Total Population  
blocks units  
Aberdeen Centre 1978- Aberdeen Hutchison 20 (27-28 
n Whampao storeys) 3,000 13,000 
Allway Garden 1978- Tsuen Wan~~~Hopewell 16(22-29 
^ storeys) 3,400 12,000 
Chi Fu Fa Yuen i ^ - Pokfulam Hong Kong Land~~20 (27 
^ storeys) 4,350 20,000 
City One Shatin 1976- Sha Tin Cheung Kong + 
88 New World + 52 (27-33 10,642 50,000 
Sun Hung Kai + storeys) 
H e n d e r s o n 
Kornhill f ^ Quarry Bay~~MTR+ 44(10 
87 Hang Lung + blocks 9,500 38,000 
New World PSPS) 
Luk Yeung Sun 1978- Tsuen Wan~Hong Kong Land + ‘ 
Chuen 83 Jardine M a t h e s o n + 17 (28-30 4,000 20,000 
Sun Co. + storeys) 
Kiu Kwong 
Mei Foo Sun f ^ Lai Chi Kok New World 99 (20 
Chuen 78 storeys) 13,110 75,000 
Nan Fung Sun 1977- Quarry Bay~~Nan Fung 12 (20-32 
Chuen l_S storeys) 2,856 11,000 
Tai Po Centre f ^ Tai Po Sun Hung Kai 23 (22 
^ storeys) 4,048 14,000 
Taikoo Shing 1974- Quarry Bay~~Swire 53 (22-30 
M storeys) 12,690 50,000 
Telford Garden 1975- Kowloon MTR + Hopewell~~41 (11-26 
^ ^ + Hang Lung storeys) 4,989 25,000 
Whampao Garden 1984- HungHom Hutchison  
9J Whampao 94 11,224 40,000 
Source: adapted from Lee, A.W-C. (1987). 
market (Wong, et. al. 1996, p.86). And, in the public sector, the Hong Kong 
Housing Authority (HKHA) has started to construct subsidised owner-occupied 
housing units since 1982. ln fact, its production has made it the largest developer 
in Hong Kong (ibid.; Poon & others 1995, p.l4). 
So far, we have seen the evolution of the Hong Kong property developers 
and its property development industry from its early beginning to the present state 
of sophistication. In the next section, a brief profile of some developers will be 
given. 
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British-controlled property companies 
Hong Kong Land 
Hong Kong Land has the longest history, lt was established by two businessmen, 
Paul Chater and James Johnstone Keswick, the latter being a representative of 
Jardine Matheson. It was incorporated as a public company on 2 March 1889 
under the name of the Hong Kong Land Investment and Agency Company Ltd. Its 
portfolio was worth $9.6 billion in 1997 (SCMP, 6 August 1997), and included 
much of the most valuable property in Central District. Actually, the company has 
been the ‘King of Central' since early 1970s (Feng 1996, p.l53). Currently, it 
owns 4.89 million square feet ofoffice (a 40% ofoffice space in Central) and retail 
space in the area, including Exchange Square, Jardine House, Landmark, Swire 
House, Alexandra House and Prince's Building. In 1997，it received in the form of 
rent from these assets a total o f U S $485.1 million {SCMP, 1 August 1997). 
For residential properties, the company owned mainly high-class 
residential premises for rental purposes. These properties were located at Mid-
level, Stanley and Deep Water Bay. In mass residential development, the 
company's major project was the $600 million Chi Fu Fa Yuen at Pokfulam, 
which was developed in stages over six years from 1976 to 1981. This estate 
provided a total of 4,350 residential units in 20 high-rise and seven low-rise 
blocks. Another significant housing development was Luk Yeung Sun Chuen, a 
4,000-tlat residential commercial complex over the Tsuen Wan MTR depot. The 
company was one of the participants in a joint venture (15%) with Jardine 
Matheson, the Sun Company and Kiu Kwong Investment (a Beijing-backed 
property company). The project started in 1978 and completed in 1983. Also, the 
company was awarded a contract by the Hong Kong government, under the 
Middle-income Housing Scheme, to develop for sale and manage a residential-
cum-commercial estate at Tuen Mun, Chi Lok Fa Yuen. This project was 
completed in 1981. 
However, starting from 1984, the company started to scale down its 
investment in Hong Kong. First, the confidence crisis iii 1982-84 arising from the 
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Sino-British negotiation over the fate of Hong Kong's sovereignty in 1997 made 
Jardine Matheson, the parent company of Hong Kong Land, moved its 
headquarters from Hong Kong to Bermuda. Second, after the takeover of Wharf 
by Y.K. Pao, Jardine Matheson and Hong Kong Land bought a substantial volume 
of each other's shares so that a potential predator would have to take the two 
companies together. Unfortunately, this mutual reinforcement became a mutual 
burden as Hong Kong Land incurred major losses during the property market crash 
in 1983. Hong Kong Land had to sell all its residential and some commercial 
investment until its land bank was exhausted. The result was a drastic shrinkage in 
the size and centrality of Hong Kong Land in the property market. 
Swire Properties 
Swire Properties, a 72.5 per cent-owned subsidiary of Swire Pacific, was 
incorporated in November 1972 with the objective ofdeveloping some 96 acres of 
surplus land of Swire Pacific and Swire Industries situated at Shau Kei Wan, 
Quarry Bay and Braemar Hill, North Point, lt was later listed in the stock 
exchanges in 1977. 
The first and most important company project was, of course, the Taikoo 
Shing, a re-development involving some 53 acres at the former Taikoo Dockyard 
in Quarry Bay. lt took 11 years (1974-84) in ten stages to complete, and it now 
comprises an estate of 53 tower blocks providing 12,690 apartments and housing 
50,000 people. Stages one to four, comprising 4,960 flats in 24 towers, werejoint 
venture with local developers, with a view to accelerating the massive 
development programme and to acquiring the necessary expertise. The remaining 
stages were developed solely by the company. Using cash flow generated from 
land disposals and sales of the Taikoo Shing flats, the company has diversified its 
property assets to other areas outside Hong Kong. Offshore, the company has 
property and development interests in Florida and Hawaii. 
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So far, the company is the most active British-controlled firm in Hong 
Kong property development industry. Its most recent project is Island Place in 
North Point, and interestingly, its developments are centred at Hong Kong Island 
East stretching from Sai Wan Ho to North Point. 
Chinese-controlled property companies 
Cheung Kong (Holdings) 
Cheung Kong is often ranked as the most successful local developer that has 
broken into the monopoly position built up in prime Central commercial 
properties by Hong Kong Land. The company was formerly named Cheung Kong 
Real Estate Co. Ltd., and was incorporated in June 1971, with the present name 
being adopted in August 1972. 
The company, under the directorship of its chairman K.S. Li, has become 
established within a relatively short span of time as one of the Hong Kong's 
leading property development company, representing the new Chinese influence 
in the market. Born in 1928 in the Guangdong town of Chaozhou, K.S. Li started 
selling plastic products in Hong Kong after migrating to the territory with his 
family in 1940 and barely obtaining a high-school diploma. After weathering the 
1951 Korean War embargo, his plastics company thrived. By early 1960s, he was 
reputed to have accumulated $50-60 million from the business (Wong, G. 1996， 
p. 100). From the mid-1960s to early 1970s, he bought a lot of properties when the 
prices were relatively low. In the 1970s, he shifted his main business to the 
property development. His flagship company, Cheung Kong, went public in 1972. 
In 1974, he set up Canadian Eastern Finance, a deposit-taking company as 
a joint venture with the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce. Later, he was 
made a director of the HKSBC in 1978. Previous to this, in 1975, HKSBC 
acquired a large proportion ofHutchison's shares in a rescue operation. Then, in 
1979, HKSBC sold its shares to Cheung Kong giving it the control over the 
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Hutchison Whampao". In the following week, K.S. Li was made a director of the 
China International Trust and Investment Corporation (CITIC), which was one of 
the first major investment vehicles set up by the State Council of China. So, by 
1979, K.S. Li was the colony's largest private landowner (Gilley 1997a). This is 
evident in Figure 4.2 that shows that Cheung Kong's profit had a big jump 一 a 
135 per cent increase — from $639.9 million to $1,604.5 million in 1979-80. 
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Figure 4.2 Cheung K o n g ' s profit at tr ibutable to shareholders ended on 31 Augus t , 
1975-95. 
Sources-. Cheung Kong's annual reports, various years. 
Prior to 1976, Cheung Kong's major business was property investment in 
commercial premises at Central District and Wanchai. In 1976, it began the 
trading activities in large scale residential development projects. The first one was 
“Because ofmis-judgement in the investment in the stock market, Hutchison suffered a huge loss 
($1.29 billion) in the 1973 stock market crash, ln order to rescue the company, Hutchison sold its 
33.65% shares to HKSBC in September 1975，making HKSBC as the major shareholder of the 
company. In November, HKSBC invited W.R.A. Wyllie into the Board of Director in Hutchison, 
and began the restructuring of the company. At the end of 1977, Wyllie made an important decision 
to combine Hutchison International Ltd. and Hong Kong & Whampao Dock Co. Therefore, 
Hutchison Whampao was formerly established on 3 January 1978. However, on 25 September 
1979, HKSBC and K.S. Li made an agreement to transfer HKSBC's control of Hutchison 
Whampao to Cheung Kong. In this transaction, Cheung Kong enjoyed a favourable term. K.S. Li 
only needed to pay 20% of the market price ofHutchison Whampao's current stock, which Wyllie 
later commented as, ‘Mr Li just uses US $2,400 deposit to buy over US $10 billion asset’ (Feng 
1996，p.242). 
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City One Shatin. Cheung Kong, in conjunction with three other Hong Kong 
property developers (Henderson, New World Development and Sun Hung Kai), 
formed a company called Paramatta Investment Co. Ltd. in which each of the 
parties owned a 25 per cent interest. This company acquired from the Government 
by tender, in the amount of$20.6 million, about 40 acres ofland at Siu Lek Yuen 
in Sha Tin. lt erected 52 blocks of27-33 storeys residential buildings, providing 
10,642 units and housing about 50,000 people. It was also the first large scale 
private residential estate in the New Territories. 
Later, in 1984, K.S. Li announced Cheung Kong's another major 
residential project, the re-development of Whampao Dockland at Hung Hom. At 
that time, Hutchison Whampao was the subsidiary of Cheung Kong. The re-
development scheme was named Whampao Garden. It comprised 94 towers with 
11,224 residential units of average size 63 m� ’ providing homes for about 45,000 
people. It was completed in 1991. 
At the property slump at the end of 1980s, while many developers 
withdrew their property investments, Cheung Kong was very active in large scale 
residential projects. Between 1987 to 1990, it involved in four main projects, 
namely, Laguna City and Sceneway Garden in Lam Tin, South Horizon in Ap Lei 
Chau and Kingswood Villas in Tin Shiu Wai. The sales of these four projects 
accounted for the dramatic rise in the company's turnover in 1991 (see Fig. 4.3). 
Thus, starting from early 1990s, Cheung Kong has established its leading role in 
private housing development in Hong Kong. Its vast number of other projects of 
different scales and categories spreading in almost every corner ofHong Kong. 
Hang Lung Development 
Hang Lung was incorporated as a private company on 13 September 1960, and 
went public on 28 September 1972. Initially, rental incomes from commercial 
properties and high class residences formed the major profit element (60%; Tse, 
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C.C. 1979, p.46) for the company. But from 1975, the company started to be 
intensively involved in the property development over MTR stations. 
The first residential project was Telford Garden in Kowloon Bay MTR 
station, lt was developed as ajoint venture between the company and Hopewell 
Holdings to provide 4,984 residential units in 41 towers. Close to this site. Hang 
Lung developed another major project, Amoy Garden — 13 residential blocks in 
two phases. Apart from these two major popular class residential projects, the 
company won the tender for the Kornhill development above and adjacent to 
Taikoo MTR station in June 1981. This development scheme wasjointly designed 
and developed by MTRC and Headstarts Ltd., a consortium formed by several 
property developers, headed by Hang Lung and New World Development. 
Fourty-four blocks, including ten blocks of Private Sector Participation Scheme 
(PSPS) units, were built, providing 9,500 housing units to accommodate 38,000 
people. Besides these residential projects, Hang Lung was responsible for other 
projects constructed over Fortress Hill, Tin Hau, Wan Chai and Sheung Wan MTR 
stations. 
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In comparison with Cheung Kong, Hang Lung's policy and performance in 
property trading have been somewhat conservative and the relative lack of success 
in capturing the full benefits of the property booms (Tse, C.C. 1979, p.45). Its 
production was relatively low; however, its significant involvement in MTRC,s 
projects made it a prominent figure in 1970s and 1980s. 
Henderson Land 
Henderson was established by S.K. Lee in 1973 after he resigned his directorship 
of Sun Hung Kai. Its first major project was City One Shatin in which the 
company was one of the four partners, ln fact, Henderson was active in resuming 
land piece by piece at the urban core for re-development. For example, the 
company spent four years and ten months (from March 1988 to January 1993; 
Liang 1997, p.93) in buying 28 premises to accumulate a lot of30,505 square feet 
for a building site at North Point. Therefore, Henderson was rarely seen in public 
land auctions except those held during the property slumps'l Consequently, 
Henderson has built its prominence by building and selling small- to medium-size 
flats in the urban area that were favoured by the lower-middle income households 
in the old days (Loong 1985, p.l8). 
Also, Henderson has been keen to acquire land through the accumulation 
of Land Exchange Entitlements (LEEs; details of LEE will be discussed in next 
chapter). Figure 4.4 shows the stock ofLEEs in the period between 1981 to 1986. 
As these LEEs are for the sole purpose ofexchaiige for land at New Territories for 
property developments, it is not surprising to find Henderson has begun its large 
scale residential development around late 1980s and early 1990s. Actually, the 
most recent projects are found in the New Territories, for example, Wonderland 
Villas in Kwai Chung, Sunshine City in Ma On Shan, Finery Park in Tseung Kwan 
0 , and so on. In such context, Henderson can be regarded as a late-comer, but one 
12 For instance, Henderson paid $88 million for development of residential units at Fanling on 25 
July 1989，the first public land auction after the June 4 massacre in Beijing. The auction price was 
a 25% drop o f t h e property market price at that time {SCMP, 26 July 1989). 
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of the three giant companies along Cheung Kong and Sun Hung Kai in the 
provision of private owner-occupied housing in Hong Kong. 
Sun Hung Kai Properties 
Sun Hung Kai was incorporated in August 1972 to consolidate the property 
interests of the partnership between T.S. Kwok, K.H. Fung and S.K. Lee. The 
main activity of the company has been the development of properties for sale, 
notably in the popular residential unit category. Over years, around 70 per cent of 
gross revenue has originated from property development {Express News, 13 
September 1997). The company has also 66 per cent interest in New Town 
Properties Ltd. which, as the name implies, specialises in developments in the 
New Territories and with the popular New Town Plaza in Sha Tin on the top of its 
portfolio list. In other words, Sun Hung Kai has firmly established itself as a 
major developer in new towns. ‘ 
Also, while Hang Lung was the major developer specialised in property 
developments along the MTRC Island Line, Sun Hung Kai has been the key 
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developer in the property developments above stations of the MTRC Kowloon 
Line and the Light Railway Transit (LRT). Typical examples are Sun Kwai Hing 
Gardens, Sun Kwai Fong Gardens, Sun Tuen Mun Centre and Sun Yuen Long 
Centre. 
Additionally, starting from 1994, Sun Hung Kai has become one of Hong 
Kong's largest luxury property developers, with 1.4 million square feet of 
completed prestigious properties being held for rental, including Dynasty Court 
and Hillsbourough Court in the Mid-levels and Pacific View in Tai Tam. 
Furthermore, Sun Hung Kai owns the largest land bank in Hong Kong. Figure 4.5 
indicates that its land bank in 1995 was sufficient for property development in the 
next five years. Moreover, nearly 70 per cent of these lands were centred in the 
New Territories, particularly at Yuen Long (Fig. 4.6). With its large land bank, 
most of which was acquired at competitive prices, the company will certainly 
maintain its leading role in the future property development industry. 
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Figure 4.5 Distribution o f m a j o r developers ' land banks, March 1995. 
Source-. Au-Young & Chiu (1995). 
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Figure 4.6 Major developers' land bank breakdown by location, March 1995. 
Source: Au-Young & Chiu (1995). 
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Other local Chinese-controlled property companies 
Other major local developers whose investments involve residential developments 
include Hopewell Holdings, Hysan Development and New World Development'^ 
However, their businesses mostly centre in the commercial sector, particularly 
New World Development whose properties are high quality commercial and 
residential premises situated in prime locations. 
In addition to the large property companies, there are hundreds, or even 
thousands, of smaller property companies 一 at least during the upturns in the 
property cycle (but many of them disappear during downturns). According to the 
member list of the Real Estate Developers Association ofHong K o n g " (Appendix 
II), the largest association of Hong Kong's developers, there are over 200 such 
small-to-medium sized firms operating in the property market. Many of these are 
one-man firms or offshoots of estate, construction and insurance agents. Others 
are subsidiaries of large companies. For example, the Amoy Properties is the 
subsidiary of Hang Lung. Sun Hung Kai had 16 principal subsidiaries in 1996*5， 
of which three were involved in property investment. While most of these 
subsidiaries are actual operating property companies, there are countless paper 
property companies that have been formed for tax purposes. Also, it is quite 
common for a property company to register a separate company simply for the 
purpose of undertaking one development or property transaction. 
These smaller property companies are not only active in small-to-medium 
scale residential projects, but also participate in large scale projects byjoining the 
consortium headed by large developers. For instance, Lai Sunjoined a consortium 
led by Cheung Kong in the large scale residential development at Tin Shui Wai. 
13 Major investment properties o fNew World Development are the New World Centre in Tsim Sha 
Tsui and the Hong Kong Convention and Exhibition Centre in Wan Chai. 
14 The association was established in 1976. It acts as a link between government and the private 
sector. The association presidential-level members are property giants such as Y.T. Cheng, Stanley 
Ho, Thomas Kwok, S.K. Lee, K.S. Li, T.F. Ng and Gordon Y.S. Wu. 
15 The 16 principal subsidiaries listed in the 1996 annual report were those which principally 
affected the profit and loss account or assets of the Sun Hung Kai Properties Ltd. For the Sun Hung 
Kai Group, there were totally 151 principal wholly owned subsidiaries, of which 119were involved 
in property development and investment. 
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Similarly, HKR International participated a joint venture with New World 
Development in the Discovery Park development at Tsuen Wan. 
Generally, small property companies are keen to spend $100-200 million 
to acquire properties or vacant lots in urban areas for development {SCMP, 24 
September 1997). At the same time, some companies are active in acquiring 
semi-completed projects in the New Territories that usually were granted re-
zoning approval by the Government. This investment strategy can achieve lower 
land costs, and enhance the medium-sized companies' competitiveness against 
property giants. 
Also, many small- and medium-sized companies concentrate their 
businesses in constructing residential buildings at the top-end market. Liu Chong 
Hing, for example, developed Fairview Court in Repulse Bay Road, and Po 
Garden in Brewin Path, the Peak. Yu Tai Hing, a local property developer since 
1966, is known for developing luxury houses such as Louisettes in Stanley, 
Rosecliff at Tai Tam Road and the Hazelton at Shouson Hill Road. This kind of 
development involves low plot ratio, which in turn reduces the construction cost 
but increases the rate of return in profit. At the other end, some developers only 
construct village-type houses in the New Territories. For instance, Kai Tak 
International's major projects are to re-develop the small houses of indigenous 
villagers'^ in Yuen Long and Tuen Muii. These houses are usually of European-
style, 2-3 storeys high and the size of units ranging from 350 to 700 square feet 
{Express News, 31 July 1997). 
Finally, there are numerous but an unknown number of private property 
companies who continuously or intermittently involve in residential development 
16 Indigenous villagers are, by law, those who can prove they are descended, through the male line, 
from a resident of a recognised village existing in 1898’ and are entitled to a once-in-a-lifetime grant 
of a housing site. Once the site has been granted, the villager can build a single family dwelling that 
is restricted to no more than three 700-sq-ft storeys. Theoretically, the grant is designed to provide 
housing for indigenous villagers. But, the villager may apply to remove the 'non-assignment' 
clause in the conditions of grant. After this modification, the house can be sold. Therefore, there is 
an active market in the New Territories and Outlying Islands dealing the sales of houses on sites 
assigned to indigenous villagers. 
91 
in Hong Kong. Among them, the giant company is Chinachem Group. 
Chinachem is privately owned by T.F. Wang and his wife, Nina Wang. Its 
residential projects are usually small- to medium-sized scattering in Tsuen Wan, 
Kwai Chung, San Po Kong, Kwun Tong and Sha Tin. Although it is the fourth 
biggest developer, along with Henderson, Cheung Kong and Sun Hung Kai 
{Oriental Daily, 23 May 1997), its projects are not so popular as the others'. The 
main reasons are the poor workmanship and improper design. Therefore, the 
appreciation potential of these units is relatively low. A typical example is the 
high vacancy rate of Pictorial Garden in Sha Tin (1,320 vacant units; Oriental 
Daily, 15 April 1998), which have been completed for more than two years. 
Interestingly, Chinachem never faces financial difficulties although its properties 
are not be sold within a short period. Another well-known private company is Nan 
Fung Development, which is the property arm ofNan Fung Textiles. Its first main 
project was Nan Fung Sun Chuen. 
Overseas-based property companies 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the unique performance of the Hong Kong property 
market has been attracting many overseas players since early 1980s. These 
outsiders are dominantly overseas Chinese from Southeast Asia and recently 
Chinese from Mainland China. In the Southeast Asian Chinese group, the most 
prominent one is Sino Land. 
Sino is a Singapore-based company, and is a relatively new entrant. It is 
often regarded as unorthodox in Hong Kong's real estate development industry. 
Henderson and Sun Hung Kai, for instance, have special land entitlements from 
the Government. Cheung Kong specialises in having land-use rules changed. 
Others send teams sniffing out sites around the territory. Sino relies largely on 
public auctions. Take 1986/87 as an example. Sino won seven out of 23 lots of 
land sold in public auctions {Ming Pao, 2 December 1987). In the land auction, 
Sino is characterised by its aggressive bidding. There are, in fact, many notable 
examples. In December 1993, Sino paid a record $3.94 billion for the Ling Ping 
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Road residential site at a government auction, on average about $58,244 per square 
metre {Hong Kong Economic Times, 16 December 1993). Recently, on 25 March 
1997, Sino paid $11.82 billion (or US $1.53 billion) to beat offmore than 14 rival 
bidders to win a large residential site in Siu Sai Wan — a site which was probably 
the highest price paid at auction for any site in the world {SCMP, 26 March 1997). 
Currently, Sino is the fifth largest property developers in Hong Kong (Healey & 
Shameen 1998)，and its most well known project is the Gold Coast, Tuen Mun. 
In the Mainland Chinese group, two companies are particularly active in 
the property development sector. They are the China Overseas Land and 
Investment Ltd. (COLI) and the CITIC Pacific. 
Established in 1979 as a subsidiary company of the China State 
Construction Engineering Corporation, COLI is the largest of the China funded 
enterprises directly engaged in property development. In the period 1985-93, the 
company completed some 26 residential aiid/or commercial development projects 
in Hong Kong (Hastings 1995, p.8), and the annual report listed some $5,274 
million as attributable to property interests. On 20 August 1992, the company was 
listed on Hong Kong Stock Exchange, and reported its land bank of 3,619 square 
feet of agricultural land in Yuen Long. Its recent projects are mostly located at the 
New Territories, for example, Parc Royale in Sha Tin, Classical Garden in Tai Po 
and Union Plaza in Fanling. 
CITIC Pacific, another key China-related company, is the Hong Kong 
representative office of CITIC, Beijing (a state-owned enterprise). Established in 
1985-86, it acts as the investment arm of the Beijing government. Since inception, 
the company has undertaken a series of purchases to acquire land and real estate 
development schemes in the form of joint ventures with one of the major local 
developers. Its latest project is the Paragon in Tai Po. Clearly, companies with 
powerful Mainland Chinese backing are now in a position to compete on equal 
terms with any local or overseas developer. As a result, there is an increasingly 
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sophisticated group ofinvestors who will become major players in the Hong Kong 
housing market. 
Public-sector developers 
Hong Kong Housing Authority 
The main public-sector developer in Hong Kong is the Hong Kong Housing 
Authority (HKHA) and is the housing body of the Government. Constituted in 
1954, the authority plans and builds public sector housing, either for rent or sale. It 
manages public housing estates, Home Ownership Scheme (HOS) courts, interim 
housing, cottage areas, transit centres, flatted factories, commercial facilities and 
other community and ancillary facilities throughout the territory. It also 
administers the PSPS and the Home Purchase Loan Scheme. 
Increasingly, the HKHA has become the largest developer in the provision 
of owner-occupied housing in Hong Kong. Since the set up o fHOS in 1976 and 
PSPS in 1977, over 266,000 flats have been sold (see Table 4.3 and Appendix III). 
As Appendix III shows, HOS and PSPS flats scatter in every corner of Hong 
Kong. Indeed, the success o fHOS has enabled the HKHA to become financially 
self-supporting since 1992 and to generate sufficient funds to finance its large 
public housing production programme'^ ln 1995/96, the revenue from HOS sales 
amounted to 56 per cent of the total income (HKHA 1996b., p.5). It is the 
Government's objective to promote home ownership rate to 70 per cent by 2007. 
To fulfil this objective, HKHA plans to build 175,000 flats for sale over the period 
from April 1995 to March 2001 (Hong Kong Government 1997a, p.20). 
Hong Kong Housing Society 
The Housing Society (HKHS) is an independent, non-profit-making organisation, 
established in 1948. lt provides housing for specific low-income groups in Hong 
17 In the consultative document of the LTHS, the HKHA plans its annual production of 54,000 PRH 
units in the period from 1995-96 to 2000-01, and 39,000 units in the period from 2001-02 to 
2005-06 (Hong Kong Government 1997a, p.6). 
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Table 4.3 Number of HOS and PSPS flats, 1978-97. 
Year Phase no.# No. of flats 
1 9 7 8 / 7 9 ~ i 9 , 8 7 9 “ 
1980/81 2 A a n d 2 B 3,574 
1981/82 3 A a n d 3 B 5,407 
1982/83 4 A a n d 4 B 10,648 
1983/84 5 A a n d 5 B 8,165 
1984/85 6 A a n d 6 B 12,520 
1985/86 7 A , 7 B a n d 7 C 12,574 
1986/87 8A, 8B and 8C 16,648 
1987/88 9A, 9B and 9C 12,242 
1988/89 lOA, 10B and 10C 15,437 
1989/90 l l A , l l B a n d 11C 17,372 
1990/91 1 2 A , 1 2 B a n d l 2 C 16,525 
1991/92 13A, 13Band 13C 18,634 
1992/93 14A, 14B and 14C 22,015 
1993/94 15A, 15Band 15C 14,658 
1994/95 1 6 A a n d l 6 B 12,774 
1995/96 1 7 A a n d l 7 B 12,789 
1996/97 18A, 18B and 18C 13,731 
1997/98 19A, 19B and 19C 31,030 
T O T A L 266,622 ~ 
# details of HOS and PSPS flats introduced in each phase shown in Appendix III. 
Source: HKHA. 
Kong. Apart from the construction of rental estates, the Society builds owner-
occupied housing through three schemes. 
The first scheme is Urban Improvement Scheme (UIS) that was 
established in 1974 with a $100 million starter loan to be repaid in 1994'l Under 
such scheme, slum properties in decaying urban areas are identified for re-
development. As the properties are resumed at market price, the re-developed 
units are therefore sold at market price, just like ordinary private housing units. 
Then in 1988, a Flat-For-Sale Scheme (FFSS) was initiated under which quality 
flats at concessionary prices are provided to the low-to-middle income families. 
At the end of 1997, the above two schemes produced a total of 12,717 units (Table 
4.4). 
'8 Also, in 1994, the Housing Society issued $2,000 million Floating Rate Mote to raise funds from 
the commercial sector. 
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Table 4.4 Owner-occupied housing production by HKHS, 1985-98. 
Year UIS FFSS SCHS Total 
1985/86 97 - - � ~ 
1986/87 380 - - 380 
1987/88 485 - - 485 
1988/89 450 926 - 1,376 
1989/90 - 254 - 254 
1990/91 - - - -
1991/92 998 1,328 - 2,326 
1992/93 - 638 - 638 
1993/94 69 400 - 469 
1994/95 154 - - 154 
1995/96 448 1,128 1,024 2,600 
1996/97 - - 882 882 
1997/98 900 4,062 4,010 8,972 
TOTAL 3,981 8,736 5,916 18,633 
Source.. HKHS. 
In August 1993, the Government launched the Sandwich Class Housing 
Scheme (SCHS), and the Housing Society was appointed to implement both the 
Loan Scheme and the Main Scheme in phases. In the Main Scheme, the Society 
constructs flats for sale to the middle-income families at affordable prices. It has 
to pay 50 per cent land premium for the land and to finance the full cost of 
construction. The reduced land cost enables the flats to be sold at approximately 
30 per cent below the market price (So, V. 1996, p.52). The first SCHS project 
was Tivoli Garden in Tsiiig Yi offering 1,024 flats, and completed in December 
1995. The another development was Park Belvedere in Ma On Shan that offered 
882 flats at the end of 1997. Apart from these two, nine other sites were granted at 
the first batch'^, and another 11 SCHS projects have been identified that will 
produce some 12,000 units, so that the Society will produce a total of30,000 units 
by the year 2003. 
19 The other sites for Batch 1 SCHS Main Scheme locate throughout the territory at Ap Lei Chau, 
Diamond Hill, Ho Man Tin, Sha Tin, 2 sites at Kwai Chung and 3 sites at Tseung Kwan 0 . 
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Land Development Corporation 
Land Development Corporation (LDC), a quasi-government corporation, was 
established by the Government on 10 December 1987 under the LDC Ordinance 
(Chapter 15). It aims to improve the urban environment through urban renewal. 
To enable the Corporation to carry out such a task, the ordinance has given it the 
power to prepare and implement development proposal. Once the land has been 
acquired, LDC will implement its plans for urban renewal either independently or 
with participation of private developers. The residential units produced will be 
sold to the public at market prices. 
As the LDC was provided with an interest-bearing loan facility of $ 100 
million as initial funding by the Government 一 a very modest sum indeed in 
terms ofinvestment capital in real estate development, only six residential projects 
have been completed so far which are listed in Table 4.5. This also reflects the 
difficulties of LDC to assemble sites for re-development. However, given its 
pledge of achieving an annual production of 85,000 housing units in next ten 
years, the Government plans to upgrade LDC to the Land Renewal Authority in 
1999 and delegate much power to speed up the urban renewal process. In fact, 
LDC has planned to produce a total of5,838 residential units up to 2003^°. 
Other public companies 
As described at the beginning of the chapter, there are many public companies that 
are involved in property development in Hong Kong, even though their main 
business interests lie elsewhere. In this group, the two most prominent are the 
MTRC and KCRC. 
Mass Transit Railway Corporation 
The MTRC is a statutory body established by Hong Kong government in 1975 to 
construct and operate an underground railway system on prudent commercial 
2° This figure is provided by the Personal Relation Department, LDC. 
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Table 4.5 Owner-occupied housing production by LDC, 1994-96. 
“ No. of 
Projects Developer residential units 
A. Completed projects 
— L i Chit Garden, Wan Chai New World 180 ~ 
Ko Nga Court New World 226 
~ Ko Chun Court, Sai Ying Pun New World 26 — 
~ ~ t a i Yuen Court, Wan Chai LDC 100 
— Y a n Yee Court, Wan Chai LDC 46 
Kui Yan Court, Sai Ying Pun LDC 48 
—Total 626 
B. Under construction 
Bulkeiey Street, Hung Hom LDC 54~~ 
—Total 54 
C. Under active implementation 
Queen Street, Sheiing Wan New World + Cheung Kong 850 
Wanchai Road/Tai Yuen Street, Chinese Estates Holding + 
Wan Chai Kwong Sang Hong + 432 
Chi Cheung Investment + 
Peregrine Investment  
Kwong Yung Street, Mong Kok LDC 192 
Gillies Avenue, Hung Hom LDC 160 
— N g a Tsin Wai Village, San Po Kong LDC 648 —  
Macpherson Stadium, Mong Kok Hong Kong Playground 
Association 308 
Tsuen Wan Town Centre LDC 1,728 
Kennedy Town New Praya LDC 784 
一 Yeung Uk Road, Tsuen Wan LDC 608 
Ka Wai Man Road, Kennedy Town LDC — 128 
Total 5,838 
Source: Personal Relation Section, LDC. 
principles. Since the MTRC had heavy commitments to the railway construction, 
resources for property development were limited. Besides, in order to maximise 
profits and avoid as much risk as possible, the MTRC adopted the policy to rely on 
the expertise and financial resources of local or overseas developers. As a result, 
air space over the MTR stations and depots were co-developed by MTRC and 
property developers in the form of joint ventures. 
The MTRC started its property co-developments in 1976. The first project 
was the residential development over the Kowloon Bay depot, that is the Telford 
Garden. Thereafter, various projects were implemented along the railway line 
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during 1977 to 1990. The total number ofresidential properties was 31,366 (Table 
4.6), making it one ofthe largest property management companies in Hong Kong. 
Table 4.6 List of M T R C property co-development projects, 1976-90. 
No. of 
Developed project Station Developer residential flats 
Telford Gardens Kowloon Bay Hang Lung + Hopewell 4 ,992 
Luk Yeung Sun Chuen Tsuen Wan Dai Sun + 
Hong Kong Land + 4,000 
Jardines 
N e w Kwai Fong Gardens Kwai Fong Sun Hung Kai 1,264 
Sun Kwai Hing Gardens Kwai Hing Sun Hung Kai 600 
Kornhill Taikoo Hang Lung + 
N e w World Development 8,828 
Fortress Metro Tower Fortress Hill Hang Lung + 
N e w World Development 757 
Hongway Garden Sheung Wan Hang Lung + 
New World Development 4 J 2  
Perfect Mount Gardens Shau Kei Wan Tai Wing Construction 760 
N e w Jade Garden C l i a i W a n Sun Hung Kai 1,488 
SoLithorn Garden Wan Cliai Hang Lung + 
N e w World Development 480 
Heng Fa Chuen Heng Fa Chuen Heng Fa Chiien Development 6 ,560 
Park Towers Tin Hau Hang Lung + 
N e w World Development 493 
Felicity Garden Sai Wan Ho N e w World Development 732 
Total 31,孙6 
Source: MTRC's 1988 aiiiiual report. 
Kowloon Canton Railway Corporation 
The KCRC was established on 24 December 1982 under the KCRC Ordinance 
(Chapter 372) to undertake the operation of the British Section of the Kowloon 
Canton Railway. Although its principal activities are to operate a railway system 
between Kowloon and Lo Wu, and a LRT system in Western New Territories, 
property development is also the official principal activity. In fact, at least 8 per 
cent of its recurrent revenue came from commercial properties in the years 1990-
93. In 1997, more than 60 per cent of its net profit was derived from property 
development along the KCR and LRT lines {SCMP, 26 March 1998). The KCRC 
has participated in at least eight residential projects located at sites originally 
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owned by itself. All these projects are jointly developed with private developers 
(Table 4.7), and the first co-development was Jubilee Garden at Sha Tin depot in 
1983. 
Table 4 .7 List o f K C R C property co-development projects, 1983-98. 
No. of Tota l 
Project Station Developer residential residential  
units floor area (m2) 
Hanford Garden Tuen Mun LRT Hang Lung i 7 I 88,000 
Ho Tung Lau Ho Tung Lau KCR depot Sun Hung Kai n.a. 271,660 
Jubilee Garden Sha Tin KCR Cheung Kong 2,260 n.a. 
Manlai Court Tai Wai KCR Cheung Kong 640 43,850 
Pierhead Garden Tun Mun LRT New World 1,400 91,400 
RoyalAscot ,Phases l&l l Fo Tan KCR Sun Hung Kai 2,500 271,656 
Sun Yuen Long Centre Yuen Long LRT Sun Hung Kai 1,072 66,430 
Sun Tuen Mun Centre Tuen Mun LRT Sun Hung Kai 4,500 200,000 
Source: KCRC's annual reports, various years. 
Others 
Finally, less visible than the property companies but nonetheless important, is the 
involvement of private organisations in property development. They are usually 
owners of a block of building(s) who consider the re-development of the existing 
buildings to be a financially rewarding investment, either because o f the fact that 
the existing building(s) is/are too old or dilapidated or the development potential 
of the land has not yet been fully exploited. Due to the capital intensive nature of 
property development and their lack of professional knowledge in this particular 
field, these organisations form a joint venture agreement with a commercial 
property developer who is responsible to finance the construction costs and to 
provide all necessary professional expertise. The profits of the project will then be 
divided between the two parties according to a pre-determined formula, either in 
the form ofcash or proportional floor space ofthe building, after its completion. A 
recent example is the Cheung Kong's Deerhill Bay development in Tai Po. Its 
joint venture partner is the Chinese Anglican Church in Hong Kong, who provided 
the 1.96 million square feet site, ln return the Church has the right to retain one-
third of the apartments for long-term investment upon completion. 
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Table 4.8 Developmental phases o f H o n g Kong property developers. 
Primary residential 
Phase Period Characteristics of property firms developments 
I 1945-71 Many Chinese individual developers, Tenement buildings and later  
and 4 dominant British hongs. single high-rise buildings. 
n 1972-81~~~Emerging Chinese public f irms, but Single high-rise buildings and 
British-controlled f i rms still dominant small scale estate  
developments . 
III 1982-91 Dominant large Chinese f irms, Dominant ly large scale 
shrinking of British-controlled firms, residential estates, 
and emergence of overseas Chinese  
f irms.  
IV 1992- Public-sector development agencies Mix of small, medium and large 
present increasingly grow large, rise of scale residential 
medium-sized f irms, but large f i rms developments .  
still dominate 
In sum, a better understanding of the Hong Kong property developers can 
be achieved by positing four significant phases in its development as shown 
schematically in Table 4.8. These phases tend to coincide with the economic and 
political shifts in Hong Kong. Before 1971,the structure ofhousing provision was 
largely a reflection of the political domination ofthe British. In 1972, the Chinese 
developers made a triumphant entry to the scene largely because oftheir economic 
power. In 1982, the political factor again provided a major stimulant for change 
leading to an apparent replacement of the British interests with those of the 
Chinese. Finally in 1992, the large Chinese property companies became much 
more prominent. Overall, a pattern has evolved of a conglomeration at the top with 
a proliferation of subsidiaries at the bottom. Between them are groups of 
medium-sized firms and some overseas Chinese-controlled public companies, ln 
other words, a pattern that parallels other industries in Hong Kong, though arriving 
a little later in the case of property development after the deregulation of the 
banking system in 1976. 
Conclusion 
From the preceding discussion, it can be seen that the changing economic and 
political conditions of Hong Kong provided the opportunities for the rise of 
101 
powerful Chinese entrepreneurs. But how that opportunity was being exploited 
was determined by the Government land, housing and planning policies at that 
time. The following chapters are therefore structured to flow from the 
development process in providing owner-occupied housing, to the property 
developers' economic power in the residential market, then their political power in 
the Hong Kong economy, and finally to considerations for the future structure of 
owner-occupied housing in Hong Kong. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE OWNER-OCCUPIED HOUSING PROVISION IN HONG 
KONG 
Housing provision encompasses production, distribution, exchange and 
consumption. To understand a specific structure of housing provision, it is 
necessary to look at how housing is being produced. 
The conclusion we reach is not that production, distribution, 
exchange and consumption are identical, but that they all form 
members of a totality, distinctions within a unity. Production 
predominates not only over itself, in the antithetical definition of 
production, but over all other moments as well. The process always 
returns to production to begin anew. ... A definite production thus 
determines a definite consumption, distribution and exchange as well 
as definite relations between these different moments. 
Admittedly, however, in its one-sided form, production is in itself 
determined by the other moments. For example if the market, i.e. the 
sphere of exchange, expands, then production grows in quantity and 
the divisions between its different branches become deeper. A 
change in distribution changes production, e.g. concentration of 
capital, different distributions of the population between town and 
country, etc. Finally, the needs of consumption determine 
production. Mutual interaction takes place between the different 
moments. This is the case with every organic whole (Marx 1973, 
quoted in Clarke & Purvis 1994, p.l092, emphasis in original). 
This famous statement of Marx's, taken from the Grundrisse, indicates a 
broader ‘antithetical’ definition of production, and states that '[t]he [capital 
circulation] process always returns to production to begin anew，. In other words, 
in looking at housing provision, one needs to look at the moment of production as 
the key moment in transforming the whole. 
In the production of housing, there is a whole range of institutions and 
interests, that is, the agents, involved. These agents, as well as the relations that are 
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established between them in the production process, can vary. Chapter 3 has 
explained that a specific form of housing production is an articulated combination 
of conditions, relations and means of production structured in a relation into which 
each one of the defining elements specifies the condition of existence of the others. 
In this study, property developers are placed as the key agent in the Hong Kong 
owner-occupied housing provision. However, to facilitate housing development, 
they need to negotiate with other agents, in particular the Government. The 
process of negotiation is one of structured interaction, a bargaining within certain 
sets of changing rules. These interactions can be defined as a game in so far as 
games are rule-governing behaviours where outcomes are uncertain (Short, 
Fleming&Witt 1986, p.2). 
In such context, this chapter provides a comprehensive analysis on the 
housing development process in Hong Kong. From it, new insights and 
clarification of the patterns, causes and trends ofhousing development, and actions 
and behaviours of property developers are systematically presented. 
Forms of housing production 
Housing can be produced in many ways. Cardoso and Short (1983) identify four 
different forms of housing production (Fig. 5.1). 
(a) self-produced housing 
Self-produced housing production (see Fig. 5.1a) corresponds to the non-
existence of any type ofhousing market. Values are created for use rather than 
for exchange. Owner occupation in Third World countries belongs to this form 
ofhousing production, the occupier being the developer, builder, labourer and 
tenant. 
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Conditions Relations between Forms of housing 
of production agents of production consumption 
(a) Self-produced housing 
developer 
Land and finance ^ builder = owner occupier 
labourer 
(b) Individual contract production 









fcJ Institutional contract production 




(2) Land and finance ^ developer ^ owner occupier 
个 ~ ~  
builder 
I • landlord > tenant 
labourer 
(d) Speculative production 
Land and finance • developer 
builder • owner occupier 
i k 
labourer  
^ landlord ^ tenant 
Figure 5.1 Forms ofhousing production. 
Source.. Cardoso and Short (1983), Fig. 2. 
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(b) individual contract production 
This form of production (see Fig. 5.1b) reflects two fundamental processes — 
first, the separation between the owner and consumer of the product, on the one 
hand, and the labour process, on the other; and second, the separation of labour 
from the means of production. The eventual owner of the housing assembles 
the land necessary for building, and either self-finances the construction of the 
house or obtains finance through formal or informal channels. Because of the 
individual nature of the process of production and the consumer control of the 
product during the production phase, this form can provide relatively high 
quality housing. Thus, only the very rich can afford to employ builders on an 
individual contract, as in Figure 5.1b(2). 
(c) institutional contract production 
The separation between labour and the means of production is now matched by 
the separation between the consumers and the control over the production of 
the product (Fig. 5.1c). Institutional developers include the local governments, 
the central state, and companies that sell [Fig. 5.1c(2)] and/or rent dwellings 
[Fig. 5.1c(l)]. Large amounts of land are now necessary, since many 
dwellings, rather than individual dwellings, will be constructed at the same 
time. Housing for rent is the predominant tenure type associated with this form 
ofhousing production, though not necessarily the only one. Owner occupation 
can also be linked with this productive form. 
(d) speculative production 
A mass market is the most important condition for this form of housing 
production (see Fig. 5.1d). Producers generally do not build to order, but 
instead adjust housing starts and completions in relation to demand conditions 
and price and cost expectations. When demand is on the down-swing, firms 
may lengthen completion lags, and may quickly reduce starts. In periods of 
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demand expansion, speculative producers raise completion rates, and initiate 
new starts. 
In this respect, the production of speculative housing has a number of specific 
features that can distinguish it from other types ofhousing production (Short et. 
al 1986, p.37-38): 
1. Land is an essential element, which brings developers into direct contact and 
sometimes conflict with landowners and with the whole system of land use 
planning both at the national and local levels. 
2. The circulation time of capital employed in the housebuilding sector is 
comparatively long. Money has to be spent on labour and materials, and 
the long construction period means that capital is not realised until many 
months elapse and the house is sold. This means that the housebuilding 
sector can be very reliant on external sources of finance to bridge the gap 
between production and realisation. 
3. The fmal product is expensive. The immediate purchase of a dwelling is 
beyond the reach of all but the wealthiest of households. The speculative 
housebuilding industry can exist only through some mechanism that 
enables households to purchase the dwelling but phase the repayments over 
a period ofyears. Bank loans fulfil this role, but this means that the health 
of the housebuilding sector is crucially dependent on these sources of 
finance. 
4. The consumption of housing requires infrastructure investments. On the 
one hand, there is the physical infrastructure of roads, pavements, sewerage 
and basic services of lighting and others necessary before housing can be 
adequately consumed. Often there are statutory levels laid down for such 
provision. On the other hand, there is the social infrastructure of shops, 
schools and cultural facilities that may or may not have such similar 
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Statutory levels but nevertheless are important elements in housing 
consumption and are used in households' housing choices. Frequently, 
developers seek to pass the infrastructure cost on to public authorities. 
In Hong Kong, owner-occupation is closely associated with the speculative 
form of housing production. Also, there is a tendency for integration between 
housing production and the production of the total surrounding environment, 
including social and physical elements. Housing production now increasingly 
tends to mean production of the entire physical space under the control of one 
single big property company. In other words, developers are building a community 
instead of jus t building houses. 
The housing development process in Hong Kong 
At its most simple, residential development can be likened to any other industrial 
production that involves the combination of various inputs in order to achieve an 
output or a product. In the case ofresidential development, the product is a change 
of land use and/or a new or altered building, and the production combines land, 
labour, materials and finance. 
In Hong Kong, the process of residential development can be summarised 
as a series of stages (Fig. 5.2). These stages are interrelated, but temporally 
separate, activities. Although the operations are presented in sequential fashion, 
the real process is more complex, and a developer is likely to be involved at various 
stages of the production on different sites. 
At first sight, developers may seem solely passive reactors to external 
forces. This is certainly how the problems of speculative developers ideologically 
are treated within most political and polemical debates. Yet such passivity is 
misplaced as developers' drive for profit plays a determining role. The way in 
which each developer arranges its development process determines the firm's 
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Figure 5.2 Housing development process in Hong Kong. 
Source: adapted from Poon and others (1995), Fig. 1. 
individual relation to those external pressures and, in total, firms' actions help to 
determine the characteristics of the markets in which they operate. At the same 
time, government's regulatory mechanism oversees the whole development 
process, and involves four key types of controls: (i) land, (ii) planning, (iii) 
building, and (iv) selling. 
L a n d search and assembly 
Land assembly is a central element in housing provision because of the effects it 
has both on the cost of housing and the way it is produced. The way in which 
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governments influence the release of land for building through planning and 
development rules will therefore be crucial. This also provides a further means to 
influence the production system, by regulating the location and volume of new 
housebuilding. In Hong Kong, developers acquire land directly from government 
and/or land already leased to the private sector. 
Acquiring government land 
Developers can acquire government land by means of public auction, public tender 
and private treaty grant. At public auction, the Government's basic policy is to sell 
land to the highest bidder', subject to an un-disclosed reserve price below which 
the Government will withdraw the land from sale. The successful bidder will have 
one month's time to complete the purchase and pay in full the purchase price that is 
called land premium, ln public tender, land is not sold to the public but to the user 
who is strictly defined. Sales by tender have become more popular since the 1980s 
when the Government often requires the developer to build and surrender part of 
the development on completion for government use. Land for community 
purposes such as public housing, home ownership schemes, public utilities, 
schools, churches, clinics, welfare and certain charitable purposes is usually 
granted by a private treaty grant. However, the land sale in Hong Kong either by 
public auction or public tender is different from the selling of land under a freehold 
system. It is the sale of the land lease, not the land. 
Hong Kong has a rather peculiar land tenure system? Except for one piece 
of land, that is the land on which St John's Cathedral in Garden Road stands (Wu 
1983, p.2), all lands in Hong Kong belong to the Government. Lands are 
regularised into land lots that are then allocated as leaseholds to private users for a 
fixed period of time. Lands on the Hong Kong Island leased in the nineteenth 
century generally carried a 999 year lease. All privately held land parcels in the 
‘The land sale policy has a long history. The first land sale took place on 14 June 1841, and was 
restricted to 50 lots only (Bristow 1984’ p.23). Later, in 1960, the Government began to draw up an 
annual auction programme for the regular provision of government land (ibid., p.85). 
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New Territories were leased for a period of 99 years, beginning from 1 July 1898 
and terminating three days before 30 June 1997. Most other land carries a 75 year 
lease, which can be renewable or non-renewable. Contained in the lease are 
clauses that specify the annual land rent and the type(s) of use that is (are) 
permissible on the respective land parcel. After 1 July 1997, the present leasehold 
system continues. Currently, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 
(HKSAR) government can issue new leases with terms lasting until 2047 through 
the existing land disposal system of public auction, tender or private treaty grant. 
Such leasehold system allows the Government to derive substantial 
revenue from land; first by sale of land leases (or simply land sales); second from 
lease renewal; and third from alterations of lease conditions (will be discussed 
later). Table 5.1 gives the relative contributions of the different types of land 
revenues in the period 1974-90. Before the year 1985, revenues derived from land 
premium, whether in terms of the absolute amount or as a proportion of total 
government revenue, exhibited wide fluctuations, but were nevertheless 
consistently substantial over time 一 the percentage contribution of land sales 
revenue averaged 14.7 per cent in the period 1970-84. At times of falling property 
prices, such as what had happened in 1982-84, total land premium did experience 
drastic decline. However, even in this period an average of 11.85 per cent of the 
general revenue was derived from land sales. 
But, starting from 27 May 1985, the revenue generated from land sales 
were limited by the Sino-British Joint Declaration on the Future ofHong Kong 
(the Joint Declaration) that was concluded between the Chinese and British 
governments on 26 September 1984. According to Annex III of the Joint 
Declaration, land sales by the then Hong Kong government during the transition 
period, that is from 27 May 1985 to 30 June 1997, was restricted to 50 hectares per 
annum. (Lands leased to the Housing Authority (HKHA) for the construction of 
2 Detailed discussion of Hong Kong land tenure system can be found in Bristow (1984)，Leung, 
C.Y.(1986) and Yeh(1994). 
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Table 5.1 Revenues from land transactions, 1974-90. 
in $ million 
Total Total % of land 
Land Lease Lease land government premium 
Year sales modification renewal premium revenue '" total 
revenue 
“ 1 9 7 4 242.6 5 ^ 2 ^ 318.6 5,305.8 0 ~ 
1975 211.7 63.3 12.4 287.4 5,973.1 4.8 
1976 258.1 66.8 21.0 345.9 6,724.6 5.1 
1977 350.5 137.4 69.4 557.3 7,575.8 7.4 
1978 1,557.9 217.4 56.0 1,831.3 10,232.6 17.9 
1979 1,647.0 299.8 34.0 2,007.8 12,557.0 16.0 
1980 2,416.6 396.9 31.7 2,845.2 16,796.1 16.9 
1981 9,972.1 768.5 29.2 10,769.8 30,290.3 35.6 
1982 8,955.3 690.0 31.2 9,676.5 34,312.9 28.2 
1983 4,678.8 314.2 55.2 5,048.2 31,097.6 16.2 
1984 2,049.5 180.3 37.3 2,267.1 30,399.7 7.5 
1985 3,592.9 653.0 21.3 4,267.2 36,342.5 11.7 
1986* 3,688.2 183.6 23.2 3,895.0 43,695.0 8.9 
1987* 519.8 120.2 116.0 756.0 48,602.0 1.6 
1988* 296.] 134.5 30.4 461.0 60,875.0 0.8 
1989* 308.7 28.1 28.2 365.0 72,658.0 0.5 
1990* 180.1 1^ 28.9 212.0 82,429.0 0.3 
1974-90 40,952.9 4,312.9 645.5 45,911.3 535,867.0 8.6 
* Following the implementation of Annex III of the Joint Declaration, the ambit of this revenue 
head was revised to include only land transactions completed before the coming into force of the 
Joint Declaration, i.e., before 27 May 1985, or land transactions conferring a benefit that expired 
before 30 June 1997. Revenue from land transactions that conferred a benefit that extended 
beyond 30 June 1997 and completed after 27 May 1985 were credited direct to the 'Suspense 
Account' of the Capital Works Reserve Fund for sharing between the former Hong Kong 
government and the Government of HKSAR. 
Source: Yeh (1994), Table 1. 
public rental housing (PRH) were exempted from this land sales limit). Also, 
proceeds from government land transactions, whether in terms of disposal of new 
lands or modification of existing leases, after deducting site formation costs, were 
distributed on a 50:50 basis to the then Hong Kong government and new HKSAR 
government, respectively. 
Table 5.1 shows that starting from 1985, the percentage ofland premium in 
total revenue was diminishing. But, at the other side of picture, wealth was 
accumulating via the Land Fund for the HKSAR government. The Land Fund was 
set up in 1986 to help generate reserves for the HKSAR government, and received 
half of all land revenues, after the deduction of development costs, up until the 
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handover on 30 June 1997. Figure 5.3 shows that the fund stood at $430 million in 
1986 and built up to a staggering $197 billion in 1997. 
$ billion 
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Figure 5.3 Net assets ofLand Fund, 1986-97. 
Source: Express News, 30 September 1997. 
Data shown in Table 5.1 and Figure 5.3 produce the image that there was a 
substantial supply of government land to public. Yet, closer examination reveals 
that it was not. In fact, the amount of land sold at public auctions each year, not 
including lands granted under public tenders and private treaties, averaged some 35 
hectares over the period 1978-85 (see Table 5.2). In relation to the size of the 
existing built-up area, which is only slightly larger than 10,000 hectares (or 100 sq 
km), and in consideration of the high costs of land formation in Hong Kong that 
had been estimated in 1986 to average $1,400 per square metre by the Government 
(Li 1990b, p.92) due to the territory's rugged terrain and the high cost of land 
acquisition, such a level of new land acquisition was indeed quite high. 
Figure 5.4 shows that the amount of residential land disposed (including 
land disposed under public auction, public tender and private treaty grant) by the 
Sino-British Land Commission. The 50-hectare land sales limit further reduced 
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Table 5.2 Area of government land sold at public auction, 1978-96. 
Total area of Area of residential % 
Year land sold land sold of residential land in 
(hectares) (hectares) total land sold 
1978/79 n A 2 ^ 5?9 
1979/80 42.30 26.27 62.1 
1980/81 65.61 40.00 61.0 
1981/82 37.22 23.54 63.2 
1982/83 53.91 8.01 14.9 
1983/84 11.46 5.44 47.5 
1984/85 2 ^ 20.38 ^  
"~1978-1985 
Average 35.09 18.65 5^  
1985/86 1 9 . 1 5 “ 13.06 68.2 “ " “ ^ 
1986/87 10.55 4.23 40.1 
1987/88 9.81 4.45 45.4 
1988/89 26.28 17.28 65.8 
1989/90 15.92 9.92 62.3 
1990/91 27.07 21.32 78.7 
1991/92 22.87 17.04 74.5 
1992/93 18.14 12.19 67.2 
1993/94 16.85 13.29 78.9 
1994/95 24.74 20.75 83.9 
1995/96 8 ^ 2 2 ^ ^  
““1985-1996 
Average 25.52 14.06 5JJ_  
1978-1996 ~ ~ ~ ^ " ~ ~ ^ ^ """^  ^  ^ 
Average 29.55 15.99 ^  
Source: Census and Statistics Department, Annual Digest of Statistics, various issues, 
hectares 
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the supply of residential land. Such limited supply of residential land and the high 
land cost induce developers to find other means to acquire land. Actually, the main 
source ofland for residential development is not from the Government, but through 
cumulative purchases in the private sector of leased land with re-development 
potential. This is evidenced in Table 5.1. It shows that modifications of existing 
land leases that often involved re-development were of some importance. In eight 
out of 17 years covered (i.e., 1974-90)，over 15 per cent of the total land revenues 
was derived from modifications of existing leases�. As a large proportion of new 
lands disposed by the Government was in the New Territories, the only source of 
land to provide housing in urban areas was to re-develop the built up areas. 
Acquiring land from private sector 
To overcome the limited supply of residential land, developers are keen to re-
develop or rehabilitate the old urban core, or convert non-intensively used lands, 
such as dockyards, warehouses, farms and low density staff quarters to more 
profitable residential developments. However, strategies to identify the right site 
for re-development used by developers are closely related to a developer's annual 
number of completions, and more fundamentally related to its financial strength. 
Typically, the small-sized property companies rely almost exclusively upon 
purchases direct from the private leaseholders. The most favoured sites of these 
firms are the single buildings in the old districts, such as Sheung Wan, Yau Ma Tei 
and To Kwa Wan. The medium-sized firms about equally rely upon private 
leaseholders for direct purchases, but they do have a reasonably diverse source of 
supply. They sometimes operate on the large sites via inter-developer dealings. 
Generally, when developers have identified a site that has a high re-
development value, they will try to access individual leaseholders^ (if they can 
successfully identify them). The price they pay to the individual leaseholders will 
3 Lease modification premium is normally assessed on the basis of the difference between the land 
values before and after modification. 
4 In Hong Kong, virtually all urban properties are under multiple ownership. For instance, a typical 
30-storey residential tower may contain as many as 480 titles (Lai, W-C.L. 1994, footnote 51). 
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depend on the market value of the flats and on the future value of the re-developed 
units. The prices they pay are usually 10 to 20 per cent higher than the market 
value (Lee & Wong 1988, p.55). These will act both as a sweetener for 
leaseholders and a compensation to them for their removal expenses. 
Normally, the private developer will make conditional offers to those 
leaseholders who accept compensations. The offer will be effective if the 
developer can successfully acquire all the relevant properties, or at least the key 
ones, in the re-development site. Otherwise, the offer will be void. This 
conditional offer protects the interest of the developer in case that the last few 
leaseholders refuse to sell their properties or demand unreasonably high prices. In 
some cases, developers may compromise and pay higher prices for some flats. 
However, when the request is too ex-orbitant, developers may prefer to abandon 
the whole re-development project instead of working on a non-profitable one. The 
conditional offer will help to limit the loss of developers to the administration and 
liaison costs at the beginning stage of the re-development project. In such context, 
private developers enjoy more flexibility than the rigid government departments 
and the Land Development Corporation (LDC). Their prices paid to the 
leaseholders can be adjusted to market conditions immediately, and can also take 
into account the potential values of the re-development. In addition, private 
developers usually are not responsible for the re-housing of tenants and 
leaseholders. 
For the large developers, they often have a specialised land search 
department. In order to avoid the high price paid in land auction, they spend more 
time in obtaining cheaper land. However, to amalgamate pieces of land into a 
sufficient size for re-development requires considerable search and negotiation. A 
much quicker way is to find a large piece of land owned by a single party. 
A good example of this kind of re-development project is the senior 
government staff quarters that are located in high-valued residential districts like 
Tai Hang, Happy Valley, North Point and Kowloon Tong. These quarters were 
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offered by the Government to its senior staff at preferential prices years ago. The 
physical conditions of these buildings are still good. It is the re-development value 
of these quarters that attracts the interest of private developers. Usually, the plot 
ratio of these quarters is not fully utilised. Hence, it is profitable to re-develop 
these sites by constructing taller buildings that can fully utilise the plot ratio. 
Another attraction of these quarters is that they usually have committees 
that are responsible for the daily administration of the quarters. These committees 
can serve as a link between developers and property owners. Therefore, it is easier 
for the developers to communicate with the property owners. Also, individual 
owners will have more trust in a party that represents their interest in the 
negotiation with developer on compensations. This will probably speed up the 
negotiation process. Besides, the areas of these sites are usually of considerable 
size. It is most cost effective to negotiate a single or several parties for a piece of 
large site than to negotiate with dispersed owners for a small site. 
Several large developers are active in acquiring these government staff 
quarters. These include Cheung Kong, New World Development and Sun Hung 
Kai. For example, Cheung Kong acquired all of the 224 flats ofBelcher Gardens in 
Pokfulam, which is an excellent residential site for high end market. The site had 
an area of about 200,000 square feet. The re-development provided a total floor 
area of about two million square feet. The compensation package from Cheung 
Kong to the property owners was very generous. It included both cash 
compensation and a flat of comparable size in the future re-development. Clearly, 
the high re-development value enabled Cheung Kong to grant this handsome 
compensation package to the property owners. 
The other way to obtain a large piece of land for re-development is to 
convert company-owned assets into residential lands. Mei Foo Sun Chuen at Lai 
Chi Kok was the first attempt from private sector to covert obsolescent industrial 
land for the comprehensive residential development in early 1966. Formerly an oil 
depot of the Texaco Group, it has turned into a huge residential estate with more 
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than 27,000 flats housing nearly 90,000 people. The re-development took more 
than 16 years to complete, not including the amount oft ime required to relocate the 
oil depot facilities to Tsing Yi. 
Another large scale re-development scheme was Taikoo Shing at Quarry 
Bay on Hong Kong Island. The site was formerly Taikoo Dockyard owned by the 
Swire Pacific. Swire Properties submitted the initial proposal to the Government 
in August 1973, and by March 1975, the scheme was approved. Indeed, the 
Government encouraged private developers to carry out development of large 
commercial/residential sites. For example, in 1974, following the oil crisis 
recession and local property downturn, the Government introduced some new 
development initiatives including a system of deferred payments of Crown Lease 
premiums. 
The third way of land acquisition is to acquire a controlling interest in 
companies with substantial under-developed properties. Through gradual 
accumulation, Sun Hung Kai built up a large holding in Kowloon Motor Bus. The 
real motivation of Sun Hung Kai in this strategic move was not the bus routes, but 
the property assets — the bus depots in urban areas. Hang Lung was not interested 
in the canning operation when it took over Amoy Canning 一 the substantial land 
bank in the latter's balance sheet was the motivation. Similarly, Hong Kong Land 
acquired the Dairy Farm group of companies in November 1972 because the latter 
had large area ofland capable ofbeing developed in Causeway Bay, Pokfulam and 
other sites. The site at Pokfulam, for example, was developed to a major residential 
complex called Chi Fu Fa Yuen in 1976. 
In such large scale re-development projects, private developers are not only 
required to pay a premium for lease modification, but also liable to adhere special 
conditions in the modified lease. For example, in the case of the re-development of 
the Whampao Dockland into a residential estate, the developer, Hong Kong & 
Whampao Dock Co., Ltd. (a subsidiary of the local conglomerate Hutchison 
Whampao) was required to pay a premium of $390 million to the Government 
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(Lim 1985). Additionally, the developer had to form the sites for two primary 
schools and two secondary schools, build a public transport terminus and provide 
certain community facilities within the development. Further to the above 
requirements, the developer also had to construct and hand over to the Government 
upon completion an external road network of an estimated total worth exceeding 
$200 million in association with the re-development. 
Generally, the processing of these large scale re-development projects is a 
long and tedious undertaking (will be described later). The amount of time for the 
process will be much dependent on the complexity of the project. However, the 
huge profit obtained not only from the sale of a large number of residential units, 
but also from the renting of commercial premises make large scale urban re-
development a very attractive alternative to direct acquisition of government land 
(see Table 5.3). 
As this kind of re-development requires large capital investment, it is 
monopolised by large property companies; in some cases, theyjoin hands to form a 
consortium to undertake the re-development. They not only have adequate 
financial resources and workforce, but also they are well connected with the 
financial capital, therefore, easy to get credit to finance their projects. For the 
Government, such development, on the one hand, is able to generate a considerable 
sum of money from land premium, on the other hand, save construction costs in the 
provision of community facilities like market, school, youth centre, etc., that is, 
such responsibility is transferred to developers. 
Co-developments 
Starting from late 1970s and early 1980s, co-developments were becoming 
increasingly popular. Private developers in Hong Kong regard co-development 
projects as a source of opportunities for real estate business apart from acquiring 
land from the open market or the Government by tenders and auctions. Examples 
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Table 5.3 Large scale re-development projects in Hong Kong. 
Development Owner before Use before Area 
Project Developer Year re-development re-development (ha) 
Mei Foo Sun New World 1968-78~"Texaco Group Oil depot. ^ ~ ~ 
Chuen Development  
Cosmopolitan Hutchison 1974-76 Whampao Tai Tung Dockyard 2.2 
Estate Whampao Group 
Taikoo Shing Swire Properties 1976-87 Taikoo Group Taikoo Dockyard. 2L4~ 
Wai Heng Chong~~Tai Cheong 1976-77~~Hong Kong & Gas plant. Z 0 ~ 
Sun Chuen China Gas Co.  
^  
Nan Fung Sun Nan Fung 1977-78~Nan Fung The north portion is a 3 2 ~ 
Chuen Textile Group service reservoir. The 
south portion is 
industrial land.  
Chi Fu Fa Yuen Hong Kong Land 1978-81 Dairy Farms Dairy farm. 9.1 
and Pokfulam (Chi Fu Fa Yuen) Group 
Garden Sun Hung Kai  
(Pokfulam Garden)  
Tsuen Wan Far East 1980-82~~Far East Group~~Amusement park. i T ] ~ 
Garden 
Amoy Garden and Hang Lung 1981-87 Amoy Group Canning factory. 4.0 
Tak Bo Garden and Amoy 
Beverly Villa Cheung Kong 1981-82~~Hong Kong La Salle College • ~ 
Catholic Church  
City Garden International City 1983-86 Hong Kong The north portion (north 3.1 
(Cheung Kong Electric Group of Wharf Road) is sea 
group) bed. The south portion 
(south ofWharfRoad) 
is used for an electricity 
generation plant.  
Whampao Garden Hutchison 1985-90 Whampao Whampao Dockyard 22.2 
Whampao Group 
Tsuen King Sun Hung Kai 1986-88~China Dyeing Police station and 3 2 ~ 
Garden Group adjoining undeveloped 
land.  
Belvedere Garden Cheung Kong 1987-91 NanFung Spinning factory. 4.8 
Textile Group 
Riviera Gardens Tsuen Wan 1987-88~Texaco Group Oil depot. ^ ~ 
and Waterside Property Co., Ltd. 
Plaza  
Bayview Garden Hang Lung 1991-92~China Textile Spinning factory. L 4 ~ 
Group  
Laguna City Cheung Kong 1991-95 Shell Group Oil depot. 8.8 
South Horizons Cheung Kong and 1991-95~~Hong Kong Electricity generation B 1 ~ ~ 
Hutchison Electric Group plant  
Whampao  
Source: adapted from Wong, Chau, and Lai (1996), Table 4.7. 
include the re-development agreements confirmed between private developers and 
schools, hospitals and religious bodies, such as Alice Ho Mui Nethersole Hospital, 
St Joan o f A r c School and Canossian Catholic Mission. However, these public or 
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semi-public organisations participated in property development only in one-off 
basis. Meanwhile, there are public and quasi-govemment organisations in Hong 
Kong constantly or intends to be constantly involved in real estate co-development 
projects. These organisations are Mass Transit Railway Corporation (MTRC), 
Kowloon Canton Railway Corporation (KCRC), LDC, and finally, the HKHA that 
conducts the Private Sector Participation Scheme (PSPS). 
In residential development, the biggest co-development projects are the 
development rights above Mass Transit Railway (MTR) stations (see Table 4.7). 
After having identified sites for railway construction, MTRC has to compensate 
the Government for the cost incurred in land resumption. Land premium based on 
current market value or the cost incurred by the Government in resuming the land, 
whichever the higher, has to be paid by the MTRC for the right to develop the space 
over the MTR stations. Once the land premium is agreed, the land for property 
development is granted to the MTRC in the form of private treaty grant. 
The MTRC will then find ajoint venture partner through internal tenders. 
Usually, only large private developers are invited to submit tenders. The 
successful property company is selected based on meeting all tender requirements 
and offering the best financial terms to the MTRC. Ajoint venture agreement will 
be negotiated between two parties, and their roles are as follows (Lai, T-K.P. 1991, 
p.30): 
For MTRC: 
(a) acting as a coordinator to ensure efficient interfacing of railway elements and 
property development; 
(b) providing development brief indicating the maximum development content 
and minimum acceptable standard; and 
(c) monitoring the activities of the developer so as to ensure good concept 
standards and a high quality of workmanship and finish. 
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For developer: 
(a) paying the land premium, finance and interest, consultant fees and total 
construction cost; 
(b) employing project manager to manage the design and construction of the 
project, and 
(c) selling of completed development at prices agreed by the MTRC. 
It should be noted that the MTRC is not liable for any loss arising from the 
development. Though the risks and costs on development are incurred solely on 
the developers, the developers are extremely eager to participate in the joint 
venture property development. The reason is that railway sites are considered as 
prime locations with excellent development potential. Some developers are even 
prepared to pay a substantial non-refundable front end payment to the MTRC for 
securing their development rights. 
In a similar vein, the KCRC is keen to invite private developers to 
undertake co-development projects above KCRC's and the Light Railway 
Transit's depots and stations. However, it is not only public companies that are 
actively looking for partners of the joint venture, but also the Government and its 
statutory body, the LDC. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the LDC is the statutory body established by the 
Government to undertake the re-development of urban areas designated for 
renewal. As the corporation itselfhas very limited funds (an initial funding of $ 100 
million by the Government), the only way to implement urban renewal projects 
commercially viable is to bring in participants with the financial resources and 
ability to absorb the many surprises and unknowns that lay in the path of re-
development. Another reason for adopting this approach is the uncertainty over 
how long the whole process of planning, land assembly and property development 
will take. The corporation, therefore, invites as many private developers as 
possible to submit offer for the joint venture participation through competitive 
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tendering. The major criteria for selecting successful developers are the financial 
return to LDC, financial strength of the developers, track record in marketing, 
quality of previous completed development and experience of the developers in 
project and property management. 
The successful developers are required: 
(a) to make substantial up front payments to LDC; 
(b) to provide all the financing necessary to cover various project expenses from 
land acquisition, tenant compensation and re-housing, government land 
premium and construction costs; 
(c) to provide the necessary experience and expertise in project implementation; 
and 
(d) to bear all costs of re-development, including the burden of loss. 
Property development is a risky business, especially in Hong Kong where 
the market is extremely sensitive to the slightest political or economic ripple. 
Urban renewal, with its lengthy lead time and extensive implementation period, is 
even more risky. In such context, only large private developers are willing to 
participate as joint venture partners of LDC (see Table 4.6). Given the expensive 
land and high real gains, participation in urban renewal projects offers another 
attractive option to acquiring and assembling land in urban core. 
While the large developers are actively sought by the above public bodies 
for co-developments, small- and medium-sized firms play a key role in the small 
scale PSPS scheme. The major private firms involved include Chevalier 
Development International Ltd., Penta-Ocean Construction Co. Ltd. and Winfoong 
Investment Ltd. 
The PSPS, which was introduced by the Government in 1977, is intended to 
draw the resources of the private sector to assist the provision of subsidised 
owner-occupied housing. Under the scheme, the Government provides land, and 
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invites private developers to tender for sites on which they are required to build 
flats conforming to certain specifications. Like other government land sales, the 
land premium tendered for a PSPS site is accrued to the Government. The 
successful developer owns the land tendered, and is responsible for design, 
building and managing the estate as well as bearing all financial costs involved. 
The flats built are sold to government appointed purchasers at prices set by the 
Government. Yet, the developer bears very little risk as un-purchased flats will be 
taken up by the Government at a guaranteed price.^ Also, as a private development, 
the developer is free to sell or let the commercial properties in a PSPS project. 
The PSPS is indeed a form of joint venture between the Government and 
private developers. As the Government owes social responsibility to its citizens, 
control has to be exercised on private developers who seek for maximum profit. 
The control, however, restricts the flexibility of the project. Also, since the sale of 
domestic units is guaranteed by the Government, there is a temptation for the 
developers to keep building costs as low as possible, sometimes at the expense of 
quality and workmanship, to maximise profit. The result is that PSPS flats have 
often been regarded as second-class HOS flats�(HKHA 1996b, p.37). And, unlike 
the HOS flats, the sales of the PSPS flats are transactions between developers and 
purchasers. 
In sum, sites for new housing stock came from two primary sources: new 
land and allocated land under some developed uses. The supply of the former has 
been sluggish, and was constrained by the 50 hectares land sales limit in the 
transitional period. Although a flexible attitude was adopted by the Chinese 
government in the past (see Fig. 5.4), application of exceeding the 50-hectare rule 
required the concurrence of the Chinese government, and variations on the rule 
meant time had to be assigned for negotiation. Also, the new land supply came 
5 However, if the actual selling price of the flats is higher than the guaranteed price, the surplus will 
accrue to the H K H A funds. 
6 There have been criticisms from owners on the quality of PSPS flats. The latest complaint came 
from owners of On Ning Garden in Tseung Kwan 0，where cracks in walls, seeping water and 
crumbling ceilings could be seen throughout the six 40-storey blocks. The ground was also uneven, 
and the walls at the entrances to some of the blocks were tilted {SCMP, 11 November 1997). 
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primarily from the New Territories. Between 1980 to 1993, the average annual 
share of the new land supply of the urban area was only 43 per cent of the total land 
supply, with a range of 7 to 80 per cent (Wong, et. al. 1996, p.99). Furthermore, 
the new residential sites in the territory sold by government auction and tender 
were indeed very small in terms of size compared with those for large scale housing 
development obtained by lease modification. Therefore, it is perhaps not 
surprising to find that approximately 160 hectares of allocated land has been 
converted for housing use since 1976 (ibid., p.93). 
Land banking 
Land is a scarce resource in Hong Kong and a basic requirement for developers. To 
ensure continued production, developers often hold supplies of land greater than 
currently used. McDonald (1978, p.33-34) provides a summary of the reasons for 
holding land banks. They are mainly necessary to cope with the uncertain flow of 
suitable sites, and they help to ensure continuity, flexibility of response, cushioning 
for delays on specific sites, a spread of development between areas, economies of 
scale in relation to infrastructure, an influence over planning decisions through the 
assembly of sites, to achieve a practical local monopoly and to benefit from 
enhanced land values. 
Usually land without official consent, such as agricultural land, can be 
obtained at a very low cost, and would therefore have extremely high planning 
profit potential. But cheap land can be dear land. First, cheap land with no 
planning permission, may have no prospect of receiving any and, even if it does, 
may in the long-term be laden with infrastructure costs and marketing difficulties. 
Second, it requires the developer to undertake lengthy negotiations to obtain 
planning approval. Thus, a variety of sources (Knox 1995; Short, Fleming & Witt 
1986, p.57) suggest that size of the firm is a crucial influence on land banking 
activity. Only large developers have the financial flexibility to invest in land, often 
buying counter-cyclically, that is to build up land banks during the slumps of the 
property cycles. 
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A notable example is Cheung Kong's 16,000 housing units Kingswood 
Villas at Tin Shui Wai. Cheung Kong started to buy the agricultural land piece by 
piece in 1978, and paid as little as $100 per square foot in the beginning. The 
cumulative 53 million square feet agricultural site was finally converted to a huge 
residential estate in December 1991. The selling prices of units of the most recent 
phase of developments were between $5,000 to $5,300 per square foot {SCMP, 26 
December 1997). However, financially successful for the developer, Kingswood 
Villas endured a high vacancy rate as high as 60 per cent in mid-1996 due to its 
remoteness {SCMP, 13 August 1997). Nevertheless, large property developers 
with strong balance sheets can afford to buy agricultural land and reserve in their 
land banks ready for development only in appropriate times. 
Medium-sized companies, on the other hand, cannot afford to take risks on 
land for which they may not secure permission to build, or to pay the interest on 
large parcels of land that take a long time to develop. When they do get sites of 
suitable size, they therefore seek to maximise profits either by building blocks of 
flats at high densities or by catering for the top end of the market, building low-
density semi-detached or detached houses in 'exclusive' areas. This leaves small 
firms to use their more detailed local knowledge to scavenge for smaller infill sites, 
where they will assemble the necessary materials and workforce, and seek to build 
as quickly as possible, usually aiming at the market for larger, higher-quality 
dwellings in areas with an established social reputation. In this context, there is a 
tendency that an increasing proportion of agricultural lands is held by large 
developers (see Fig. 4.6). 
Another form of land banking activities, which is unique to Hong Kong, is 
holding land in form of Land Exchange Entitlements (LEEs). These entitlements 
were first issued in 1960 when the Government started developing the New 
Territories. During that time, residents of the New Territories, who had held the 
land in their family before the Convention of Peking in 1898, objected to their 
ancestral heritage being exchanged for cash. Also, as urban development spread to 
the New Territories, land prices rose, but compensation for the mostly agricultural 
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plots was restricted to that described under the Block Crown Lease?. In other 
words, the payments did not recognise speculative prices being paid for land at the 
time. The Government therefore instigated a policy ofLEEs. 
Instead of compensation, the policy offered land owners a Letter ‘A’ or 
Letter 'B ' . Letter A was used where resumption (i.e., compulsory purchase) 
proceedings had not begun, but it was necessary to obtain early possession of a site. 
Letter B was used where resumption had been notified in the government gazette, 
and gave the owner the chance to surrender his/her land voluntarily before 
resumption for the right of future exchange. The registered owners of the letters 
could submit tenders for certain lots in the form of exchange entitlements they were 
prepared to surrender in return for the grant of a site. The exchange entitlements 
were converted to an ‘area of entitlement'. Such land exchange system enabled 
land owners in the New Territories to receive financial benefits from local 
developments that took place from the 1960s. It also saved the Government money 
as it did not have to make compensation payments. 
Property developers quickly saw benefits in acquiring LEEs for later use 
because owners ofsuch letters could then tender for lots made available in the New 
Territories through the Land Department's six-monthly sales programme. Since 
such letters were assignable, a strong secondary market in these letters developed, 
thus allowing property companies to accumulate the equivalent of land banks. 
The advent of the New Town Policy in the 1970s entailed a large scale 
acquisition of land in the New Territories. As a result, by the end of the 1970s， 
more than 20 million square feet of LEEs had been issued {SCMP, 25 June 1997). 
The values ofLetter B jumped 1,000 times {Ming Pao, 6 May 1981). In fact. Letter 
7 The Block Crown Lease specified whether the land was agricultural or building land. The 
leaseholder required to pay an annual rent called the Crown Rent. The Crown Rent was normally a 
nominal sum, and bore little or no relationship to the actual value of the land. For example, in the 
urban area, the typical charge was $1,000 per lot, irrespective of size. In the New Territories, for 
new non-agricultural leases, the typical charges were $300 for a lot under 50,000 sq ft, $1,000 for a 
lot from 50,000 to 150,000 sq ft and $2,000 for a lot over 150,000 sq ft, for agricultural leases the 
rent was only $20 per lot (Wu 1988，p.227). Owing to inflation, the Crown Rent for land was 
negligible over times. 
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B allowed exchange on a metre-for-metre basis for building land given up and on a 
ratio of two to five for surrendered agricultural land, both weighted at the time of 
tenders for new land by the length of the time period from when the old land was 
surrendered, thus old Letters B were more valuable. For example, in January 1981， 
the price of Letter B issued in 1965 was $2,400 per square foot compared with 
$900-950 and $600-650 that were issued in 1974 and 1977，respectively. So, once 
again, large developers had financial resources to accumulate LEEs through the 
secondary market. Over time, these Letters B gradually went into the hands of four 
large developers — Henderson (see Fig. 4.4), Chinachem Group, Nan Fung 
Development and Sun Hung Kai {SCMP, 25 June 1997). 
The build-up of outstanding letters became a growing problem. Hence, in 
1979, the policy was changed. The offer of LEEs was restricted to one half of the 
area of agricultural land surrendered with the remaining halfbeing eligible for cash 
compensation, while full exchange of building land remained possible. The new 
policy worked well for a number of years, and the number ofLEEs issued each year 
was reduced significantly. But, it became increasingly clear that there was not 
enough land to meet the commitments. The LEE policy was therefore abandoned 
in March 1983. 
Although the Government ceased issuing Letters A and B, by that time, its 
outstanding commitment was about 35 million square feet of agricultural land, 
which would require about 14 million square feet of land for development to meet 
the promises made in Letters A and B (ibid.). To solve the problem, the 
Government began talks with major holders of LEEs, that is, the property 
developers. The outcome of these talks was the adoption of a currency value for 
outstanding Letters A and B that could be used in lieu of cash for payment o f N e w 
Territories land transactions and a few sites in the urban area. 
However, the redemption of outstanding commitments was slow. Unless 
the Government put up more sites in the urban area, developers would hold on to 
Letters A and B. Later, under the pressure from the Chinese side of the Land 
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Commission who asked for assurance that the letter commitment would be met by 
30 June 1997, the then Hong Kong Government began to bring new legislation to 
clear the outstanding backlog. 
Ultimately, the New Territories Land Exchange Entitlement (Redemption) 
Ordinance was enacted in April 1997. The ordinance means that the letters will no 
longer be valid for land exchanges after 1 July 1997 but bear the currency value 
stated on the letter. Currently, all traceable Letters A and B have been redeemed, 
and there now remains only about 648,530 square feet of the letters, which would 
be eligible for cash compensation at a cost of $2.4 billion (ibid.). Thus, the era of 
developers obtaining land from the Government without bidding for it at auction 
ended on 27 June 1997. This means of land banking activity vanished. 
Nevertheless, the LEE policy had enhanced the growth of some large property 
companies in Hong Kong housing market. 
In short, it is apparent that ways of land acquisition by property developers 
are strongly influenced by government policies. In the same vein, the size and 
location of land obtained influence what types of owner-occupied housing being 
produced. Simultaneously, they also affect how property developers deal with 
government in obtaining planning permission for residential development. Hence, 
the next section is to examine how planning control affects developers' strategies 
in housing development. 
Planning permission, development design and fmance 
Planning policies in Hong Kong 
In Hong Kong, the Government defines, 
Town planning is the process of guiding and controlling the 
development and use of land, with the aim of promoting the health, 
safety, convenience and general welfare of the community. It seeks 
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to promote the right development in the right place and at the right 
time.8 
In such context, the land use planning system restricts the range of choices 
available to developers in at least four ways: restricting the total quantity of 
housing land made available for development; restricting the location of the land 
that is made available; restricting the way in which the land is developed and 
altering the timing of development. All of these affect the profitability of 
development (Monk, Pearce and Whitehead 1991, p.l). 
Figure 5.5 shows the basic planning principles in Hong Kong. The 
planning system is carried at three basic levels: territorial, sub-regional and 
local/district. The top two levels are conceptual. At these levels, the overall 
requirements in terms of population, land use, transport and environment are 
determined in the Territorial Development Strategy (TDS). The TDS, which was 
formulated in 1984, sets out the optional paths and directions of urban development 
to meet the long-term socio-economic needs and expectations of the people. Based 
on the strategy, the Planning Department prepares sub-regional planning 
statements for the five sub-regions: the North East New Territories, North West 
New Territories, South East New Territories, South West New Territories, and the 
Metro Area. As plans at these levels are primarily policy statements concerned 
with broad development strategies, they are government policies rather than 
statutory plans. 
The third level of the planning hierarchy, district planning, represents the 
translation of the overall policy objectives and requirements into detailed statutory 
plans. Different parcels of land for various uses and development restrictions are 
designated on the plans. These district plans are the statutory Outline Zoning Plans 
(OZPs) prepared under the provisions of the Town Planning Ordinance^ Specific 
8 It is extracted from the 1996 information sheet ‘Town Planning' printed by Hong Kong 
Information Services Department. 
9 The Town Planning Ordinance was enacted in 1939. Although it forms the basis of urban planning 
in Hong Kong, it is not as comprehensive as similar legislation found in other countries (Yeh 1994, 
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Figure 5.5 Planning hierarchy in Hong Kong. 
Source: Planning Department (1995), p.7. 
use of individual sites within the broad land zones indicated on the statutory OZPs 
are further elaborated on the Outline Development Plans and Layout Plans. They 
are used to guide and control developments in individual districts. Sometimes, 
they are employed by government departments as action plans for the preparation 
and release of land for public and private developments. 
p.ll). It covers only the existing and designated urban areas, and has no direct power of 
development control and plan implementation. The main purpose of the Town Planning Ordinance 
is to empower the TPB to prepare and approve an OZP and to process planning applications for uses 
that need to be approved by the TPB. 
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On these plans, land in Hong Kong is zoned for different uses. The most 
common land use zones are Commercial [C], Residential [R], 
Commercial/Residential [C/R], Industrial [I], Government Institution and 
Community [GIC] and Comprehensive Development Area [CDA]. The statutory 
OZPs are prepared by Planning Department, approved by the Town Planning 
Board (TPB) and then gazetted to notify the public. Development restrictions may 
include controls on plot ratio, site coverage (the percentage of the building site to 
be covered by the building), building height and so on. There is a period of two 
months for the public to comment on the plans. Chaired by the Secretary for 
Planning, Environment and Lands, TPB consists of both official and unofficial 
members appointed by the Government. Thus, through TPB, the Government has 
total control over the use of land. Amendments to the statutory plans are subject to 
the full discretion o fTPB in consultation with relevant government departments. 
Yet, within the system, there is flexibility that allows change of land use. 
This is possible through the operation of a planning application system. A 
Schedule ofNotes, a part of an OZP, specifies which uses are always permitted in 
all zones (Column 1) and uses always permitted in a given zone or may be 
permitted on request of planning permission (Column 2). Section 16 in the Town 
Planning Ordinance enables the TPB to grant permission, with or without 
conditions, for uses under Column 2 of the Notes. In this way, the statutory zoning 
plan system provides certainty to developers on exactly the types and intensity of 
use on almost any piece of land in Hong Kong. 
Lease modification for re-development 
As was noted above, the main source of land supply was private land. In fact, 
between 1987 and 1993, the average annual flat production from re-development 
projects was about 18,000 per annum, which amounted for 70 per cent of total 
annual supply of new domestic premises (Wong, W.Y. 1994). 
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Re-development projects involve modification of leases before 
development can proceed. Leaseholders have to apply for change in the lease 
conditions provided that the proposed change conforms to the OZP. The 
application of lease modification can be a highly complex and technical activity, 
requiring detailed knowledge o f the appropriate legislation and policies, as well as 
local knowledge of how a particular planning authority operates. The whole 
process involves numerous stages, different divisions of the Lands Department and 
a number of other government departments. Within the Lands Department, an 
application has to go through the District Land Office/District Lands Conference 
(with representatives from other concerned government departments), Valuation 
Conference and the Legal Advice and Conveyancing Office. Other contributing 
government departments include the Land Registry, Buildings Department, 
Drainage Department, Highways Department, Planning Department, Transport 
Department, Environmental Protection Department, Water Services Department 
and Agriculture & Fisheries Department (if felling of trees is involved)'°. 
Given these intricate procedures, the success or failure of a re-development 
scheme depends on the skills and experience of the project director, the developer's 
representative in charge of the re-development, in handling the negotiations with 
the Government (Wan 1985). To be capable of dealing with government officials 
effectively, the project director should, apart from being proficient on the property 
field, be familiar with firstly, the procedures with which development proposals are 
processed within Government, and secondly, Government's general stand on these 
issues. Thus, a logical source of candidates for project directors of re-development 
schemes is the ex-government officials who used to be involved in dealing with 
development matters. Indeed, it is not uncommon, especially during a property 
boom, to see high ranking government officials with a similar background joining 
property development companies upon retirement or even before retirement. 
'° Sometimes, Urban Services Department or Regional Services Department is involved if the trees 
to be felled are located in urban regions and the New Territories, respectively. 
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A notable example is the Whampao Dockyard Re-development. J.D. 
Johnston, the Managing Director of the Hong Kong & Whampao Dock Co. Ltd. is 
an ex-government official. Prior to joining Whampao, Johnston was the Principal 
Land Agent with the Government, and had 19 years of experience in the Hong 
Kong property field {SCMP, 28 February 1985). By 1980, he became Executive 
Director and General Manager ofWhampao. He personally oversaw the Whampao 
Dockyard Re-development project right from the very beginning when the initial 
proposal was first submitted to the Government. He had numerous meetings with 
various government officials, some of whom he knew as friends, including town 
planners, traffic engineers, high-ranking officials and junior officials and those in 
between. 
Yet, the use of right personnel-in-charge does not guarantee that the 
processing time can be shortened. In fact, there is no time limit for completion of 
this process. Simple cases take approximately one year, and more complicated 
ones may take several years to complete. In the case of Whampao Dockyard, it 
took nearly three years to get through the Public Works Department Conference 
and a further year before first receiving TPB's approval (Wan 1985). In this 
context, the developer needs to make realistic initial estimates of the likely time 
and cost of obtaining the appropriate permissions. 
Clearly, the lease modification procedures have implications on the 
competitiveness ofhousing development industry. For instance, the length of time 
taken for lease modification may increase the cost for holding the site to the extent 
that small developers with limited cash flows may run into financial problems. In 
contrast, large developers have the financial ability to employ expensive 'in-house' 
experts, who often are ex-senior professional staff of the Lands Department, to 
handle lease modification cases for them. The experience of these experts helps the 
large developers to obtain approval within a shorter period of time and possibly at a 
lower land premium. The result allows, like that in land acquisition, the big grows 
bigger and small becomes smaller, or the developer would leave the market. 
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Development design 
By the time the lease modification application is made, the developer should 
formulate a planning brief. The brief is important for complex schemes as it sets 
the design parameters for an architect. The more rigorous and experienced 
developers produce briefs running to as much as a hundred pages, detailing 
everything from building height and colour of materials to precise requirements for 
toilets and taps (Cadman & Austin 1991, p.5). 
Generally, a developer will undertake an appraisal of the types and forms of 
development to be produced. Feasibility study on marketability (i.e., ofbeing able 
to sell houses at a profitable price) and technicality will also be carried out. In the 
case of private sector development, this will include analysis of the market and the 
potential for profit in relation to the risk to be done. For the public sector and 
non-profit-oriented development, it will attempt to ensure that appropriate cost 
recovery is available. The study will also involve the assessment of the ability to 
connect the development to the appropriate service and infrastructure provision. 
A design team will be formed to carry out the design in accordance with the 
most economic design solution arrived at the feasibility study. Given the need for 
speed of construction, together with the advantages to be derived from economies 
of scale and standardisation, the result is a strong tendency to build large and 
uniform housing estates. Moreover, the imperatives of profitability ensure that the 
housing is built at relatively high densities, and in case of public sector 
development, to relatively low standards. Actually, the housing estates tend to be 
uniform down to the styling of doors, windows and kitchen furniture. 
In Hong Kong, the norm is a two-bedroom flat in a large private housing 
estate, but there is a growing demand for larger units. In the past, Hong Kong 
people were content with the medium size of 480 square feet per housing unit. 
However, as the population has become more affluent, it has an increasingly high 
aspiration for space standards in the built environment. Despite falling household 
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sizes"，the size of private residential units completed has been steadily increasing. 
Figure 5.6 shows that class B unit (saleable area of 431 to 752 sq ft) has become the 
dominant form of new private residential units. They contributed 34 per cent ofa l l 
private housing units in 1979 but increased to 56 per cent in 1995. Also, Table 5.4 
reveals that the average size of private residential units completed between 1992 
and 1996 has increased 28 per cent (Leung, C.Y. 1997). 
H A : < 4 3 0 s q . ft. " B : 4 3 1 - 7 5 2 sq.rt. • € : 753-l ,075 sq.ft. 
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Figure 5.6 Distribution of new private residential units by different classes, 1979 and 
1995. 
Source: Moir(1996), p.50. 
Table 5.4 Average size of private residential units completed in the period of 1992-96. 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Average size per unit (sq. ft.) 577.49~582.33 602.86~""679.08~~739.17 
Size change (1992 = 100) 100 丨01 104 118 128 
Source: SCMP, 4 March 1998. 
In response to the change of consumers' demand, since the late 1980s, the 
developers have to use some innovative designs to attract customers, particularly 
projects in the new towns. Estates are developed in a more fancy style, club house, 
丨丨 The average household size decreased from 3.9 persons in 1981,3.7 in 1986,3.4 in 1991 and 3.3 
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shuttle bus service, commercial arcade, multi-storey carparks, big landscaped open 
space, colourful and great varieties of play equipment are commonly found. The 
segregation between each function is clearly marked by modern directory signages. 
Fountains or sculptures are erected at the entrance to emphasise the elegancy of the 
portfolios. The whole housing design of these estates aims at giving ample privacy 
and breathing space to residents. Overall, this type ofhousing estate design reflects 
the socio-economic changes of Hong Kong. 
Finance 
Housing development is financed, in general, by a combination of two types of 
capital funds. One consists of internal sources of funding, which are derived 
primarily from the savings of the property firm. The second source consists of 
external funding. 
Three methods are used to obtain building finance externally (Chan 1987). 
The commonest type is debt financing. Developers usually rely on bank loans'^ as 
the major financial source. In order to obtain support from the banks, developers 
have to maintain a sound track record. The developer who can show consistent 
profitability and ability to repay loans satisfactorily and profitable completion of 
individual projects has always been looked on favourably when requesting further 
assistance. The more successful and large developers are, the easier they obtain the 
loans. In addition, banks tend to prefer the large developers as borrowers because 
they figure a big company is less likely to go bankrupt than a small one. In this 
way, they contribute to concentration and centralisation of large property 
developers in the real estate development sector of the Hong Kong economy. 
Large developer can also finance new construction projects by issuing new 
shares to the public. It not only enlarges the equity base of the company, but also 
increases the credit-worthiness of the company so that it can raise more equity in 
in 1996 (Census & Statistics Department, 1991 & 1997b). 
12 There are various types of bank loans provided by financial institutions during the construction 
process. For details, see Cheung, S-S.D. (1987). 
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the future if necessary. The third method is rights offering, that is a securities 
floatation offering to existing stockholders according to their proportional 
ownership. Among the large developers, Sun Hung Kai is keen on using rights 
offering in raising funds. 
Given the heavy dependence on bank finance, which fluctuates rapidly in 
availability and cost with variations in monetary policy and also taking account of 
the problems of speculative housing production, bankruptcies in the housing 
development industry are not uncommon in recession phases. Indeed, at the time 
of writing, the use of a high interest rate policy to stabilise the HK-US fixed 
exchange rate has resulted in developers fmding all possible means to alleviate the 
burden of high interest payments. The most recent example was Sun Hung Kai 
sold 300 car parking spaces in its Greenfield Garden development in Tsing Yi to 
raise extra-money {SCMP, 4 February 1998). 
Housing construction 
Building controls 
Once the planning and design processes are finalised, the detailed building plan is 
submitted to the Buildings Department. Through Section 16(l)(d) in the Buildings 
Ordinance, it empowers the Buildings Department to reject submitted building 
plans that contravene an approved or draft plan prepared under the Town Planning 
Ordinance. Section 16(l)(g) in the Ordinance can also lead to the disapproval 
which ‘would result in a building different in height, design, type or intended use 
from buildings in the immediate neighbourhood or previously existing on the same 
site，. It provides a control mechanism against incompatible development within 
the neighbourhood, particular in areas not yet covered by a statutory plan. In 
addition, the Buildings Ordinance also contains a set of building regulations that 
set out detailed requirements related to the planning and design of buildings, 
including height, site coverage and plot ratio for controlling the bulk of buildings. 
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Normally, an Authorised Person will be appointed by the developer to be 
the coordinator of all plan submissions. The Authorised Person sometimes may act 
as the project manager of the project as well. The types of plans submitted to 
Buildings Department at various stages include the site formation plan, building 
plan, foundation plan, structural plan and drainage plan. 
At the other side, the Buildings Department acts as the central processing 
centre for submissions to other government departments. It will circulate plans to 
all relevant government departments for comments. These departments may 
include Geotechnical, Highways, Drainage Services, Fire Services, Water 
Services, Electrical and Mechanical Services and the like. The Buildings 
Department will then vet plans under the Buildings Ordinance, taking into account 
the advices received from consulted departments. Unlike the application of lease 
modification, there is a statutory time limit of 60 days for consideration of first 
submission and major revisions according to the Buildings Ordinance and the 
Building (Administration) Regulations. For re-submissions, the time limit is 30 
days. 
After approval from the Buildings Department is granted'\ the Authorised 
Person can then arrange site programmes for various stages of works including 
demolition, site formation, foundation, building and drainage works. Before 
commencement of these works, consent from the Buildings Department is 
required. In considering a consent application, the department will ensure 
compliance with any conditions imposed at approval stage and safeguard adjacent 
buildings and slopes against adverse effect. Again, a statutory time limit o f 2 8 days 
is imposed for the department to process consent application. 
In short, the nomination of Buildings Department as a co-ordinating role 
allows a single point of contact for developer or his/her representative (normally 
丨3 Buildings Department grounds for approval or rejection are normally curtailed to cover the eight 
important aspects of a building plan. They are: (i) plot ratio and site coverage; (ii) building 
projections; (iii) open space; (iv) means of access and escape in case of fire; (v) fire resistance and 
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the Authorised Person) with the Government related to building approval. This 
method not only helps to streamline the consultation procedures, but also provides 
greater certainty and confidence for developers undertaking any development in 
Hong Kong. 
Construction 
Under the Buildings Ordinance, all ‘building works' have to be carried out by 
Registered Contractor, and the Buildings Department has to be notified of 
appointment to a particular work. During construction, the Buildings Department 
will inspect site, witness tests and monitor safety aspects to ensure compliance with 
technical and safety standards. Also, the Buildings Ordinance and the Building 
(Administration) Regulations state that the Authorised Person has to supervise the 
work periodically and the Registered Contractor continuously to improve site 
safety and quality. 
Generally, large local developers have their own in-house design team, 
construction arms, material supplier, sales office and even property management 
subsidiary. For instance, Sun Hung Kai has made intensive efforts to integrate 
vertically into architectural and engineering (Sun Hung Kai Engineering Co. Ltd.)； 
construction (Sanfield, and Manfield Building Contractors Ltd. and Shun Fai 
Construction Co., Ltd.); property management (Sun Hung Kai Real Estate Agency 
Ltd. and Hop Yip Services Co. Ltd.)； finance (Hung Kai Finance Co. Ltd.); 
insurance (Sun Hung Kai Properties Insurance Ltd.); concrete supply (Glorious 
Concrete (HK) Ltd.)； and fire prevention and mechanical engineering (Everlight 
Engineering Co. Ltd.). 
Utilisation of an in-house design and construction team normally can 
reduce costs and allow quality control. With diminishing importance of 
construction cost, developers can pay more attention to quality and respond to 
compartmentation; (vi) lighting and ventilation; (vii) sanitary provision; and (viii) lane/street 
provision (Poon and others 1995, p.9). 
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consumers' complaints". This also enables developers to create some degree of 
brand identification and product differentiation. Yet, developers having in-house 
construction team rarely carry out the entire construction work using their own 
resources alone. It is usual to sub-contract much of the work. This allows them 
simply to withdraw from activity during slumps as they have little overhead to 
maintain (Bacow 1990, p.5). On the other hand, sub-contractors are willing to 
work for major developers because of their familiar working schedules and 
guaranteed stream of work instead of competitive bidding. 
Yet, traditional competitive tender procurement system is used by public 
sector to select contractors for subsidised owner-occupied housing construction. 
The Housing Department, the executive arm ofHKHA, maintains lists of approved 
contractors whose performance is monitored on a regular basis. The department 
sets a maximum quota for each contractor to be allocated for jobs , and usually the 
contractor who offers the lowest price is awarded. To ensure consistent standards, 
the performance of companies with current contracts is monitored through the 
Performance Assessment Scoring System for building contractors and building 
services contractors. Under the score system, contractors' performance is 
evaluated on a monthly basis. The score then determines the contractors' future 
tendering eligibility. Also, the department maintains lists ofapproved suppliers for 
factory produced building components that are rigorously tested to ensure 
compliance with specifications. Nevertheless, even under the supervision of 
HKHA, subsidised housing usually is of a lower quality than private housing in 
terms of construction, design and management. Thus, the re-sale prices of HOS 
flats are below those of private-sector flats even if they are located next to each 
other. 
On average, the construction lead time for a standard 41-storey public 
housing stock is 37 months — about nine months for foundation works and 28 
months for the superstructure and fittings. Construction of the basic superstructure 
'^  For example, Sun Hung Kai established 'Sun Hung Kai Properties Club' in January 1996. It aims 
to provide information on properties developed by Sun Hung Kai and gather members' opinions on 
the developer's properties and services. Currently, the club has members numbering over 20,000. 
141 
takes place at an average rate of two floors per month, which is comparable to that 
in the private sector'^ For private residential blocks, the actual construction phase 
may take from three to four years to complete, and the completion rate may be used 
as a variable by developers to adjust to changing demand conditions. In periods of 
brisk demand, the completion rate may be accelerated by overtime working, etc., to 
ensure quick sales. Iii periods of recession in the housing market, developers 
reduce labour inputs per unit of time so that they can avoid the financial costs of 
holding stocks of vacant completed housing units. 
Regarding the construction technique, the adoption of standard domestic 
blocks in public and private housing estates, which began in the early 1980s, marks 
a turning point in the construction industry. Prefabrication is now being used 
widely for items such as staircase, facade panels, aluminium windows, panel walls 
for internal partitions as well as a range of factory produced components such as 
doors, floor slabs, cooking benches and sinks. The use of prefabrication techniques 
brings a lot of benefits including less time and reliance on site labour, easier site 
inspection as well as greatly improved work detail and quality control. In addition, 
contractors use tower cranes and large panel framework to speed up the concreting 
process for the building structures. 
In short, speculative housing production is a risky business, and the fact 
that a delay between starting and completing a dwelling involves huge costs. 
Staley (1992, cited in Lai, W-C.L. 1994, footnote 47) has worked out that a one-
year delay in the construction of new residential units could add $ 1.1 billion to the 
cost of developing a five million square feet residential estate. Generally, the 
added costs to residential construction can vary from $250 to $300 per square foot, 
depending on prevailing interest rates. Also, the increase in construction expenses 
during the past few years has become a heavy burden on investment costs. In a bid 
to meet home buyers' aspirations for higher living standards, developers have 
upgraded the quality of developments that partly resulted in an increase in average 
construction costs for residential properties. It was estimated that construction 
15 Information extracted from correspondence ofHKHA dated 17 June 1997. 
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costs of quality projects were increased from $700-800 per square foot in early 
1990s to $1,500 per square foot in mid-1990s {SCMP, 25 February 1998). 
Together with the skills shortage in building industry, developers are keen to use 
prefabrication and the greater use of standardisation to complete the project as fast 
as possible. 
Marketing and selling 
Marketing 
Marketing is an essential tool in selling a development. It also helps promote, 
communicate and reinforce the corporate image of the development company. 
Where a development is carried out speculatively, the marketing process will start 
during the period of construction. The various means of promoting a property 
include (Cadman & Austin 1991, p.l46): (i) advertisements in mass media; (ii) 
mail shots; (iii) particulars and brochures; (iv) site boards and site hoardings; (v) 
launching ceremonies; and (vi) show suites and offices. 
In Hong Kong, a trend developed in the 1990s is the increasing use of 
television advertising to build up the ‘brand’ of a particular project. This includes 
using an actor's or actress’ image to introduce the project that targets those who 
share the same characteristic and naming the particular development with a 
'classical' name and an associated desigiVlogo to create a common theme 
throughout the marketing process. Promotion not only concentrates on the space 
contained within the building and its amenities, but also its location — after all, the 
location has determined the developer's product and, in turn, the marketing 
strategy. A particular location is often attractive to certain occupiers, for example, 
new middle class families who need locations with good accessibility to the public 
transport as well as a clean environment. 
On large developments, the developers commonly set up a show suite in the 
sales office on site to display plans and models of the scheme. The suite, which has 
been appropriately decorated, painted and fitted inside, is staffed by a group of 
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sales force to actually conclude the transactions. These sale officers not only talk 
knowledgeably to perspective purchasers who arrive on site to inspect, but also 
have full knowledge of the market, especially the strengths and weaknesses of the 
competitors in the surrounding areas. They also have the flexibility in price 
negotiation, at least within a certain limit. At the site sales office, refreshments are 
offered to provide a comfortable environment to negotiate the terms of sale. 
Furthermore, representatives of banks and solicitors are available to discuss 
mortgage arrangements and legal procedures respectively. 
Besides the physical set up that aims to give every convenience to 
perspective buyers and enhance the sales, large developers offer various incentive 
packages to attract customers particularly in the recession period. The available 
incentives shown in Table 5.5 offered by developers in early 1998 indicate the 
anxiety of developers to sell their products. Generally, big developers, who have 
financial strength, closer ties with bankers and their well-established property-
related subsidiaries, are able to absorb the extra development cost and risk. Small 
developers with less financial clout and support from banks are unable to offer 
Table 5.5 Sample of incentives offered by large developers in the early 1998. 
Developer Development Project Incentive package  
Sun Hung Kai Villa Rhapsody, Symphony Bay, . provide a top-up mortgage of up to 15% 
Sai Kung . buyers can extend the date of purchases by 
up to 12 months after occupation, but they 
will be charged interest on the balance at 
2% points above prime rate for the period 
Sino Grand Dynasty View, Tai Po • arrange banks to provide mortgage with a 
maximum repayment period of30 years 
. p r o v i d e a 45 days' prolonged transaction 
period with no added interest 
. p r o v i d e a 15% second mortgage with 
interest waived for the first 30 months 
. o f f e r a 3-month transaction period with an 
option to change the unit at an additional 
3% of the property price 
Henderson Granville Garden, Tai Wai . offer a bonus package worth about 
$800,000, including a car parking space, 
stamp duty charges, legal fees, and one 
year's management fees fully paid 
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bargaining prices and attractive payment packages. Once again, it puts small 
property companies in a disadvantaged position in competing with big developers. 
Pre-selling the uncompleted flats 
It is common practice in Hong Kong that public and private developers pre-sell to 
customers the uncompleted property at the construction stage. Such pre-sales are 
usually settled by staged paymenti6, with up to 30 per cent of the total price paid for 
during the construction stage and the balance payable within one to two weeks 
upon completion of the development. As the construction of the building may last 
at least one to two years, such a pre-sale arrangement can improve the developers' 
cash flow situation and, to a certain extent, reduce their risk in the projects*^ 
To purchase public owner-occupied housing units under the HOS/PSPS, 
applicants are mainly divided into two types: ‘Green Form，and ‘White Form，. 
Green Form applicants are mainly PRH tenants or those on the waiting list for 
PRH. If sitting tenants' applications are successful, they then have to surrender 
their flatsi8. White Form applicants come from families who are not PRH tenants 
but those who are living in the private rental units. They are also required to own 
no domestic property, and are subjected to an income limit. When the first HOS 
flats were put on sale in 1978, the maximum household income limit for private 
sector applicants was set at $3,500 per month, which was raised to $30,000 in April 
1997. 
Public response to the two schemes has been very positive. In the Phase 
19B HOS, 89,476 application forms were received for the purchase of lO,282 units 
{Express News, 13 November 1997). Since the demand is always much greater 
16 Staged payment in property transaction was invented by Y.T. Fok, a Chinese entrepreneur in 
1954. Also, he introduced the marketing strategy to sell a building phase by phase, that is to sell 
several storeys of a building at different times (Feng 1996, p.227). 
17 On the other hand, under this pre-sale transaction, home buyers are asked to undertake the 
business risk of project failure that the developers should bear. In case of contract violations, 
developers usually have resources for a prolonged negotiation process, while home buyers are 
usually individuals without sufficient resources and experience to seek for compensations. 
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than supply, a ballot is held to select successful applicants. Of the total 
applications in Phase 19B, 56,826 were White Form while 32,650 were Green 
Form. The ratio was higher than 1.5:1.0. But despite the difference in response 
between the Green Form and White Form applicants, the quota for private sector to 
have successful application was limited to 20 per cent of each phase of the scheme; 
until recently, it has relaxed to 40 per cent. The Green Form applicants therefore 
enjoy a much better opportunity to buy flats than the White Form applicants. As a 
result, the most in need o fhome ownership has to rely on purchasing uncompleted 
private housing units in the housing market. 
In the housing market, developers have or do not have to apply for consent 
from the Government, depending on which type of development schemes they 
belong to, before they pre-sell uncompleted units. Generally, land developments 
are governed by two types of scheme, namely consent scheme and non-consent 
scheme. The consent schemes normally include: (i) developments on land directly 
obtained from the Government; (ii) re-developments where Land Tribunal orders 
have been obtained to recover vacant possession; and (iii) in some cases, re-
developments where lease conditions have been substantially modified. Under the 
consent scheme, pre-sale of uncompleted flats requires approval from the Director 
of Lands Department. Consent will be granted if developers can satisfy the 
following conditions: 
(a) More than 30 per cent of the total current land construction costs have been 
expended for the land development project; and 
(b) Consent has been obtained from the Buildings Department to construct the 
superstructure of the development. 
For those re-developments where vacant possessions of properties are obtained 
through mutual agreement, forward sale does not require any approval from the 
Government. 
18 From 1978 to 1995, 86,000 PRH units were regained by the Government through the HOS/PSPS 
(HKHA 1996b). 
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One of the important purposes to pre-sell the uncompleted flats is to test 
customers' response to the initial offer and price. Usually, developers pre-sell the 
premisek phase by phase, and charge differential prices at each phase, that are 
higher prices for those units having desired features, such as locating at a higher 
level or having a view of the harbom.'(). In each phase, only a small number of the 
premises are put into the market, and developers will increase prices ofuni ts sold in 
next phases if the market response is good. And, during times of market 
depression, developers will reduce the asking prices to a below market level for the 
first phase of the sale and then gradually raise the prices back to market level in the 
subsequent phases. For example, Swire pre-sold Taikoo Shing starting in 1976 at 
an average of$218 per square foot, by 1978 increased to $370 per square foot, and 
by 1981 about $982 per square foot (So 1982). Such pre-selling practice can easily 
create a buying momentum among potential customers and produce the 
psychological effect of pushing people to purchase flats as fast as possible. 
This method of allocating private housing units not only generates publicity 
and excitement, but also practically issues an invitation to speculators. Speculation 
is, in fact, an established characteristic of the Hong Kong property market with 
property widely considered as a trading commodity (Leung, S.C-T. 1986, p.29). 
Buyers and speculators line up outside the developer's sale office nights before the 
formal sale in order to get the right to buy a pre-sale unit. The highest record was 
found on the sale ofVi l la Esplanada in Tsing Yi. A queue of more than 10,000 
perspective buyers was formed at the sale office of Sun Hung Kai on 4 June 1997. 
The company received 30,400 applications, that is 189 times over-subscription on 
160 units, and collected up to $ 10 billion deposits in the registration dates {Oriental 
Daily, 5 June 1997). 
To combat the speculative activity. Hong Kong government has started to 
introduce anti-speculation measures since November 1991 (described in Chapter 
2). Under the recent measures introduced in January 1997, developers can apply 
19 Li (1990a, p.7) finds that, on average, units commanding a view of the harbour are 22% more 
expensive than units without a view. 
147 
for pre-sale consents 15 months before a project's completion. Once approved, a 
developer must release all units in the project for pre-sale within six months, and 
must offer at least 20 per cent of the total units at each sale. For HOS and PSPS, the 
pre-sale can be arranged 24 months before completion^". 
Apart from pre-sale to the public, private developers can sell their housing 
units through internal sales. Generally, developers will internally sell a very small 
number of units through their own estate agents or other estate agents before the 
public pre-sale. This practice is used as a price searching mechanism to set the 
correct market price for the later public sale. However, in non-consent 
development scheme, internal sale can be of significant proportion, for example, 
Cheung Kong sold 50 per cent (238 units) ofManhattan Heights project in Westem 
District through private sales {SCMP, 3 May 1997). 
Under the consent development scheme, there was no restriction on internal 
sale of uncompleted properties until 1992. In order to dampen excessive 
speculative activities in the property market, the Government restricted the amount 
of internal sale to 50 per cent in 1992 and subsequently to 10 per cent of the total 
number of units in 1994. Furthermore, for those flats sold through internal sale, 
purchasers are not allowed to re-sell before the completion of assignment deeds. 
In the pre-sale transaction, purchasers have to complete a provisional 
agreement for sale and purchase at the developer's sale office, then a formal 
agreement for sale and purchase at a solicitor's office within seven days. Later, 
upon completion of the buildings, the Authorised Person and Registered 
Contractor need to certify suitability of occupation. An Occupation Permit will be 
issued by the Buildings Department stating the date and usage permitted. 
Following the issue of the Occupation Permit, a Certificate of Compliance will be 
issued signifying compliance with land and planning requirements. The units will 
2° However, the deep recession triggered by the Asian financial crisis forced HKSAR government to 
relax the anti-speculation measures in May 1998. Details will be described in Chapter 7. 
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be handed over to the buyers who are required to execute an assignment deed. The 
whole development process is then finalised at this stage. 
Conclusion 
Hong Kong has often been reputed as a showcase of laissez-faire economy. But, 
this chapter demonstrates that Hong Kong government intervenes significantly in 
the housing market. Through controls of land release directly as an owner and 
indirectly through broad land use/re-development stipulations in leases, it exerts a 
great influence on the supply side of the private housing market. Lately, the 
Government has intervened the selling practices of developers in a way to curb 
speculation. The Government also monitors housing development process through 
planning and building controls. As a result, the government intervention in 
housing production shapes the production regime under which developers operate. 
In turn, this fashions the size, location and style of housing developments, and 
consequently the structure of owner-occupied housing provision in Hong Kong. 
All these produce a repercussion in discouraging smaller scale developers and 
reducing the number of competitors in the housing market. Such end result is a 
good example showing that the unintended consequence of high concentration of 
large property developers in Hong Kong owner-occupied housing provision is 
derived from an aggregate of courses of rational and sometimes intentional 
government actions to upkeep the prosperity and stability ofHong Kong economy. 
Inevitably, the dominance of large property developers in owner-occupied 
housing provision raises public concern and the mounting urges for the 
Government to further intervene. The most vocal demand is directed to curbing the 
soaring housing prices. It seems that major developers' activities are the cause of 
most property price escalation. In view of this, do developers have such power is 
the focus of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
PROPERTY DEVELOPERS AND THEIR POWER 
Private housing provision in Hong Kong is characterised by a relatively high level 
of market concentration. The reasons for this concentration of sellers have been 
discussed in the previous chapter. This concentration has inevitably raised serious 
allegations that these large property firms have market power in extracting 
monopoly in the private residential market. 
Using Tseung Kwan 0 as a case study, this chapter looks at the extent to 
which developers enjoyed the monopoly power. Also considered is the extent to 
which developers can influence the decision-making process in the political arena. 
The chapter concludes with the overall proposition that ‘power，exists in the 
structure of owner-occupied housing provision in Hong Kong. 
Developers' market power 
According to the latest statistics, in 1994 and 1995, the ten largest enterprises' had 
much larger total market share, both in terms of gross floor area and value added, in 
the end use group of residential buildings (Table 6.1). Also, in all end use groups, 
the percentage shares of gross floor area and value added of projects developed by 
the top ten enterprises were larger than their respective share of number of projects 
in both years. This revealed that the scale of development projects developed by 
these top enterprises were on average larger than that of other developers. Among 
the largest ten enterprises in 1994 and 1995, nine appeared in both years. Given 
such business concentration of residential development activity, there are reasons 
to question whether these large enterprises may have market power in Hong Kong. 
The following section therefore assesses the validity of this claim. 
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Table 6.1 Business concentration of the largest ten enterprises in 1994 and 1995. 
Gross floor area Value added Number of development 
(‘000 m2) ($ million) projects 
End use 1994 1995 1994 1995 1994 1995 
Residential 6,399.5 5,883.0 23,161.5~"14,132.1 U 2 95 
buildings (60.3%) (62.7%) (56.3%) (46.9%) (27.8%) (27.1%) 
Commercial 1,407.9 1,908.1 11,309.0 8,504.2 46 40 
buildings (38.5%) (48.4%) (42.3%) (44.1%) (22.1%) (19.6%) 
Industrial S l ^ 965.6 2,478.6 2,424.7 36 37 
buildings (37.6%) (41.0%) (47.6%) (41.4%) (35.6%) (37.0%) 
8,646.9 8,756.7 36,950.0~~25,061.0 m m 
TOTAL (52.4%) (55.9%) (50.6%) (45.3%) (27.2%) (26.3%) 
Note: 1. Residential buildings included buildings purely for residential purpose, combined 
residential and non-residential buildings and flats built under the PSPS. 
2. Commercial buildings included office buildings, hotels and boarding houses and multi-
purpose commercial premises. 
3. Industrial buildings included flatted factory blocks and warehouses. 
4. Figures in brackets denote percentage shares to the respective total. 
Source: Census and Statistics Department (1997a), Table 7. 
What is market power? 
In a free market economy, individuals enter into relations (or exchanges) 
voluntarily. The free market eliminates authority-based allocation, coercive forms 
of labour and so on. By replacing authority with voluntary contract, the market 
economy seems to eliminate power. In this sense, the terms ‘economy’ and 
‘power’ reject each other. Yet, especially in recent years, under the political 
economy perspective, market and power are interlinked. Keohane asserts that, 
'wherever, in the economy, actors exert power over one another, the economy is 
political' (1984, p.21). Some radical political economists even claim that the 
economy (particularly the capitalist market economy) is a 'system of power, 
(Caposaro & Levine 1992, p.l60). 
In Economy and Society, Weber defines power as ‘the probability that an 
actor in a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his (sic) own will 
despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests' (1956, 
quoted in Brennan 1997, p.72). In concentrated (or imperfect) market, economic 
agents have the ‘capacity，(i.e., 'power') to influence others. In oligopoly, there are 
‘Enterprises might/might not be companies quoted on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. 
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few producers, that is, a smaller number controls larger shares of the market (in 
total production, sales, etc.). Oligopoly is also characterised by higher barriers to 
entry; in fact, barriers to entry seem to be the most important feature in maintaining 
the privileged position of the oligopolist. In such case, firms in this market 
structure are said to possess ‘market power'. 
‘Firms have market power' means several things. Firstly, firms in 
concentrated markets may be price makers. Power in this sense means the capacity 
to impose a higher price and by implication inferior terms of exchange on other 
economic agents than would exist under more competitive market conditions. 
Secondly, large firms may be able to affect the other economic parameters, 
including output levels, technology and even tastes (through allocating resources to 
advertising), ln oligopoly, firms possess an important power by lowering their 
production levels, hence increasing prices. Finally, firms have the power to affect 
other firms in an oligopolistic environment. Firms can, by pursuing different 
strategies, affect what other firms do, how much they produce, their price levels 
and even whether they enter or leave an industry. 
Another key feature of oligopoly is the interdependence among firms. 
Interdependence means that the best strategy for a firm is shaped not by the market 
but by the capabilities and strategies of rival firms. The commonest strategy is 
predatory price strategy. A firm may lower its prices in response to the possibility 
of another firm entering the market, thus driving it out. In this sense, oligopoly 
opens up opportunities for power over others. In addition to devoting resources to 
wealth making, resources can be channelled towards the transfer of wealth. Instead 
of taking price and demand levels as given, they are subject to change. And instead 
of ‘deciding, anonymously, firms may devise strategies contingent upon the 
actions of other firms. 
To what extent do property developers exert their market power in Hong 
Kong residential market? In order to examine the ‘strength’ of this power, it is first 
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necessary to explore the relationship between house price and housing production 
in detail. 
House price and housing production 
Figure 6.1 shows the supply of private domestic units for the past 17 years. 
Housing output fluctuated broadly in line with general economic activity of Hong 
Kong, albeit with a much greater amplitude. The private housing supply reached 
its maximum between 1986 and 1989，when the number of units produced was 
between 34,000 and 36,500. Unfortunately, the supply then declined steadily to 
just under 19,000 in 1997. The housing shortage in private property market is 
further illustrated clearly in Figure 6.2, which shows the supply of new residential 
units as a percentage of the number ofhouseholds. The percentage decreased quite 
steadily from 2 to 2.5 per cent in 1976-78, down to less than 1.2 per cent for 1996. 
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Figure 6.1 Supply of private domestic units and price indices (all classes), 1981-97. 
Sources: 1. Data for 1981-96: Rating and Valuation Department, Hong Kong Property Review, 
various issues. 




: : ,¾^¾^, 
0 . 5 : — . 一 一 —— 一 一 ————，   
0 |-'m'ii ir I _ , : H r I j_^ ^ U ' _ _ u U ^ U _ _ ^ _ i^ ii ii 丨< 1 _ _ ^ _ i - 1 i I i i il _ i 1 "1. i i i tii ri |mi r ii 
1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 
Year 
Figure 6.2 Percentage of new residential units over total number ofhouseholds, 1976-97. 
Source: Lee, D.C.(1997) Fig. 2. 
Figure 6.1 also shows the trend of the property price indices in 1981 to 
1997. Generally, after the slump in 1984, property prices rose steadily until 1989 
when the supply began to drop. As a result, the property price index rose quite 
sharply until 1994 when the Government introduced administrative measures to 
control housing prices. In 1995, property prices began to rise again, but supply 
decreased even further. 
Overall, the statistics indicate that there is an inverse relationship between 
house prices and housing supply. But, looking more closely, both items were 
essentially affected by external forces, like interest rates, economic upheavals, 
government intervention, etc., rather than internal strategies adopted by 
developers. Moreover, while the general trend of property prices was on the up-
swing, the housing supply fluctuated widely. This reflects the inelasticity of 
housing supply in the shorter term: the building process is time-consuming such 
that new demands simply cannot be met quickly. In the longer term, it is clear that 
land shortages must ultimately constrain housing supply. 
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The question of land supply inevitably leads many people, including real 
estate analysts, to criticise the Hong Kong government's land sales policy as the 
main culprit in pushing up property prices. In fact, the Government does control 
land supply and housing directly as owner and indirectly through land reclamation 
and broad land use/re-development stipulations in leases. Such monopolisation of 
land supply has undeniably helped the Government to generate huge financial 
resources. This allows the Government to balance its budget^ while maintaining 
low rates oftaxation. Furthermore, since the government monopoly of land means 
that the development of public facilities can often be done without the cost of 
buying land, and this has been particularly important in the massive provision of 
infrastructure and human capital in terms of health, education and public housing 
(Schif fer l991,p . l91) . 
However, the criticism of the Government's adoption of a ‘high land price 
policy’ is insensitive to the fact that although the Government does set an annual 
land sale programme and a reserve price for each public land auction, it is the 
market that eventually determines the winning bid price. Generally, developers 
follow an optimal housing production path that is dependent on property price 
trend, construction and interest cost, etc. The method by which a developer 
estimates land value is (Cheng, 1993, p.66): 
land value = gross development value 
(gross saleable area after completion x market price) 
less: - construction cost 
-interest cost 
-other costs e.g., professional fee, administrative and 
marketing costs, etc. 
-fair developer's profit 
2 Indeed, Smart (1992, p.l99) discovers that the Hong Kong government has an obsession with 
balancing the budget, and this obsession can be explained by the colonial nature of Hong Kong 
before 1 July 1997. As the propose of making Hong Kong as a British's colony was to provide a site 
for British businessmen to do business in South China, British government would not provide any 
financial assistance to businessmen to do things in Hong Kong. The colonial Hong Kong 
government therefore had to find ways to maintain a balanced budget. 
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Normally, in a land auction, developers have an incentive to compete only 
if they are confident that the winning bid can result in a fair profit. However, in 
time of property boom, developers often go out of their way by paying exorbitant 
prices for sites that would leave them with little profit. Overall, the result of 
government land auction is a good indication of developers' expectations of future 
property price trend. 
ln the same vein. Ball (1983, p.112-115) also queries the effect of land 
prices on house prices. It is frequently suggested that high land prices cause high 
house prices. From this perspective, house prices are the sum of land costs, 
construction costs and developers' profit. Ricardian rent theory"^ and its modem 
derivatives (e.g., Ratcliffe & Stubbs 1996, p.251) argue, on the other hand, for the 
residual view ofland prices where the price ofhouses is given. According to Gibb, 
McGregor and Munro (1997, p.l750), new housing is priced on the basis of the 
perceived market demand, but land is priced as a residual. That is, a standard rate 
of return is added to the cost of building, and in the light of knowledge about the 
maximum price likely to be obtained from the market, an upper bid for land is 
calculated as the residual (presented in the above formula). Based on this 
calculation, developers push prices and profit margins as high as the market will 
bear. Developers' expectations regarding sales and profits indirectly influence 
their original bids for the site and so push up land prices. Residential land prices 
therefore depend on the profitability of housing development; as a consequence, 
land prices have no direct causal relationship to the house prices (Hong Kong 
Justice & Peace Commission 1979, p.46). 
The advantages often attributed to land monopoly, that is, the power to 
extort rents above competitive levels; the power to restrict supply; and the power to 
manipulate land uses over a large area in order to create more profitable ‘rental 
3 Ricardian rent theory, formulated by Ricardo(1772-1823), posits that the 'intrinsic' value of land 
(delineated as property) is determined by its productive usefulness (fertility in the case of rural 
land). Intrinsic value can be further enhanced by the nature of improvements placed upon, or 
incorporated into, the land. So, land value is the residual between production costs and selling 
prices. Hence, land values consequently do not determine anything, but are determined by demand 
and supply in the final product market. 
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contexts', offer only a potential within a market economy. They do not give the 
power to set price levels in real estate markets (Houghton 1993, p.264-265). 
Empirical studies indicate that speculation — not monopoly — is a more salient 
explanation for dramatic shifts in real estate prices, at least in the short term. Yet, 
speculation cannot be considered in isolation. Sudden demographic movements 
combined with interest rates, along with a host of other factors, can enter into 
plausible explanations for the rise of real estate values. Generally, it is the large 
increases in house prices that induce any substantial new housing output. The 
interlinkage ofhouse prices and housing output means that both feed in each other. 
But, new housing production has fallen substantially over the period from 1995-97 
(see Fig. 6.1), so significant shortages ofowner-occupied housing appeared during 
the boom. 
So the problem goes back again to the lack ofhousing supply. Actually, the 
developers' power in housing supply is tempered by land use planning policies and 
government legislation on land supply; the obvious example was the 50-hectare 
land sales limit imposed between 1985 and 1997. Development control means that 
there are effectively two markets in land: the market in land with planning 
permission for residential development and the market in land without planning 
permission where prices are lower. The scarce supply of land with planning 
permission ensures that developers have to bid at higher prices^. 
Chapter 5 has established the fact that a large proportion of residential land 
has come from private land without planning permission. Given the Government's 
'departmental division of labour' (Ng 1997, p.47), it not only made smaller, start-
up operations difficult to enter the housing market, but also slowed the conversion 
of these lands to residential use. Bristow (1984) and Cuthbert (1991, p.585) 
identify that there is no single agency controls development in Hong Kong 
planning system. By fragmenting control over the built environment, each agency 
4 Before 1978, land cost comprised 40% ofthe cost of a flat while construction comprised 30% and 
the developers' gross profit another 30% (Hong Kong Justice & Peace Commission 1979, p.42). 
But after 1990，the land prices and house prices started to move upwards. Under the estimation of 
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(i.e.. Planning Department, Buildings Department, Hong Kong Housing Authority 
(HKHA) and the like) becomes a separate realm ofpolitical power within the state 
bureaucracy. This means that Herculean efforts are required to coordinate the 
different authorities. The ambiguity of such planning system is often perceived as 
one of the major causes of shortage of land. 
In short, the competitive nature of the supply-side market for land and 
housing in urban areas contributes to their high prices. The policy of suppressing 
development in ‘rural，areas ofHong Kong artificially created a ‘scarcity，ofurban 
land and the continued escalating of its price (Wu 1983). The Government's 
obsession to keep a balanced budget ensures that reproduction of land has to be 
remained at its point ofmaximum value in order to increase government revenues. 
On this basis, strategic planning has never been made statutory. Instead of 
planning being carried out at a macro-scale, directing development in accordance 
with legislation, it has devolved to a system of micro-powers throughout the 
planning system (Cuthbert 1991, p.583). At the same time, the high land price adds 
to the attractive appearance of investment in the secondary circuit of capital. The 
more rapid the turnover of real estate is, the faster the prices (both land and house 
prices) will rise, and the faster the prices rise, the greater will be the incentive for 
investors to be involved (Gottdiener 1994, p.l90). It is the essential ambiguity of 
those regulations designed to control the construction of the built environment, 
together with the high level of activity in real estate sector, that have helped in 
recent years to guarantee super-profits to Hong Kong property companies. 
Developers ‘ influence on house prices 
Developers commonly pre-sell the units in a single development in a number of 
phases, and progressively raise prices over time. This inevitably induces the 
incentive to buy uncompleted units for speculative purposes and further boost 
house prices. Also, the 'internal selling' of some prime units to estate agents 
Hsieh (1992), the land cost accounted for about 58% of the selling price of small and medium 
residential units in urban areas. 
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instead of public sales compels final users have to pay a considerable price in order 
to acquire these units from estate agents. Such pricing strategies are often 
described as 'unscrupulous business practices' that place genuine home buyers in 
an unfavourable position in the housing market. 
This allegation however overlooks the reality of the housing market. 
Firstly, Evans (1995) alleges that there is no true market value of a property, only 
a range of prices (p.l2, emphasis in original). Because of the heterogeneity of 
properties, because of the infrequency with which any property is sold, because 
properties differ by location, and because different areas are different markets, 
there are relatively few participants in any sale with the result that the price is 
bounded but not determined. As a consequence, other factors determine the price, 
such as the psychology of buyers and sellers and the behaviour of real estate 
agents，. So, the property market is an inefficient market (p.27). 
Secondly, Reichert (1990, p.388) argues that housing consists of essentially 
local markets influenced by national forces. In analysing the geographic structure 
of housing market across the United States, he found that various regions 
responded in similar fashion to certain national factors (such as mortgage interest 
rates), but that local economic and demographic factors (such as population, 
employment and income) exerted unique effects in each region. Yet, comparing 
with the United States housing market, Hong Kong housing market is small and; in 
fact, it can be regarded as a single local market. Nevertheless, it still contains many 
small local areas. The home prices of these local areas are largely determined by 
local market forces, that is, the local supply and demand of housing units. 
Thirdly, demography, economic growth and financial liberalisation in the 
1980s generated a growth of high-income households who were trading up or 
looking for high-quality housing as their first owner-occupied dwelling. This kind 
of housing is usually found in large scale estate development that are mainly 
5 In fact, real estate agents in Hong Kong do not have a high reputation. Their unethical or 
sometimes illegal behaviour contributes partly the inefficiency of the property market. 
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supplied by large developers (refer Table 4.2). In consequence, consumers' 
preference for these housing estate units^ put large developers in a slightly more 
advantageous position as compared to small developers. In general, the prices of 
these units are often higher than the corresponding district averages (Lai, W-C. L. 
1996, p.llO), and are labelled as the benchmark ofhouse prices in a local area. In 
order to ensure the continuity of the large scale housing development, developers 
try every possible means to guarantee good consumers' response. I f the sale o fone 
stage is not good, sales of later phases of the development will be affected. This 
would have a serious effect oii the expected cash flows of developers, and can lead 
to an increase in the cost of finance in the future as their credit ratings are adversely 
affected. Furthermore, in order to raise finance from the stock market or from 
institutional connections, large developers have to present an image of growth and 
prosperity if investors' confidence is not to be undermined. To maintain dividend 
repayments and a high turnover of capital implies a greater incentive to sell or 
pre-sell new units even when the market is sluggish. This is evident from the fact 
that developers are selling at prices below those of the secondary market in many 
large developments during the downturn of the property cycle. Sometimes, many 
developers are offering top-up financing for home purchasers in a bid to sell their 
own units. 
Finally, given the importance of large scale housing estates in the Hong 
Kong housing market, developers are often perceived to exert monopoly power by 
'fixing' prices in this sector of the residential market, leading to the overall price 
increase. However, Houghton (1993, p.265) regards this power to set price levels 
in housing market does not depend upon having a monopoly, but can be 
accomplished by virtue of simply having a ‘leading，position, that is, ‘smaller or 
less efficient firms have no practical choice except to follow the prices charged by 
the industry leaders' (Hewitt & Ostas 1990, p.l95). In other contexts, such price 
6 Three major factors are responsible for the popularity ofthese large estates. Firstly, the price range 
is suitable for the mass market. Most ofthese estates have a solid reputation with banks, making the 
transaction procedure easier. Secondly, most popular estates are in close proximity to transport, 
schools and shopping facilities. Thirdly, because of a large number of blocks and units all in the 
small size range, it gives buyers a near guarantee that they will be able to sell again when the time is 
right (Bartlett 1990，p.9). 
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leadership has been an oft-cited feature of'oligopolistic competition' (White 1981, 
p.441). Even ifproperty owners can achieve monopoly pricing within districts (see 
Harvey 1985b, Ch. 4), no developer or small group of developers can control the 
overall supply in an area, ln Hong Kong, new supply is a small proportion o f the 
total stock (2-7%; Lee, D.C. 1997, Fig. 1), and it is unresponsive in the short term 
to price movements because of production lags. Thus, it is beyond developers' 
ability to influence the whole market by 'pushing up' the prices o fnew units. Also, 
ease ofentry into the market and the potential of previously undeveloped districts 
to compete with developed areas destabilises market domination (Fainstein 1994, 
p.220). In any case, even in a concentrated provision of owner-occupied housing, 
large developers do compete among themselves in terms of pricing, particularly 
during a downturn in the market. The property development industry indeed has a 
paradoxical situation with regard to market position — it is simultaneously 
monopolistic and highly competitive. The following analysis of sales strategies 
adopted by developers in Tseung Kwan 0 throws some lights on this. 
Developers，pricing strategies in Tseung Kwan 0 
Tseung Kwan 0 , known as Junk Bay before June 1989, is chosen as a case study 
because its secondary market is not yet as big as in other mass residential areas 
since its development is fairly new. It is easily accessible to the author, and 
consequently its choice as a case study area has many practical advantages in 
finding contacts and sources ofdata. Also, extensive coverage of i t s development 
and the sales of private housing units have been constantly reported in the mass 
media. The reports provide a useful supplementary information in this study. The 
period June 1996 to April 1998 offers the opportunity to examine different aspects 
ofdevelopers' selling strategies at different points in time. The mid-1996 showed 
a peak of housing prices and then a distinct trough in October 1997. This price 
movement allows us to look at closely the behaviours of private developers in 
response to the changes in the property market. 
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The development of Tseung Kwan 0 as a new town? began in 1983. 
Covering a site area of 1,715 hectares, the new town development is divided into 
three phases. The Phase I area has been substantially completed. Phase II 
development generally refers to the town centre area. The removal of the steel 
works and the development of the third industrial estate and chemical storage 
terminal in Tseung Kwan 0 , and the clearance ofTiu Keng Leng (previously called 
Rennie's Mill) for public housing development are considered as the Phase III 
expansion of Tseung Kwan 0 new town (Fig. 6.3). 
Unlike other new towns such as Fanling and Sheung Shui, which are 
granted a developable ratio ofonly five times, most of the areas in Tseung Kwan 0 
are allowed to build high-rise residential properties with a plot ratio o f u p to eight 
times with open space on the basis of 10.764 square feet per person {SCMP, 12 
November 1997). The new town is targeted to accommodate a population of 
520,000 when it is scheduled to be completed in 2011. 
Population of the Tseung Kwan 0 new town was about 143,000 in the 1996 
census (Census & Statistics Department 1996, Table F8). Like all Hong Kong new 
towns, the development of Tseung Kwan 0 is 'public housing led，，(Pun 1987, 
p.42), that is, new towns exist, grow, and have their design determined primarily to 
meet the long-term production targets of the HKHA. Currently, over 80 per cent of 
living quarters are provided by the HKHA (Table 6.2). The first two public rental 
estates — Tsui Lam and Po Lam — were completed in 1988/89, and the first 
subsidised owner-occupied housing estates were King Ming and Ying Ming Home 
Ownership Scheme (HOS) courts and Hong Sing Garden, a project under the 
Private Housing Participation Scheme (PSPS) in 1989-90 (see Table 6.3). The first 
batches ofprivate housing developments were Nan Fung's Well On Garden and 
7 The development of new towns in Hong Kong concerns the development of major new cities (in 
the population range of 1,000 to 800,000) on virtually virgin undeveloped sites (Bristow 1989, p.2). 
There have been 5 successive major cycles ofnew town development in Hong Kong. The first was 
Kwun Tong that was commenced in the late 1950s. The second was Tsuen Wan, Sha Tin and Tuen 
Mun (known as Castle Peak before 1973) in the 1960s. The third was the expansion of major rural 
townships in Tai Po, Yuen Long and Fanling/Sheung Shui in the mid-1970s. The fourth was Junk 
Bay (now Tseung Kwan 0) and Tin Shui Wai and the expansion of Sha Tin at Ma On Sha in the 
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Source: Territory Development Department (1997) Fig. 2. 
1980s. Finally, the 1990s saw the initiation of new development in Tung Chung/Tai Ho in North 
Lantau. 
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Table 6.2 Tseung Kwan 0: number of dwelling units by type ofliving quarters, 1991 and 
1996. 
Type ofliving quarters 1991 1996 
Housing Authority rental housing 11,099 18,862 
Housing Society rental housing - -
Housing Authority HOS estates 8,652 14,779 
Private housing - 1,778 
Villas/Bungalows/Modern village houses 490 1,030 
Simple stone structures/Traditional village houses 130 95 
Institutions (include hospitals, prisons, old people 
homes, religious houses and British force barracks) 42 -
Other permanent housing 115 
Staff quarters 392 
Non-domestic quarters 70 
Other temporary housing 1,878 
Public temporary quarters 1,273 
Private temporary quarters 16 
f m A h 22,406 38,295 
Sources: Census and Statistics Department (1991, 1996) Table F1. 
Henderson's Finery Park, which began occupation in 1994. Then, the first Hong 
Kong Housing Society's (HKHS) subsidised owner-occupied housing estate, 
Verbena Height, was introduced to eligible purchasers at a discount in late 1996^ 
(see Table 6.4). All these public and private housing estates are mainly located in 
areas of Phase I development scheme (Fig. 6.4). 
At present, only six private housing developments have been carried out by 
different developers in Tseung Kwan 0 (Table 6.5). These housing estates are 
located adjacent to each other; therefore, units from individual development can be 
8 However, when buyers started moving into their flats ofVerbena Height in September 1997, about 
1,500 households were informed by the HKHS that they had paid the wrong price (including 922 
buyers reported that they had been over-charged by up to $100,000) as architects had failed to take 
into account the changing width of an external wall when measuring the size offlats. To pacify the 
protest from flat owners, the society offered to buy back the properties at the original price and 
repay the legal fees, stamp duty charges and expenditure on decoration expenses, etc. As a result, 
about 160 buyers decided to rescind the purchase agreements by selling them back to the HKHS at 
the original price. About llOfamilies chose to rent the flats. The rest accepted the compensation, 
which totalled more than $30 million, and went ahead with the purchase {SCMP, 17 December 
1997; Express News, 31 December 1997). 
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Table 6.3 Tseung Kwan 0: existing housing estates provided by H K H A as at 31 March 1998. 
1. Public housing estates 
Year of No. of No. of Accommodated 
Name of estate completion blocks flats population 
~ P o Lam i 9 ^ 6 5,007 W j ^ 
Tsui Lam 1989 8 4,932 20,307 
King Lam 1992 7 5,510 19,404 
Hau Tak 1994 6 4,268 14,098 
Ming Tak [ ^ 2 \ _ ^ 4,343 
Sub-total 29 21,278 78,100 
2. HOS courts 
Year of No. of No. of Accommodated Selling prices 
Name of estate completion blocks flats population ($)* 
King Ming T ^ 3 U ^ 3,900 178,100-381,000 
YingMing 1990 5 1,750 6,500 213,300-433,300 
Yan Ming 1991 5 1,750 6,500 235,900-481,500 
H o Ming 1991 1 816 3,000 195,200-340,700 
Chung Ming 1994 5 1,750 5,800 415,300-934,100 
Y u M i n g 1994 2 1,216 4,000 676,800-1,168,700 
Yuk Ming 1994 3 1,824 6,000 754,300-1,404,900 
Hin Ming \ ^ 1 1J9 2,600 293,800-1,150,100 
Sub-tolal 25 10,915 38,300 
3. PSPS estates “ 
Year of No. of No. of Accommodated Selling prices 
Name of estate completion blocks flats population ($)* 
Hong Sing Garden f ^ 5 f ^ 6,800 235,800-394,500 
Fu Ning Garden 1991 6 2,449 8,600 269,200-439,700 
O n Ning Garden | ^ 6 2,302 8,200 312,200-528,100 
Sub-total 17 6,602 23,600 
TOTAL 71 38,795 140,000  
* selling prices were 45-50% of the market prices. 
Source: H K H A . 
Table 6.4 Tseung Kwan 0: existing owner-occupied housing provided by H K H S as at 31 
March 1998. 
Year of No. of No. of Accommodated Selling price 
Name ofestate completion blocks flats population ($/ sq. ft.) 
1. FFSS estates “ ~ 
Verbena Height 10/97 6 1,894 6,629 2,119 
2. SCHS estates 
The Pinnacle(0 8/98 4 1,424 4,984 3,513 
Serenity Place(2) 11/98 5 1,526 5,341 n.a. 
Radiant Towers(0 12/98 2 704 2,464 2,732 
Total 17 9,300 32,550 
Notes: (1) Radiant Towers and The Pinnacle were sold at about from 33.36% to 38.42% on full 
market values. 
(2) The selling price ofSerenity Place has not finalised yet. 
Source: HKHS. 
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Table 6.5 Tseung Kwan 0: private housing developments as at31 March 1998. 
Year of No. of No. of 
Name of estate Developer completion blocks flats Means o f land acquisition 
W e l l On Garden Nan Fung 9/1994 4 1,280 through LEEs in 1991. 一 
Finery Park Henderson 10/1994 2 688 through LEEs in 1991. — 
Metro City Henderson 4/1997 6 2,048 through LEEs in 1992. 
(Phase I)  
East Point C i t y ~ ~ S u n Hung 11/1997 7 2,184 through LEEs in 1992. 
K a i (including 28 
penthouses)  
Maritime Bay Sino 2/1999 2 736 via public auction in March 1995.~ 
La Cite Noble Henderson 5/1999 6 2,184 n.a. 
TOTAL 27 9,120 — 
regarded as close surrogates to each other. Residential units from each 
development have been put into the market at different points in time since 1993. 
Well On Garden, the first private housing estate was launched for public 
sale on 10 March 1993 at an average purchase price of $2,950 per square foot. 
Later, Finery Park was also sold to public at an average price of $3,000 per square 
foot. The selling prices of these two estates were close to those ($3,000-$3,200 per 
sq ft) at the suburban areas like Sha Tin, Tai Po and Tsing Yi. Yet, the prices were 
set slightly below the overall market prices since these developments were small in 
scale. 
Public attention was drawn to Tseung Kwan 0 when units iii Metro City 
(Phase 1)9 were sold. Over 2,000 units were introduced into the housing market at 
various stages between June 1996 to June 1997 (Table 6.6). In the first batch of 
sales, Henderson faced competition with its own development, Sunshine City in 
Ma On Shan. In order to arouse public interest, the selling prices of the first 68 
units were set an average of $4,376 per square foot, a 8 per cent below those at 
Sunshine City ($4,738-$5,355 on 2/6/1997). Such prices attracted overwhelming 
responses, and subsequently, the flat prices rose from $5,000 per square foot in 
June-July 1996 to a high ofover $7,500 per square foot by March 1997. 
9 Metro City consists of 3 phases. Phase II w i l l provide 3,400 housing uni ts and be sold in mid-
1998. The phase III is planned to provide 1,400 units at the end of 1998. 
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Table 6.6 Price movements of Metro City (Phase 1), Tseung Kwan 0. 
No. of Price 
Sale date units ($/sq. ft.) Results of the sales/Remarks  
23/6/1996 68 4,376 4,137 applications including514 company 
172 4,677 subscribers. Overall 95% sold on that 
176 4,685 day. 
104 5,037 
208 5,095 
12_ 5J33  
7/7/1996 ^ 4,725 1,801 applications including 360 company 
100 4,836 subscribers. Overall 98% sold on that 
100 5,025 day. 
12 not disclosed  
"H/7/1996 34 5,239 Units re-sale with price adjustment. 
18/8/1996 48 5,041 Overall 99% sold on that day. 
^ 5,062 
1/9/1996 ^ 4,724 Overall 99% sold on that day. 
28 4,942 
2 not disclosed  
15/9/1996 40 4,865 83% sold on that day. 
13/10/1996 32 5,211 63% sold on that day. — 
10/11/1996 28 5,200 57% sold on that day. — 
29/1/1997 72 5,500 Overall 98% sold on that day. 
20 not disclosed  
7/2/1997 80 7,092 Re-sale with discount during 7-16/2/1997. 
6/3/1997 ^ 7,092 Units on higher floors. 
16 7,587 
^ 73^5  
• • • • 
• • • • • • • • 
1 W 1 9 9 7 30 7,485 Re-sale with discount during 28/6-7/7/97. 
Sources: Hong Kong Property Journal, various issues. 
Yet, the most eye-catching sales occurred in January 1997 when units o f the 
East Point City were put into the market. Sun Hung Kai first released 304 units in 
the first batch priced at $5,158 per square foot that was below the secondary market 
price. At that time, the selling prices of Metro City were around $5,200 per square 
foot. Despite the introduction of new anti-speculative measures in January 1997, 
the relatively lower price, undoubtedly, attracted a record high subscription of 
27,132 applications (including 5,510 company subscribers) for 304 units. 
Encouraged by such an overwhelming response, the developer released additional 
flats in batches at increasing prices on the same day, making a total o f l , 8 6 4 units. 
The prices of added units reached $5,596 per square foot (Table 6.7) that were 
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Table 6.7 Price movements of East Point City, Tseung Kwan 0. 
No. of Price 
Sale date units ($/sq. ft.) Results ofthe sales  
1 1/1/1997 304 5,158 27,132 applications 
152 5,313 including 5,510 company 
152 5,472 subscribers. Overall 90% 
888 5,636 sold on that day. 
^ 5,596 
9/4/1997 i^5 6,790 Overall 24% sold on that 
U 5 7,082 ^  
Sources: Hong Kong Property Journal, various issues. 
ultimately higher than those of Metro City. Nevertheless, about 90 per cent were 
sold on that day. Later, Sun Hung Kai released another 100 flats at $6,790 per 
square foot on cash payment in April 1997. The cost per square foot was 32 per 
cent higher than the first batch of units sold in January. It then released an extra 
115 units at $7,082 per square foot. However, only 52 of 215 units were sold. 
Indeed, the East Point City became the first major new project suffered the 
downturn of the market, which was caused by the raise in interest rate in March 
1997. 
Facing the intense competition from Sun Hung Kai and the changed market 
sentiment, Henderson began to cut its remaining Metro City units to $7,000 per 
square foot in April 1997. Later, the prices rose again when Hong Kong housing 
market experienced a short boom before the handover in July 1997. However, after 
the Asian financial crisis, as part of a Lunar New Year promotion, the developer cut 
almost 20 per cent off the listed price in January 1998. It also offered a 90 per cent 
loan fixed at 10 per cent for two years. Furthermore, it waived the legal fees, and 
paid the 2.75 per cent stamp duty charges {SCMP, 30 January 1998). 
On the other hand, Sun Hung Kai released 28 penthouses at its East Point 
City in December 1997 at price of $7,500-$8,000 per square foot. At first, the 
developer did not cut prices to compete for buyers, and set prices that were higher 
than those in the secondary market. Instead, it provided preferential mortgage 
terms to buyers, like paying the balance of interest charges if prime lending rates 
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rose to 10 per cent or above. Also, Sun Hung Kai launched full-page 
advertisements in seven Chinese newspapers on 21 November 1997 that stated a 
happy family life in one of its flats was more important than the fact that it might 
depreciate in price. Yet, the tactical advertisement campaign failed to push the 
market upwards. Sun Hung Kai, ultimately, has succumbed to market forces by 
offering the units at sharply lower prices ($6,865 per sq ft; Express News, 1 January 
1998). However, selling at below secondary market prices does not by itself 
guarantee that all units could be sold in a short period of time, as is evident in the 
latest sales results of East Point City. 
The pricing strategy of a developer is also affected by the way the land is 
acquired and its own company's structure. In the time of December 1997, along 
the sales of penthouses of East Point City, Sino pre-sold uncompleted units of 
Maritime Bay in Tseung Kwan 0 . Maritime Bay is a two-tower development, with 
736 units ranging from 588 to 892 square feet in size. The first 148 units were 
offered for sale on 1 December 1997 at an average $5,727 per square foot 一 about 
12 per cent lower than the prices of similar units sold in Tseung Kwan 0 ' s 
secondary market. Actually, the secondary market in Tseung Kwan 0 was very 
small, mainly comprised units of Metro City that began occupation in April 1997. 
The average price of Metro City was $6,500 per square foot while those of Finery 
Park and Well On Garden were $5,200-$5,300 per square foot. Also, Sino is 
always the most aggressive developer in terms of its way to acquire land in public 
auction. Therefore, it is very eager to speed up sales and generate cash flow, 
despite weak market sentiments. 
Furthermore, the year 1998 will witness a move toward domination of 
Tseung Kwan 0 ' s new-construction housing market by a big developer, 
Henderson. It is anticipated that Henderson will sell over 13,000 units, a 35 per 
cent of total residential supply this year {Express News, 8 December 1997). 
Among them, nearly half of them are located at Tseung Kwan 0 . They include 
4,752 units at Metro City Phases II and III and 2,160 units at La Cite Noble. Such 
large supply in the area and the combination of the economic hard times upset the 
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entire price structure in Tseung Kwan 0 . With prices sliding, interest rates 
prospects uncertain and buyers hesitate, Henderson, with its substantial land bank 
at Tseung Kwan 0，has no choice but continues to boost sales by discounting 
prices. As a result, nearly 70 per cent of the initial batch of units on sale at La Cite 
Noble were sold below $3 million in April 1998. The first batch of218 units was 
released at $4,028 per square foot (see Tables 6.6 and 6.7 for comparison), more 
than 10 per cent below secondary market prices. Actually, the effective price o fLa 
Cite Noble was lower than the listed price since Henderson offered mortgage 
interest subsidies, decoration cash coupons and legal fees payment. Clearly, the 
large backlog of new flats in Tseung Kwan 0 puts pressure on developers' pricing 
strategy. 
Thus, the above case study shows that developers do compete strongly 
against each other in selling their products. Sometimes, they arrange shuttle bus 
services to their own sale offices in front of their rival's in order to secure more 
customers. Developers do consider price movements both in the local area and also 
others where similar units being sold. So, developers do not have sufficient market 
power to control price and extract monopolistic advantage. Finally, even in a local 
area, there exists different sub-markets. No one can deny that a local market, 
particularly in a large metropolitan area, does not operate as ‘one large market', but 
rather as a series of linked sub-markets. To sell a particular housing type, 
developers have to adjust their selling strategy to attract a particular cluster of 
households who look for better and more spacious housing units. This is evident in 
how Sun Hung Kai sold its East Point City's penthouses. Ultimately, it is the 
market, that is the interaction of demand and supply at a local area, which 
determines the house prices. 
Collusion ofdevelopers in the housing market 
On the other hand, the existing nature ofowner-occupied housing provision, that is 
a high concentration of housing supply within a small group of large property 
firms, enforces property entrepreneurs' capacity on the general public. Put another 
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way, the current housing market structure enables entrepreneurs to attain their goal 
and profit. One possible outcome is that developers have collusive power in the 
housing market. This can be assessed in the land auction in June 1994, which was 
immediately following the Government's package to curb speculation in the 
property market. During that auction, Hong Kong's top 12 property developers 
jointly bid for the land. The two plots near the Chinese border sold for $2.6 billion 
(US $338 million), approximately 40 per cent below the market prices at that time. 
The developers organised effort caused an uproar in the community, and the 
Government, shocked by the outcome, immediately reviewed the bidding 
arrangements. The developers, on the other hand, claimed that the offer of low bids 
was a self-defence in an uncertain market. But, economic critics said the 
developers' real intention was 'to teach the government a lesson’ (do Rosario 1994, 
p.62). The anti-speculative measures, which aimed at bringing property prices 
down, would deduce the developers' profit. But, the drop of property prices would 
diminish the Government's main source of revenue, that is from land sales and 
property-related taxes. Thus, it was thought that the developers' cartel-like move 
to keep auction prices low was intended as a reminder of the above fact. 
Whatever the real motive for the below-expectation bid, there has been not 
enough evidence of collusion (ibid.). In fact, it is very common for developers to 
form joint venture, especially when the parcel of land being auctioned is large or 
the market is at a slump. Also, joint venture among smaller developers allows 
them to bid for large plots ofland and thus promote competition in the land market. 
Besides,joint venture in housing development is inevitable since this is the means 
by which developers can diversify their risks, reduce development income 
fluctuation over time and achieve scale economies. The latter is manifested in the 
popularity of large scale housing estate development. 
Although the accusation of collusion among developers cannot be 
empirically proved, the Consumer Council claims that developers can co-operate 
with each other by having common directorship. Table 6.8 shows a number of 
leading figures in prominent property development companies who serve as 
172 
Table 6.8 Cross-directorships among Hong Kong major developers in 1995. 
Company Position  
Ho Tim New World Development Co., Ltd. Director 
Sun Hung Kai Properties Ltd. Director  
Lee Shau-kee Henderson Land Development Co., Ltd. Chairman & Manager Director 
Sun Hung Kai Properties Ltd. Vice-Chairman  
Lee Yeh-kwong, Cheung Kong (Holdings) Ltd. Director 
Charles Henderson Land Development Co., Ltd. Director 
Hopewell (Holdings) Ltd. Director 
Sun Hung Kai Properties Ltd. Director  
Li Tzar-kuoi, Cheung Kong (Holdings) Ltd. Deputy Chairman & Deputy 
Victor Managing Director 
Hopewell (Holdings) Ltd. Director  
W o o Po-shing Henderson Land Development Co., Ltd. Director 
Sun Hung Kai Properties Ltd. Director  
Source-. SCMP, 12 May 1996. 
directors of other firms, ln this context, the Council points out that, ‘there is a 
significant risk of abuse of market power and anti-competitive practices' {SCMP, 
12May 1996). 
However, a browse among annual reports of large property development 
companies can dismiss the claim that such cross-directorship will make collusion 
between developers easier. First, it is common practice for an expanding firm to 
invite prominent figures to join the company to improve its prestige and standing in 
the sector. Second, the person invited into the Board usually accounts for a very 
small company's share, which means he/she does not have enough power to veto 
the major shareholder(s)' decision. Rather than using co-directorship to facilitate 
collusion, it actually serves as a basis in forming a business network. 
Yeung (1997, p.5) defines a business network as ‘an integrated and 
coordinated set of ongoing economic and non-economic relations embedded 
within, among and outside business firms'. The embeddedness is realised in 
ongoing networks of relationships at three distinct levels (p.20): 
(a) extra-firm relations with 'influential individuals' within the state bureaucracy 
through political connections; 
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(b) inter-firm relations with business partners through intricate shareholding 
arrangements and with personal friends through joint ventures; and 
(c) intra-firm control and co-ordination through the process of 'family-isation', 
that is, socialisation ofkey personnel into the 'corporate family'. 
In such context, a network is more thaiijust an integrated structure because 
it is simultaneously a structure and a process. It is a nested structure with emergent 
power in an abstract sense (p.5). 
The business network formation, however, does not change the traditional 
characteristics of a Chinese business organisation. Redding (1991, p.36) 
distinguishes Chinese entrepreneurs' style of management as follows: 
(a) Control of the firm should be retained in the interests of long-term family 
prosperity; 
(b) Risks should be hedged to protect family assets; 
(c) Key decisions should remain within an inner circle; and 
(d) Dependence on non-belongers for such essentials as managerial, technical or 
marketing skills should be carefully limited. 
Because of this obsession to maintain control, the power of decision 
making is extremely centralised. Usually the owner, entrepreneur, founder of 
father/mother figure becomes the key decision maker. Even when the Chinese firm 
grows larger, and has to adopt more 'rational’ methods of management in order to 
remain competitive, Tsoi's (1993, p.21) in-depth analysis of the internal dynamics 
and organisational structure of a Chinese property development company in Hong 
Kong finds that relatively important decisions on personnel and financial matters 
still remain at the top. Thus, Chinese developers have their own business policies 
in pursuit of self-interest and profit maximisation. So, conflicts often arise making 
collusion among developers impossible. Even collusion did happen, the bond 
would certainly be fragile, and could not last permanently. 
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To conclude, any economic action designed to increase market share, boost 
prices or exert some control over the economic environment is often perceived by 
an outside observer as 'monopolistic' behaviour. But, unless it can be shown that 
there is a conscious strategy to create a monopoly or an olipology, it can never be 
more than an attribution (Houghton 1993, p.271). Even the housing market is 
today full of very powerful developers providing and selling a vast number of 
residential units, but few of these enjoy a pure monopoly position in the market, 
and none ofthem can legitimately force customers to pay them money against their 
will. Indeed, from the viewpoint of large private development companies, 
concentrating capital resources to create a monopoly in a certain segment of real 
estate would probably be viewed as a recipe for disaster, given the disjoiiitedly 
cyclic and frequently volatile nature of markets in real estate. Furthermore, the 
investment necessary to create such a condition would be enormous, even 
impossible in most cases. 
In current practice, large real estate developers 'hedge their bets' through 
purposefully followed programmes of diversification, not only in types of real 
estate (e.g., multi-use projects include hotels, shopping malls, and recreational 
facilities, etc.) but in locations as well (e.g., China, Canada, United Kingdom and 
so on). Some even diversify their businesses to unrelated sectors, like retails 
industry, communication services, public utilities services, etc. This dispersal of 
capital and development activity not only tends to mitigate against the realisation 
of monopolies, but also casts doubt upon connections that monopoly power is a 
systematically sought goal of large and sophisticated property developers. 
Nevertheless, it does not rule out that varying degrees of co-operation takes place 
among developers, but the rationale behind these acts of co-operation is more than 
in gaining monopolistic advantages rather, it is the non-monetary returns they 
actively seek for. Increasingly, Hong Kong large developers are more than a group 
of housing producers, they occupy prominent positions in Hong Kong's, or even 
China's, political sphere. 
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Developers ' political power 
The foregoing account examined developers' power in an economic content, and it 
demonstrated the difficulty of finding empirical evidence. However, from a 
broader viewpoint, developers do possess power in Hong Kong's economy. Thus, 
in order to examine this issue closely, a more stringent definition of power is 
required. 
First, Polsby (1963, p.3-4) defines ‘power，， 
as the capacity of one actor to do something affecting another actor, 
which changes the probable pattern of specified future events. This 
can be envisaged most easily in a decision-making situation. 
There are two aspects in this definition. The first and substantive part is 
that power implies an element of control over others as well as over future events. 
The second aspect is concerned with the empirical manifestation of power, and 
Polsby proposes that power is most easily indicated in decision-making. The 
people who make decisions, particularly at a social-political level, and determine 
the direction of future events, thus have power. Putting these two aspects together, 
the important part ofPolsby's definition of power is that it is the ability to influence 
others, thereby changing the pattern of future events. This ability is at the heart of 
the conception of power. I fan actor can influence the decision-makers, he/she can 
have the pattern of future events changed to suit him/her. It is he/she, rather than 
the decision-makers, who wields power. 
In this regard, Anderson and Gibson's conception of power is also helpful. 
They(1978,p.45) describe, 
Power inheres in the social relations which regulate or control the 
flow ofmaterial and human resources in a society. Thus, power may 
be measured by the degree to which a person or group controls the 
application and distribution of a society's resources. 
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Resource control confers power in that the actions of the controller 
significantly affect the livelihood ofothers 一 their employment, careers, incomes, 
use of public utilities and so on——and to an important extent shape their values and 
beliefs. The way in which a society's major resources are applied or re-distributed 
therefore has a profound influence on the development of future events. In a free 
market economy, such as Hong Kong, many of society's major resources are 
controlled by individuals and corporations in the private sector, who thereby have a 
hegemonic position in society. 
Leung, B.K.P. (1990, p.20) explains why such hegemony has a powerful 
influence on the decision-makers in both the then Hong Kong government and the 
new HKSAR government. As a substantial portion of government revenues comes 
from the economic undertakings of these individuals and corporations, their 
application or withdrawal of resources will significantly affect the stability and 
well-being of the economy. Thus, no sensible decision-maker in the Government 
would venture to neglect their views and interests in policy-making. 
From the outset, the private sector's dominance of the economy was 
established. In a review of the political structure in Hong Kong, Rear (1971, 
p.78-79) demonstrated that power was exercised in the Colony through a tacit 
alliance between business interest and the bureaucracy. Davies in his study of the 
overlapping membership between political bodies, boards of directors and 
government advisory boards in 1976 came to a similar conclusion. 
In general, it can be concluded that there is in Hong Kong a relatively 
small elite that controls the policy process. It is in the main non-
Chinese and with a large proportion of expatriates. (1977, p.69) 
The business interests referred above were mainly the trading houses 
(hongs) started by British entrepreneurs in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century. Traditionally, the chief executives of the four major hongs (Jardine and 
Matheson, Swire, Hutchison and Wheelock Marden) would be represented on the 
board of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HKSBC). These 
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'taipans' would also be the Unofficial Members of the Executive Council, the 
major policy-making body in the colony. They would also be members of the then 
Royal Hong Kong Jockey Club (now known as the Hong Kong Jockey Club), 
whose chief administrator would also be represented on the board ofHKSBC. The 
Chairman o f H K S B C in turn would always be the chief steward of the Jockey Club. 
This network was so tight; indeed, the power of the elite group ofbusinessmen was 
so great that it had been said that, ‘power in Hong Kong resides in the Jockey Club, 
Jardine and Matheson, the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank, and the Governor — in 
that order’. (Hughes 1976, p.23). 
However, this business network was loosened in the early part ofthe 1970s 
when the property development industry became flourishing. The property boom 
gave rise a group of Chinese business groups. Wong, G. (1996, p.104-105) 
identifies four reasons why the hongs were not able to profit from the property 
boom as much as the Chinese businesses. 
The first reason could be that because of the speculative nature of the 
property market, the conservative hongs wanted to avoid the risk. Indeed, many 
Chinese businesses had gone bankrupt because of the property market. The 
Goodyear Property Development Co. (the Southeast Asian Chinese property 
company constructed the first high density building project mentioned in Chapter 
4) was a good example of how a very successful company went bankrupt in a very 
short period oftime. 
Secondly, the property developments in late 1970s and the 1980s were 
mainly high density building developments in the N e w Territories. The senior 
executives of the hongs, mainly expatriates, tended to live and work in different 
areas in Hong Kong that were more luxurious and less crowded. Hence, they did 
not have the intimate knowledge of these areas that made it difficult for them to 
undertake very large financial commitments to these development projects. 
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Thirdly, it could be that they lacked faith in the future of Hong Kong. 
Being British, they had the option of moving out more easily than their Chinese 
counterparts. Investing in landed property would neutralise this advantage because 
of further committing their investment to remain in the colony. Finally, property 
ownership has always been a means to build up family prestige and wealth in 
traditional Chinese villages. Chinese businessmen therefore value property 
foremost as a form of investment, and they readily accept a speculative nature of 
industry as a sine qua non ofbusiness. 
Later, the effect ofthe Sino-British negotiation iii 1982-84 precipitated the 
fall of British hongs, but provided an opportunity for the Chinese business groups 
to consolidate their footings not only in the property field, but also in the economy 
as well. However, when compared with their British counterparts, most of the 
Chinese entrepreneurs did not actively involve themselves in any political group. 
They were not offered seats in the Executive or Legislative Councils, non in any 
government advisory boards. Yet, by virtue of their prominence in the business 
circle, the Chinese property tycoons have always been able to maintain a certain 
degree of influences over the decision-makings of various government 
departments. The negotiation of planning matters, land premiums, discretionary 
rulings, etc. are always more favourable to the large companies, not only because 
they have stronger bargaining powers, professional expertise, financial back-ups, 
but also in most cases, because of their political influences. The development of 
Tin Shui Wai is one classic example. 
Controversy over the development ofTin Shui Wai 
The initial idea for the development scheme had originated from an investment 
consortium that had bought speculatively a large parcel of 488 hectares of fish 
ponds to the west of Yuen Long. The early intention was to develop low-density 
private housing, but the scheme was changed when the interests were brought out 
by a new consortium formed as Mightycity Ltd. 一 made up of 51 per cent China 
Resources Holdings (the biggest Mainland China's trading and investment 
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company in Hong Kong at that time), Cheung Kong, Trafalgar Housing and 
Wheelock Marden. 
The consortium submitted a master plan for the now 846-hectare site to the 
then Hong Kong government in November 1980. It proposed a development 
scheme to provide 60,000 public housing units, 43,700 H O S units and 43,000 
private units, with a 15-year development period to a target population of 535,000 
——a proposal equivalent to one of the Government's own new towns. As the 
consortium represented a major grouping of some of the largest Hong Kong's 
Chinese property companies at that time, and with the high-profile Mainland 
Chinese backing, it represented an important developer that the colonial 
government could hardly ignore. Moreover, the dominant Chinese interest set the 
Government a political dilemma that proved particularly sensitive, especially once 
the build-up to the 1984 Sino-British Agreement on the future of Hong Kong after 
1997 had begun in the early 1980s. 
In general terms, the proposal met all criteria and constraints in urban 
design and planning set by the Government's own planning standards and 
guidelines, but, at the sub-regional level, it posed an immense problem to the 
Government. Experience with the earlier and smaller private sector residential 
developments at Fairview Park and Hong Lok Yuen suggested that the 
Government would be faced with large infrastructure expenditures resulting from 
the new scheme, particularly if major commuting patterns were to develop. 
Certainly the Government could not change its priority-setting ofthe annual public 
works programme to fit the rigid time scale of a private-sector scheme over other 
projects that had a higher social or economic priority (Bristow 1989, p.217). In this 
context, the Government had a strong rationale not to accept the proposal on both 
planning and financial grounds, yet politically it felt unable to issue an immediate 
and outright rejection. The preferred solution was the prolonged negotiations 
between the Government and the developer to find alternatives'" for the scheme. 
⑴ There were 4 alternatives proposed by the Government. The first one was an exchange of land 
close to the north of Lantau Island where the Chek Lap Kok International Airport located, and Tin 
Shui Wai site would be taken by the Government as a longer-term development bank. The second 
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Eventually, the property slump ofl982 pressurised the consortium to beat a 
retreat. As the Government knew that serious negotiations with China on the 
future ofHong Kong were about to get under way, any collapse of the Tin Shui W a i 
scheme, given the Chinese involvement in it, would be highly and seriously 
embarrassing. The result was a decision by the Government to buy the developer's 
land-holding at a total price of some $2.26 billion and to co-develop the southern 
part ofTin Shui Wai site {SCMP, 30 July 1982). That site covered 170 hectares, 
part of it (39 hectares) was granted to the developer for the Kingswood Villas 
project, while the remaining part was for public housing and community uses. 
The final agreement was controversial. Firstly, for the purchase price not 
only marked the highest amount the Government had ever paid for a piece of land, 
but also it was the first time it had agreed to pay property that was not earmarked 
for a specific and immediate project. Secondly, Mightycity gained a $800 million 
deduction of land premium from the purchase price in addition to the 39 hectares 
site granted back to it for private housing and commercial development (Bristow 
1989, p.220). 
The Till Shui Wai example does not permit the conclusive claim that the 
Government is run in the interests of the big developers who therefore are the real 
power-wielders given that the event occurred in the sensitive period of 1982. But, 
the influence ofdevelopers and the demonstrated relationship between developers 
and the Government lead to the belief that there is a solid ground for maintaining 
that government policy-making is significantly subject to the constraint of big 
business. Also, the Tin Shui Wai example illustrates how Hong Kong Chinese 
developers use Mainland China's influence in shaping the Hong Kong government 
policy-making. Unlike British counterparts, local Chinese property tycoons are 
keen to cultivate their relationships with officials working in Mainland China 
rather than officials in Hong Kong government. 
one was to defer the relocation ofHong Kong International Airport to Chek Lap Kok and allow Tin 
Shui Wai to proceed its development. The third was to transfer the new airport site to Deep Bay, 
adjacent to Tin Shui Wai site. The last alternative was to turn down the scheme and buy out the 
developer (Bristow 1989, p.218-219). 
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Hong Kong properly developers and Mainland China 
Since the China's economic reforms and open-door policy in 1978，the investment 
flow between Hong Kong and China has expanded dramatically. Hong Kong is the 
largest single source of direct investment in China (Smart & Smart 1991, p.216). 
From the early 1980s, Hong Kong industrialists moved low-cost assembly 
operations of manufacturing activities across the border to Guangdong and other 
southern parts of China. The result is that Hong Kong is the shop front and 
Guangdong is the backyard factory of Hong Kong manufacturers. Between 1978 
to 1996, Hong Kong-based investors poured $48 billion into 70,000 projects in 
Guangdong. Besides accounting for the largest share of foreign investment in the 
province (72%), this flow has also accounted for a substantial proportion (24%) of 
total foreign investment in China (Gilley 1997b). 
At the same time, the level of investment from China in Hong Kong has 
been rising, particularly since 1992. Indeed, recent investment by Chinese 
enterprises in Hong Kong has been spectacular. In addition to the four major 
enterprises which had already set up offices in Hong Kong before China's 
economic reforms (namely, the Bank of China Group, the China Resources Group, 
the China Merchants Group and the China Travel Holdings), various other 
enterprises in China, including government-affiliated enterprises, enterprises 
affiliated with the People's Liberation Army and even rural enterprises in the Pearl 
River Delta area of Guangdong province, have now opened offices in Hong Kong. 
The fields of their investment are widespread, but tend to concentrate in trade, 
finance, tourism, transportation, warehousing, communications and real estates. In 
property development industry, China Overseas Land and Investment Ltd. and 
CITIC Pacific Ltd. (mentioned in Chapter 4) are particularly active, and 
increasingly become major players along with Hong Kong large property 
developers. 
ln recent years, the rising property market in China has attracted much 
attention from Hong Kong developers. Statistics from Guangdong reported that in 
the first three months of 1992, 58 per cent of the foreign investment contracts 
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valued at more than U S $5 million were real estate projects (Li & Lo 1993, p.ll4). 
In 1992, Hong Kong's largest 15 publicly owned companies have invested $10 
billion in real estate projects in China. These included residential and commercial 
buildings and industrial warehouses. 
Unlike those manufacturers who set up small-scale export-processing 
ventures in small towns or in villages, Hong Kong developers invest large-scale 
property and infrastructure projects in major cities such as Beijing, Guangzhou and 
Shanghai. While the manufacturers use kinship and friendship ties to develop 
interpersonal relations {guanxi) with local officials to circumvent bureaucratic 
inefficiencies and problems of material shortages (Smart & Smart 1991, p.226), 
property developers adopt another strategy to directly build relationship with 
central authorities. To understand the strategies employed by Hong Kong 
developers in building this extra-firm business network, Cheung Kong will be 
examined in details. In many ways, K.S. Li, the founder of Cheung Kong, is well 
known for his relationship with China and his role in Hong Kong's business and 
politics. 
‘Generally, the network was first initiated by property developers to invite 
China-based enterprises to participate joint venture businesses in Hong Kong. In 
July 1979, K.S. Li involved two large-scale investments with China-based 
enterprises. One was a joint venture with Kiu Kwong, a China-based property 
company, to co-develop premises above Sha Tin railway depot. The other one was 
a co-operation with China- and America-based corporations to establish the China 
(Hong Kong) Cement Co., Ltd. At the same time, K.S. Li made a substantial 
donation of U S $85 million to set up a university for 5,000 students in Shantou, 
near his hometown of Chaozhou in Guangdong province (Reyes 1997, p.45). In 
fact, many Hong Kong well-known tycoons have made generous donations to 
construct hospitals, schools, universities and temples for the worship of ancestors 
in their native places or in locations nearby. 
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The efforts channelling into promoting a close relationship with Chinese 
top officials were rewarded when K.S. Li was invited by CITIC Pacific into the 
Board of Directors on 2 October 1979. This year also witnessed K.S. Li become 
the first Executive Director controlling a formerly British hong — Hutchison 
Whampao. In this way, K.S. Li's group — Cheung Kong — has become the most 
important business group not only in terms of its market capitalisation, but also its 
connection with China. Later, K.S. Li's position in China's economy was further 
consolidated by being accepted as an honourable guest in meeting with China's top 
decision-makers like Deng Xiaoping (former Chinese President), Zhou Zhiyang 
(former Prime Minister) and Jiang Zemin (the current Chinese President). 
Unlike the former Hong Kong government who usually appointed wealthy 
businessmen into the highest level of policy-making bodies, the Chinese 
government invited these businessmen into committees that allowed them to 
decide the future of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR). For 
example, K.S. Li was appointed a member in the Drafting Committee for the Basic 
Law of H K S A R and the Election Committee for the Selection of the Chief 
Executive and the Formation of the Legislation Council of H K S A R . In a way, 
China's cooption of Hong Kong tycoons into these committees follows the British 
government's strategy in reinforcing the dominance of big business in the Hong 
Kong political arena. This also explains why Hong Kong property tycoons are 
keen to cultivate relationships with top Chinese officials who are the ultimate 
decision-makers of H K S A R rather than government officials here. For instance, 
Cheung Kong constructed the new headquarters of the Chinese Foreign Ministry in 
Hong Kong for a relatively cheap $800 million (or U S $102.6 million) by crews 
working around the clock (Gilley 1997a). Also, when Jiang Zemin came to Hong 
Kong for the June 30 handover ceremonies, K.S. Li provided free services by 
accommodating Jiang in the $3,800-a-night presidential suite at his Harbour Plaza, 
a five-star hotel in Hung H o m . 
O n the other hand, by inclusion of Chinese top officials into the network, 
Hong Kong property tycoons not only preserve their influence in Hong Kong 
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economy intact, but also gain privileges in carrying out large-scale property and 
infrastructure projects in China. The development of Oriental Plaza in Beijing is a 
typical example. K.S. Li proposed to develop a vast property project near 
Tiananmen Square. The project had been approved by the former administration 
despite building heights violated regulations (70 m against a 24-m limit) ensuring 
the prominence of state buildings and Forbidden City that surround the square. 
Nevertheless, the project was stalled for three years after most of the Beijing 
leadership was purged in a corruption scandal. The project resumed in mid-1996 
after Li's agreement to scale back the project size (a 30-m-tall building; Cheng & 
Vriens 1996, p.44). Completion is now set for the National Day, 1 October 1999. 
In short, despite their lack of an established political organisation and of 
representation in both previous Hong Kong government and the current H K S A R 
government, Hong Kong property developers are closely related to the Chinese 
government through their network relationship. Derived from this relationship, 
Hong Kong developers are able to exert their powerful influence to Hong Kong's 
decision-makers to protect their businesses. Yet, even though they are a powerful 
group in the economy, their survival is much dependent on another key actor—the 
financial institutions 一 in the structure of owner-occupied housing provision in 
Hong Kong. 
Property developers and financial institutions 
The property market is now very much a part of the financial system. Previous 
chapters have indicated the importance of financial institutions in the process of 
property development. Capital investments in the property market can only be 
accomplished if over-accumulated production in other sectors can be transformed 
into capital that can move freely and unhindered into the property sector. Also, the 
Government's goal to promote home ownership by relying on the private sector to 
provide owner-occupied housing has further boosted the importance of financial 
institutions in maintaining adequate mortgages to home buyers. In such context, as 
Lefebvre has indicated, the secondary circuit (i.e., the real estate sector), from 
185 
being an 'accidental' means by which capital has decided to solve its accumulation 
problems in the primary circuit (i.e., the industrial sector), has now become an 
‘essential，mode ofinvestment activity for the Late Capitalist economy (Gottdiener 
1994, p.245). 
The growing involvement of financial institutions in property development 
is well illustrated by the large property exposure in their investment portfolios. 
Statistics released by the Hong Kong Monetary Authority ( H K M A ) showed that 
property-related loans, that are loans for property development and investment as 
well as mortgages, accounted for 39.9 per cent of all loans for use in Hong Kong in 
March 1996. That figure climbed in subsequent quarters to 40 per cent in June, 
40.8 per cent in September and to 41.7 per cent in December' ‘ (Fung 1997, p.9). 
As ofMarch 1998, property-related loans stood at $120 billion, 42 per cent of total 
lending (Zheng 1998, p.69). 
Actually, property exposure has been increasing steadily since 1989. The 
rapid increase from 31.94 per cent in 1989 to 37.6 per cent in 1993 alarmed the 
H K M A (Fung 1997, p.lO). ln February 1994, H K M A formally introduced the 40 
per cent threshold in lending for property development and investment. Yet, 
numerous schemes mushroomed in 1994 when banks co-operated with property 
developers, that is, banks providing 70 per cent mortgages while the developers 
came in with additional top-up loans. But, despite numerous warnings from 
H K M A , there had some banks already exceeded the 40 per cent exposure to the 
property sector'^  
Because bankers invest so much money in property, many leading 
executives maintain close ties to property development companies. 
Simultaneously, all successful property developers must have good connections 
“Compared with banks elsewhere, Hong Kong banks' lending against real estate as a proportion of 
all loans to the private sector is relatively moderate. For example, in 1992 the ratio stood at 43% in 
the United States, 30% in France, 32% in the United Kingdom, 51% in Canada, 46% in Norway and 
30% in Spain (Pryke 1994, p.l68). 
12 For example, Bank of East Asia had 47% property exposure, Dah Sing 46% and First Pacific 
45.9% in 1997 (Fung 1997，p.8). 
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with their own bankers, and no one will deny that the Hongkong Bank (formerly 
known as H K S B C ) is the most influential bank in Hong Kong. The Hongkong 
Bank, from its origins to the present, has dominated the financial services industry 
in Hong Kong, and through the firms and business ventures it supported, guided 
the direction of economic development in the territory. In fact, the name of the 
Bank appears in the list of 'Principal Bankers' of all the top property companies 
identified in Chapter 4. The close relationship between property and banking 
sectors can also be seen by examining the list of the Board of Directors of 
Hongkong Bank which includes K.S. Li (Chairman of Cheung Kong), Henry M.P. 
Miles and Lydia S. Dunn (both formerly represented Swire Properties) and 
Sohmen L. Keswick (Chairman of Hong Kong Land). 
To sum up, the interlocking relationships between bankers and developers, 
between developers and their counterparts, and between developers and political 
leaders either in Hong Kong or China, serve as a means of consolidating 
developers' power in Hong Kong economy. Indeed, Gottdiener (1994, p.220) 
observes that a network is formed which cuts across the private and public sectors, 
so that the two realms are indistinguishable. Thus, political leaders may also be 
significant owners of property, and may work with public advisory committees, 
such as Town Planning Board, that include large property owners. Hence, public 
officials are also privately interested parties who work with private citizens who 
have public positions that can foster their private interests. In some cases, given 
the attractiveness of investment in the secondary circuit, even the citizens, 
particularly those belong to middle-class, coalesce into networks who then become 
active agents in the property sector. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the degree of power, first in the Hong Kong housing 
market, then in the Hong Kong economy. The Tseung Kwan 0 case study 
demonstrates that developers do compete rigorously against each other in selling 
their housing units. While it is ultimately the market that determines prices of 
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units, developers are able to exert immense influence in the decision-making 
process of Hong Kong. By establishing network 'internal' and ‘external，to Hong 
Kong society, developers are able to maintain control over their investments and 
sustain their dominance in society. On the other hand, the changing economic and 
political contexts of Hong Kong shape the developers' strategies in how to and 
with w h o m to build the relationships. 
However, the first of July 1997 marked a new era for Hong Kong. The 
establishment of H K S A R sets a goal to solve the current housing problem. A ten-
year housing plan was formulated to tackle the problem of inadequate supply, 
soaring prices and speculation. The next chapter therefore explores the effects of 
these policies in the structure of owner-occupied housing provision in Hong Kong. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
HONG KONG OWNER-OCCUPIED HOUSING AND THE 
FUTURE 
Home ownership is now promoted as a major housing tenure in Hong Kong. In 
order to achieve 70 per cent home ownership rate by 2007, the government of the 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) of the People's Republic of 
China designed a series of measures specifically to help meet this target. However, 
less than four months after its July 1 transfer of sovereignty from Britain to China, 
Hong Kong is in the midst of a confidence-battering economic slump. It was 
brought on by the regional financial meltdown triggered the day after the handover 
on 2 July 1997 when Thailand floated the baht. That led to massive drops on the 
relative value of currencies from South Korea to Indonesia and to intense 
speculative pressure on the Hong Kong dollar. Determined to defend the HK-US 
dollar link, the H K S A R government raised inter-bank lending rates up to 300 per 
cent on 23 October 1997. Banks also raised their prime lending rate from 8.75 to 
9.5 per cent. The high interest rates and mortgage payments eventually pulled 
down property prices. Dominated by property counters, the Hang Seng Index fell 
to 8,775 on 28 October 1997. This was 47.8 per cent down from its historic high of 
16,820 that was reached on 7 August 1997. 
The bad news has kept coming. The regional economic downturn worsens 
an already severe slump in tourism', and the retail sales volume is expected to show 
negative growth. With tight monetary conditions unlikely to ease soon, growth 
estimates have been revised sharply downward. A crude initial assessment 
suggests that the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has suffered a decline of around 2 
‘The tourist industry suffered a severe setback in 1997 with visitor arrivals falling 11% and the 
hotel occupancy rate dipping to 76%, the lowest level since 1991. In the first 2 months of 1998, 
visitors to Hong Kong dropped 24.5% against the same period last year (Hang Seng Bank 1998). 
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per cent in real terms in the first quarter of 1998 over a year earlier {Oriental Daily, 
30 M a y 1998). Along with the slowdown in economic growth, poor employment 
prospects are to be expected. The depth of Hong Kong's economic gloom has led 
to worries about the future of home ownership. There are also lingering doubts 
about H K S A R government's housing policies, particularly now that many citizens 
are facing increasing job insecurity following Hong Kong's diminishing 
competitiveness among its Asian neighbours. 
This chapter will examine how H K S A R government expands the owner-
occupied housing sector in Hong Kong. It then looks at the effects on the current 
structure of owner-occupied housing provision. Lastly, it assesses the possibility 
of owner-occupied housing to become the mainstream housing tenure in the next 
decade. 
Expand owner-occupied housing sector 
To achieve a 70 per cent home ownership rate in 10 years, the Chief Executive, 
Tung Chee-hwa plans to accomplish this in two ways. The first is to increase the 
supply of residential land so that at least 85,000 new houses a year — 50,000 from 
the public sector and 35,000 from the private sector 一 can be constructed. The 
second is to widen the access to home ownership. Tung's approach marks a break 
from colonial policies of the past. Previously, the colonial government restricted 
land supply, keeping prices artificially high and ensuring healthy revenues from 
land sales. Tung's plan to increase the supply indicates a shift in priority from 
filling government's reserve to addressing the demands of potential home owners. 
The details ofTung's policies to increase land supply for housing and to promote 
home ownership are described below. 
2 Hong Kong's real GDP was first forecasted to rise between 3 and 4% in 1998, down from 5.2% 
last year. The International Monetary Fund, however, expected the HKSAR's growth rate drop to 
1.8% in 1998 (SCMP, 14 April 1998). The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development even forecasted that HKSAR's real GDP growth rate would fall tojust 0.9% this year 
given that the sharp drop ofproperties prices had put banks under significant financial pressure, and 
this was likely thal the Asian economic downturn would worsen {SCMP, 9 April 1998). Lately, 
H K S A R government admitted that a 3.5% G D P growth for 1998 as a whole was unattainable. 
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Strategies to increase owner-occupied housing production 
Increase residential land supply 
To implement the pledge of providing at least 85,000 flats each year from the 
public and private sectors, the first strategy is to secure a steady and sufficient 
supply of residential land. Actually, the Government has allocated or identified 
sufficient land to meet its production target for both public and private housing up 
to March 2001. 
The HKSAR's second land disposal programme, which gives detailed 
plans for the period from April 1998 to March 2000 and a forecast for the following 
three years, was announced on 31 March 1998. Under the programme, a total of 
650 hectares of land will be released to provide 345,400 flats (Table 7.1). For the 
first period, the Government will sell 94 sites, amounting to 157 hectares, to 
produce 91,000 private and subsidised flats. They include six government quarter 
sites and former British military sites. The majority will be for the construction of 
mass residential flats, followed by Private Sector Participation Scheme (PSPS) 
Table 7.1 The HKSAR's second land disposal* programme, 1 April 1998 to 31 March 
2003. 
1998/99 - 1999/2000 2000/01 - 2002/03 —  
Amount ofIand Estimated Amount ofland Estimated  
(hectares) no. of flats (hectares) no. of flats 
Commercial/ 
Residential M 25,500 ^ 12,900 
High density 
residential 5J_ 24,200 [02 51,300 
Low density 
residential ^ 7,100 9J_ 15,500 
Suh-total 181 56,800 219 79,7^一 
PSPS 36 34,200 12 1 0 , 1 0 0° 
Other public 
housing ^ 67,900 \33 96,700 
Sub-total 105 102,100 145 106,800 
TOTAL 286 158,900 364 186,500 
* including public auction, public tender and private treaty grant, but excluding land obtained from 
re-development. 
Source: Sing Pao, 1 April 1998. 
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flats and then luxury flats. Also, among the lands for sale, nearly 60 per cent of 
them are less than 5,000 square metres, which aims to enhance the competitiveness 
of Hong Kong housing market by allowing small- to medium-sized developers 
more opportunities to bid. 
For the period from April 2001 to March 2006, land for producing 480,000 
new housing flats (96,000 flats on average a year) has been identified. The new 
supply will come from land produced by (Hong Kong Housing Bureau 1998, p.7; 
H K S A R Government 1997b): 
(a) developing strategic growth areas in West Kowloon, Kai Tak-Kowloon Bay, 
Tseung Kwan 0 and Tung Chung-Tai Ho; 
(b) carrying out the Tsuen Wan Bay and Green Island reclamations; 
(c) re-zoning suitable agricultural and industrial areas for housing development 
where infrastructure capacity and environmental considerations permit*; 
(d) increasing the development density of public and private housing estates by 
improving supporting infrastructure and exercising flexibility in the 
application ofplanning guidelines; and 
(e) re-developing suitable old Hoiig Kong Housing Authority ( H K H A ) flatted 
factory estates. 
Overall, in order to sustain the annual production of at least 85,000 flats, the 
five-year land disposal programme will be updated and rolled forward annually. 
However, the current economic crisis has posed immense obstacles in achieving 
this target. The biggest one comes from private property developers. With the 
property market in slump, property prices have fallen more than 30 per cent from 
their 1997 peak. The 30 per cent is a crucial level, since a larger drop could 
significantly increase banks' bad debts. The lending margin for residential 
3 The extra 11,000 flats a year represents an additional ‘safety margin', a 13% above the annual 
production target (Hong Kong Housing Bureau 1998, p.6). 
4 Between 1990 and 1997, 50 industrial sites, or about 160 hectares, were re-zoned for housing and 
associated development, ln 1998, 80 hectares of surplus industrial land will be re-zoned to provide 
70,000 flats. By 2011, there will be 115 hectares of surplus industrial land for re-zoning {SCMP, 24 
February 1998). 
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property is capped at 70 per cent of market value, and a fall of over 30 per cent 
means the collateral held by the banks is worth less than the money lent out. 
Developers have therefore urged the Government to delay the implementation of 
its housing plans as any increase in supply would dampen the market further. 
So, to reduce the banks' vulnerability and to ensure a ‘soft landing' of 
property prices, the Government has changed its strategies. First, on 16 January 
1998, the Government said that the sales method of large sites in the land disposal 
programme was switched from public auctions to public tenders. The main 
advantage of selling land through tenders is that if the bids are unable to meet the 
Government's target, the site can be withdrawn from sale without disclosing the 
bidding prices, thus, it can avoid significant adverse effects on the already 
depressed property market. 
Yet, the above measure could not ease the dissatisfaction of developers 
with the new housing policy. Instead, to put additional pressure on the 
Government, property giant Sun Hung Kai announced on 22 January 1998 that it 
would suspend work on ten projects. Henderson also said that it had delayed the 
construction of residential projects in decentralised areas. Similarly, Cheung Kong 
and other developers have slowed construction, aimed at stabilising housing prices 
by controlling the rate of supply of private flats. However, the Secretary for 
Planning, Environment and Lands, Bowen P.W. Leung revealed that all the 
delayed projects belong to non-consent schemes (Apple Daily, 23 January 1998); 
for those in consent schemes (see Chapter 5), developments are governed by 
legislation, and therefore their progress has to be on schedule. Nevertheless, 
developers' effort can be regarded as ‘an ultimatum' to the Government that 'if it 
holds on its planned target at any cost, it will see the banks in great trouble' (Law 
1998, p.21). 
Finally, on 9 February 1998, the Government conceded and announced that 
the Government would implement its land disposal programme flexibly, taking 
into consideration the state of the private property market. In consequence, the 
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Government has adjusted the land sales programme, including changing the 
monthly to the bi-monthly public auction schedule, delaying sales of residential 
land, withdrawing and trimming the size of sales and placing a greater proportion 
for sale by tender^ Overall, the Government adopts a more ‘flexible’ approach to 
planning sales for the next three years. Instead of forcing private developers to 
meet its target, the Government intends to proceed with its side of the plan — 
building 50,000 units a year. In a way, the Government has set up its land bank so 
that additional land can be put into the market when demand increases. 
Speed up the rate of housing production 
To have an adequate land supply cannot solve the housing shortage problem 
without any improvement ofthe current housing development process. N o one can 
deny that the biggest problem facing developers has been the lack of co-ordination 
within the Government in dealing with the development process. There are at least 
20 departments within the Government (discussed in Chapter 5) that developers 
have to deal with. To exacerbate the already long and complex development 
procedures, contradictions frequently happen between departments in defining 
terms and regulations. 
In order to break the bottlenecks within the Government, a task force 
known as the Steering Committee on Land Supply for Housing ( H O U S C O M ) was 
set up in April 1997. H O U S C O M is chaired by the Financial Secretary, and its 
members include the heads of various government departments in land and 
planning areas. Its main aim is to bring about a 'radical reform of planning and 
co-ordination functions within the Government' {SCMP, 15 October 1997) and to 
shorten production times for property developers. 
5 For example, the Government withdrew a 914,940 sq ft residential site in Sha Tin from its sale 
plans. More than 20 sites were postponed and 11 government sites were switched from public 
auction to tender. Also, some sites were reduced in size, such as the Tuen Mun residential site to be 
sold through tender in March 1999 was cut from 1.61 million sq ft to 1.17 million sq ft {SCMP, 1 
April 1998). 
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Subsequently, a package of measures to simplify and streamline various 
government planning, land and building approval processes for residential 
development was drawn up in October 1997. For example, in planning approvals, 
formal guidelines will be published to make more transparent the Planning 
Department's decision-making process, and district planning conferences will be 
held so that developers can present their applications in one central place instead of 
going through various departments. There also will be a stricter performance 
pledge to further shorten application lead time. In environmental approvals, the 
application process will be changed from the present case-by-case examination to 
follow a published set of standards. Also, projects less than two hectares in plot 
size will no longer need to get environmental approval. For building approvals, a 
centralised authority system will be set up, and that applications for foundation 
works will be simplified. 
Most importantly, H O U S C O M intends to change the proceeding of 
housing development procedures, that is, rather than government procedures take 
place sequentially, new procedures will be followed in parallel. Also, more private 
sector expertise and resources will be employed. The Lands Department, for 
instance, has started contracting out some paperwork relating to the processing of 
the Deeds of Mutual Covenant() and pre-sale consents for unfinished property 
projects to the private solicitors to streamline its operation {SCMP, 22 October 
1997). 
But, housing development must be complemented with associated 
infrastructure facilities. To keep up housing supply, infrastructure development 
funding will rise from $1.2 billion to $11.4 billion over the period 1997/98 to 
2001/02 to accelerate housing-related infrastructure. A large proportion of funding 
will be used to construct extensive railway systems, including the West Railway 
from West Kowloon to Tuen Muii, the Mass Transit Railway Tseung K w a n 0 
Extension and the Kowloon-Canton Railway M a O n Shan Extension. This will 
6 Deed ofMutuaI Covenant is a document setting out the rights and obligations ofproperty owners 
as well as the terms of property management. 
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boost land supply and help implement road and rail projects to open up land for 
housing projects. Furthermore, more housing-related infrastructure construction 
works will be contracted out. A recent example is the pilot scheme to allow 
developers carry out through their own contractors public works such as water 
supply connections. 
Finally, to ensure the delivery ofhousing projects on time, H O U S C O M has 
complied an inventory of all housing developments in Hong Kong. Three 
government departments have been assigned to monitor progress site by site. The 
Director of Housing oversees public sector housing projects, including those 
undertaken by PSPS, but excluding projects undertaken by the Hong Kong 
Housing Society (HKHS). For private housing developments, including those 
undertaken by the H K H S , the Director of Lands has overall responsibility for all 
stages up to flat completion. Then, within new towns, strategic growth areas and 
major development areas, the Director ofTerritory Development is responsible for 
delivering public housing sites to the Director of Housing for flat production and 
delivering private housing sites to the Director of Lands for disposal (Hong Kong 
Housing Bureau 1998, p.l4). 
So far, the overhaul of the housing development process has resulted in a 
significant reduction of the development lead time for public housing: in the case 
of the H K H A , from 62 months to 47 months, and in the case of the H K H S , from 52 
months to 46 months. Despite numerous efforts having been spent in speeding up 
the housing production process, it cannot guarantee that developers will not halt 
their construction if the market is in recession. Currently, for projects under 
consent scheme, developers are required to complete construction of flats within 
three to five years. Ifthey fail to do so, they are subject to a fine that will increase 
each year. The Government has the power, too, to take back the whole piece of 
land. Yet, the Government has no power to force developers into selling the 
completed flats if they prefer to rent them. So, ultimately, it is the market that 
determines how many private units will be available for sale. 
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Encourage private developers to increase housing production 
T w o issues are relevant here. One is to speed up urban renewal, and another is to 
invite private developers to provide more subsidised owner-occupied housing. 
S P E E D U P U R B A N R E N E W A L 
Chapter 5 revealed that about two-thirds of the total private sector housing 
production over the past ten years has come from re-development of existing sites 
throughout Hong Kong. Given that the large stock of old or inadequate housing in 
the urban area, urban re-development will be another major source of new 
residential land. At present, 20 per cent of private housing, or 113,000 units, are 30 
years old, and at current rates of re-development, the stock will increase to about 40 
per cent, or 260,000 units, by 2006 (Razack 1997, p.2). 
To carry out urban renewal, the central problem is site assembly. 
According to current legislation, the Land Development Corporation (LDC) or 
private developers cannot re-develop buildings unless all owners agree. This poses 
an immense obstacle as many projects cannot materialise due to a small number of 
owners who cause problems. Difficulties in determining some flats' ownership 
often hinder urban renewal projects. As a result, L D C projects today have typically 
taken up to nine or 10 years from inception to completion (ibid., p.4). So, in an 
effort to boost the private sector's role in speeding urban renewal, the Land 
(Compulsory Sale for Redevelopment) Bill is proposed. Under the new legislation, 
the majority ofowners of private premises can apply to the Lands Tribunal to sell 
the whole building if 90 per cent of them agree to the re-development {SCMP, 15 
January 1998). In a way, the new bill will ensure private re-development would 
continue to contribute significantly to the Government's annual flat production 
target. 
In addition, an Urban Renewal Authority is being planned to replace the 
L D C in 1999, and will be provided with statutory power to expedite urban re-
development 011 a larger scale and in a more comprehensive manner. In the 
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meantime, L D C has identified more than 300 urban renewal projects involving 
more than 3,000 buildings and about 42,000 households. It covers a population of 
114,000 {SCMP, 27 December 1997). These projects comprise large-scale, truly 
comprehensive schemes that allow actual re-planning of the affected districts as 
well as smaller-scale projects with more limited objectives of removing 
substandard and dangerous buildings. 
O n the other hand, private developers are taking advantage of current 
depressed market sentiments to actively initiate or participate in property re-
development projects. For example, despite the property slump, Sino, Cheung 
Kong, Great Eagle Holdings and Sun Hung Kai expressed their interests to 
participate the LDC'S re-development of two housing projects 一 one in Tsuen 
W a n and one in Kennedy Town {SCMP, 23 October 1997). In fact, developers are 
grasping the opportunity to bargain with the Government for lower land premiums 
for their re-developed sites. Yet, only developers having strong financial backing 
can benefit from the cyclical downturn in the property market to replenish their 
land banks by securing lower land values. 
P R O M O T E M I X E D D E V E L O P M E N T 
To upgrade the quality of public owner-occupied housing above that provided 
under the present PSPS, a pilot scheme is proposed to invite developers to build 
subsidised home ownership flats as part of a mixed development. Under this 
scheme, residential sites will be offered for sale by tender. The successful 
developer will be required to hand over at least 30 per cent of flats within the 
development to the Government for sale to public tenants or low-income families 
at designated prices, ln exchange, developers will get cheaper land. 
The H K H S is appointed to help work out details of the new scheme, and 
two sites in West Kowloon and Tin Shui Wai have been assigned to provide over 
500 subsidised home ownership flats by 2001 (Hong Kong Housing Bureau 1998, 
p.l7). However, the scheme is strongly opposed by private developers. A 
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representative of the Real Estate Developers Association of Hong Kong claimed 
that, 'the scheme will pose serious problems for marketing as we are facing two 
batches ofbuyers who are going to buy flats of the same quality at different prices' 
{SCMP, 3 February 1998). And, the cheaper units that are randomly chosen by the 
Government will affect the value ofthe private housing portion of the development 
since ordinary home buyers paying higher market prices do not want a neighbour 
of a low-income family. To reduce the bad effect on selling the other non-
subsidised units, the association suggested that the developer should have a say in 
deciding which flats are given to the Government. Given the resistance from large 
developers?, it is questionable whether a pilot scheme can be carried out in early 
1998. Yet, the proposed scheme can be seen as a way to involve the private sector 
in increasing choices to buyers of subsidised homes. 
Strategies to promote home ownership 
In the White Paper on the Long Term Housing Strategy (LTHS; covering the years 
between 1997 and 2007) that was released in February 1998, three direct strategies 
are proposed to give every incentive to public rental housing (PRH) tenants who 
have increased their incomes to be home owners. However, the greatest impact on 
the growth of home ownership is the indirect measures, that are those strategies to 
restrict the number of people using the public housing services. Then, there are 
other strategies designed to relieve financial burdens in buying owner-occupied 
housing units in the private market. 
Encourage PRH tenants to he home owners 
Direct Strategies 
The first direct strategy is the sale of P R H flats to sitting tenants. Following the 
failure of the Sale of Flats to Sitting Tenants Scheme in 1991 (see Chapter 2, 
footnote 27), the new Tenant Purchase Scheme (TPS) is intended to sell off 
7 In the interview with Daniel Lau, the Property Development Manager ofthe HKHS, he revealed 
that in order to obtain a good public response of the pilot scheme, only large scale private housing 
projects would be chosen. 
1 9 9 
250,000 P R H units in the next ten years. The first batch of27,000 flats located in 
six P R H estates^  were put up for sale in January 1998. Flats prices are ranging 
between $62,000 and $340,000 — about 12 per cent of the assessed market value. 
Also, two of the Hong Kong's largest banks (Hongkong Bank and Hang Seng 
Bank) offer 100 per cent loans and mortgage interest rates up to 1.5 per cent lower 
than the current prime rate to families buying their own P R H flats. The loan 
repayment period stretches to a maximum of25 years {SCMP, 25 February 1998). 
Given the extremely attractive prices offered, almost 80 per cent of the 
27,000 families ofthe batch selected have shown an interest. Over 10,000 families 
have paid deposits for the purchase. More than 2,000 families (up to 9 May 1998) 
have signed the assignment and become owners of their P R H flats {Oriental Daily, 
10 M a y 1998). On the other hand, the success ofTPS severely affects the latest sale 
of the H O S units. More than 100 H O S buyers defaulted on their purchases in 
January, soon after the TPS was launched {SCMP, 11 March 1998). In order to 
avoid competition between the two schemes, the Housing Department announced 
those estates ofthe following three batches that will be offered for sale from 1999 
to 2001. Each batch will comprise an average 28,000 flats, locating in 18 P R H 
estates. This measure is to ensure P R H tenants have time to consider different 
housing schemes and to avoid defaults. Also, applicants for each H O S will have all 
information about housing estates for sale in the next two years under the TPS. 
The second strategy is to expand the Sandwich Class Housing Scheme to 
current and would-be P R H households. As more than one in ten P R H tenants 
belong to the most affluent one-quarter of income-earners(), there are many P R H 
tenants and prospective tenants fall within the sandwich-class income criteria, that 
is, monthly household incomes between $30,001 and $60,000. So, in giving more 
choice to them, more P R H units can be vacated for new comers. 
8 The 6 estates are Wah Kwai in Pokfulam, Funk Tak in Wong Tai Sin, Heng On in Ma On Shan, 
Cheung On in Tsing Yi, Kin Sang in Tuen Mun and Wan Tau Tong in Tai Po. The estates involve 
36 blocks that were built between 1985 and 1992. 
()Housing Department in a recent survey found that 13% of PRH tenants were estimated to own 
private properties in 1994 (http://www.info.gov.hk/hb/chart 19.gif). 
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The last strategy aims to provide new opportunity for potential P R H tenants 
to be home owners. The new 'Buy or Rent，scheme will give applicants at the top 
o f P R H waiting list the choice ofbuying a flat in a new block or renting in an older 
estate. In the meantime, prices under the new scheme have not been fixed, but 
monthly mortgage payments would be about 20 to 30 per cent of the average 
family income. Clearly, the scheme intends to shorten the time to become assisted 
home owners by by-passing the interim stage ofPRH. 
All in all, the three direct strategies contribute significantly not only to 
raising the home ownership rate, but also to clearing the backlog on the 148,000 
households waiting for P R H allocation that will in line with Tung's pledge to cut 
the waiting time for P R H from the present six-and-a-half years to three years by 
2005. Most importantly, the sale of P R H units to sitting and potential tenants can 
reduce the heavily subsidised public housing sector. Given that there are 660,000 
units in 160 P R H estates, tax-payers are contributing about $2.5 billion a year 
{SCMP, 18 November 1997). According to the latest report, the Housing 
Department will be run into a deficit of$7-8 billion by 2000 in upkeeping the large 
P R H stock {Express News’ 9 December 1997). By selling some of the stock, even 
under great discounts, can halt the growth of deficit in future. 
Indirect Strategies 
There are two indirect strategies that can exert a significant impact on the growth of 
home ownership among P R H tenants. The first one is the application of means-test 
to the existing P R H tenants after ten years' residence and every two-year 
thereafter'". The second strategy is the introduction of means-test to the child ofa 
deceased tenant who wants to inherit the tenancy. These two strategies limit the 
security oftenure and ensure a high turnover ofhouseholds. They also make P R H 
less attractive than owning and in a way compel sitting tenants to buy flats. 
'0 The application of comprehensive means-tests, covering both income and net assets, to existing 
PRH tenants has been introduced in April 1997. PRH tenants after 10 years' residence and every 
2-year thereafter are required to make an income declaration. Those households whose income 
exceeds 110% of the Waiting List Income Limits are required to pay market rent. 
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In this connection, it is clear that the Government regards public housing as 
not only a form of social welfare, but also a stepping stone to home ownership 
(Hong Kong Government 1997a, p.ii). Thus, it is not surprising to find that the 
Government tries every possible way to encourage P R H tenants to become assisted 
home owners. The Government has explained clearly that public housing 
resources should be fairly distributed and targetted to those who are in genuine 
need. For those well-off tenants who can afford homes, they should vacate their 
rental flats for the truly needy. Otherwise, they either buy their own homes or pay 
market rent. 
Provide financial reliefto home buyers 
The above strategies mentioned aim to promote home ownership in the public 
sector, but for the private sector, three strategies are implemented to relieve the 
financial burden in becoming home owners. 
The first one is offering loans to first time home buyers. A new ‘Home 
Starter Loan Scheme，(HSLS) will be launched to help 6,000 families in each ofthe 
next five years, and it covers a wider population than the current H o m e Purchase 
Loan Scheme (HPLS) and the Sandwich Class Housing Loan Scheme. The former 
targets at families who meet the income and other criteria for the purchase of 
HOS/PSPS flats to have an alternative of an interest free down-payment loan for 
the purchase of a new private sector flat. The latter only provides loans to 
sandwich class families whose income falls at $30,001 to $60,000 a month. For 
this new scheme, households with monthly income not exceeding $70,000 and 
their net asset not worth more than $1.2 million are eligible to apply for a 
maximum loan of$600,000, or 30 per cent of the price of the property, whichever 
is lower. There is no upper limit on the value ofthe property, but the maximum age 
ofproperty is 30 years. The HSLS buyers will not have to begin repayment until 
the fourth year after obtaining the loan, and they will have ten years to pay off the 
debt. Households earning less than $30,000 a month will be charged an annual 
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interest of2 per cent while those earning more than $30,001 a month, the interest 
rate is 3.5 per cent. 
The second strategy is intended as a confidence booster in the current 
property slump. A mortgage tax relief is introduced in the Financial Budget 1998. 
Under the scheme, home owners can claim a deduction ofamaximum of$100,000 
per annum from their salary incomes for their mortgage interest payment on 
owner-occupied flats. This means a maximum saving of$l 7,000 per year, or about 
$1,400 a month, for a home owner. More than 500,000 home owners are expected 
to benefit from the tax relief. However, compared with similar schemes provided 
by many western countries, Hong Kong's home mortgage relief is very small. For 
instance, in the United States, the mortgage reliefis much more generous, with the 
ceiling at US $1.1 million per year. Almost all American home buyers are able to 
claim 100 per cent tax recession on mortgage interest payment, and the benefit is 
available any time (Wood 1990, p.811) whereas the Hong Kong scheme restricts 
each individual home buyer to claim the relief for only five years in his/her life. 
Given the relatively low level of mortgage relief, clearly buyers or owners of 
smaller properties will enjoy the greatest benefit. On the other hand, combined 
with HSLS, the scheme will boost the secondary market ofHOS that has received a 
lukewarm response since it was launched in June 1997". 
The last strategy is the introduction of fixed-rate mortgage interest 
payment. This can be regarded as a counter-measure to reduce the effect ofraising 
interest rates to safeguard the HK-US dollar peg. Initially, the Hong Kong 
Mortgage Corporation Ltd. ( H K M C ) was set up by the Government in March 1997 
through the Exchange Fund, and had an initial working capital of$l billion. The 
H K M C aims to increase the amount of mortgage finance available to home buyers 
by issuing mortgage-backed securities after purchasing mortgage loans from 
authorised banks and deposit taking companies. However, after the Asian currency 
‘‘A secondary market of HOS was established in June 1997 that allows owners of HOS/PSPS to sell 
to an existing or prospective PRH tenant from the 4th year on at a negotiated price without paying a 
premium to HKHA. This aims to increase the turnover of subsidised owner-occupied housing 
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crisis, banks have taken a cautious approach in granting mortgages and property 
valuations. Home buyers increasingly find difficulties to get financing, or 
contribute more their household income to pay mortgage payments. 
To boost the debt market and shelter home buyers from high interest rates, 
H K M C introduces fixed-rate mortgages. Currently, only two banks 一 Chase 
Manhattan Bank and Dao Heng Bank 一 participate the six-month pilot scheme to 
test market response. Under the pilot scheme, mortgages written by the two banks 
at a fixed rate of 10.5 per cent for the first three years with maturities from ten to 25 
years will be eligible to be sold to the corporation. H K M C will then purchase 
written fixed-rate mortgages on a loan-by-loan basis. This means that banks will 
never book the loans on their balance sheets and need not take the interest rate 
risks. The size of individual loans under the scheme should be less than $4 
million'l In other words, the scheme covers small- and medium-sized owner-
occupied units not worth more than $5.71 million. Despite the total amount of 
loans to be written under the scheme, at $500 million, comprise only a small share 
of the HKSAR's total outstanding mortgages, the scheme offers an additional 
choice ofmortgage finance that can protect home buyers from adverse movements 
in interest rates. 
Overall, strategies to relieve financial burdens ofhome buyers will provide 
significant benefit to those buying cheaper flats where speculators tend to be less 
active. There were arguments that these policies would send prices soaring again; 
however, with interest rates still high and Hong Kong only just beginning to feel 
the effects of the economic downturn, any revival in property prices was likely to 
be short-lived. Nonetheless, given the Government's painstaking effort to increase 
the land supply in order to meet Tung's target of 85,000 new flats a year and to 
achieve a home ownership rate of 70 per cent by 2007, there are certainly impacts 
on the existing structure of owner-occupied housing provision in Hong Kong. 
units. However, the transactions were far from satisfactory. Up to 30 November 1997’ only 610 of 
100,000 subsidised homes were sold {Express News, 10 December 1997). 
12 The ceiling ofindividual loans under floating-rate home loans is $8 million, and only loans with 
a repayment record ofat least 6 months before they are eligible to be sold to the H K M C . 
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The future structure of owner-occupied housing provision in Hong Kong 
A historical analysis of the development of housing policies in Hong Kong 
revealed that there has been an increasing degree of government intervention in 
housing since the early 1950s. Initially, the colonial government concentrated in 
the provision ofpublic housing to low-income families, leaving entirely to private 
sector to provide owner-occupied housing to families who were able to afford 
without any financial assistance. But, starting from 1976, H O S was drawn up to 
provide public sector owner-occupied housing units. Later, PSPS was launched as 
a result of the Real Estate Developers Association's expressed anxiety over the 
entry by Government into the domestic tlats-for-sale market. Since 1977, 
private-sector developers have participated in public owner-occupied housing 
provision. However, the contribution of Government in overall owner-occupied 
housing provision was very small. Private developers were the major supplier of 
domestic flats for sale. 
But, starting from early 1980s, housing aspirations had risen substantially 
in parallel with the improving affluence of society (see Chapter 2). Households 
were now willing to spend a larger proportion of their income on housing. 
Therefore, the Government expected an increasing number of households willing 
to own house instead of renting PRH. This had prompted the Government to shift 
its orientation in housing provision by relying more heavily on market forces. 
Hence, the 1987 LTHS stressed the importance of the private sector in the 
housing supply. At the same time, the Government encouraged housing demand in 
the private sector by lending down-payments to households, especially those who 
were willing to give up their tenancies in PRH. Government hoped that by 
promoting home purchase amongst potential home buyers, the private sector's 
resources could be fully utilised. However, previous chapters described 
demographic and economic changes, building cycles, fluctuation in housing prices, 
restriction of land supply, slow processing of lease modifications and severe 
speculative activities that could affect it. Reliance on the private sector alone to 
produce housing was therefore proved unsuccessful. Subsequently, the 
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Government introduced the Sandwich Class Housing Scheme, and expanded the 
HOS/PSPS to guarantee the housing supply. In other words, the Government has 
begun to make public owner-occupied housing schemes as a flexible arm for 
housing provision. Increasingly, the Government has upgraded P R H blocks 
available in the market for sale. In this way, the amount ofsaleable units could be 
adjusted in accordance with housing demand. 
The escalating housing prices resulted from the shortage ofowner-occupied 
housing units in 1990s became a political concern ofthe H K S A R government. In 
response, drastic measures have been introduced to push down prices to a 
'reasonable' level. Instead of reliance on the private sector, the H K S A R 
government now becomes the major supplier of owner-occupied housing. In 
addition to the already-expanded subsidised home ownership schemes, the 
Government has begun to privatise its public housing" By selling off P R H to 
enlarge the owner-occupied housing stock, the Government has directly competed 
with private developers in the housing market. 
Figure 7.1 shows the change of the structures of owner-occupied housing 
provision in Hong Kong. The new structure of owner-occupied housing provision 
has profound implications for the future housing market performance. On the one 
hand, the sale of 25,000 P R H units annually (almost equivalent to the annual 
production of private housing units) will gradually change the owner-occupied 
housing stock. Table 7.2 and Figure 7.2 present projections in public and private 
owner-occupied housing stocks in selected years. By 2003, the public sector will 
constitute over one-third of the total owner-occupied housing stock. Residential 
differentiation between public and private owner-occupied housing will be 
apparent. The direct involvement of the Government at the lower-end of housing 
market has forced developers to concentrate their developments at the upper-end 
丨3 Kwong(1992) identifies that the practice ofprivatisation in Hong Kong housing is an incremental 
manner. The Government first adopted the corporatisation approach by setting up of independent 
statutory bodies to be responsible for the full operation of services. These corporations receive the 
asset transferred from the Government and operate according to commercial principle. Then, 
commercialisation approach is used, that is, contracting out services without transfer of assets. 
Currently, the Government has begun the transfer ofpublic housing assets to private sector. 
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Figure 7.1 Structures of owner-occupied housing provision in Hong Kong before and 
after 1998. 
Source: after Ball (1983) Fig. 1.2. 
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Table 7.2 Owner-occupied housing stock projection, 1986-2003. 
T y p e s o f o w n e r - l986"" 1991"" 1996('> 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 3 
o c c u p i e d h o u s i n g 0 0 0 s % 0 0 0 s % 0 0 0 s % 0 0 0 s % 0 0 0 s % 
I. Publ ic sector 
( i ) H K H A nats(" 6 6 130 2 0 4 317"> 3 9 2 ^ 
(i i) H K H S nats(2) - I 6 20(" 30(的 
( i i i ) prev ious PriH flats - - - 5 0 ^ 125(*) 
Sub-total 66 10.0 131 15.6 210 20.3 387 30.3 547 37.7 
II. Private seclor''' 5 9 2 9 0 . 0 7 0 7 8 4 . 4 8 2 4 7 9 . 7 889((,> 6 9 . 7 9()5(('> 6 2 . 3 
T O T A L 658 丨00.0 838 100.0 1,034 100.0 丨，276 丨00.0 1,452 100.0 
Notes: (1 ) Include H O S , P S P S and M l H S . 
(2 ) l n c l u d e F F S S a n d S C l I S . 
(3 ) U p t o 3 1 . 3 . 1 9 9 8 , llie total stock o f 1 l ( ) S / P S P S w a s 2 6 6 , 2 6 6 (refer A p p e n d i x 111). T h e average 
annual flat product ion in publ ic sector is 5 0 , 0 0 0 . ln this table, it is a s s u m e d that hal f o f these 
n e w flats is for sale. 
( 4 ) Starting from April 1998, 2 5 , 0 0 0 l)RH units wi l l be so ld annual ly to sitt ing tenants. 
(5 ) A s s u m e 8 0 % o f private h o u s i n g stock arc for owner -occupat ion . T h e s tock f igures on private 
li()using are based on thc Regis ter o f Quarters maintained by the C e n s u s and Stat ist ics 
Department. T h e y include: ( i) private flats built mainly for residential purposes; ( i i ) H K H S ' s 
lJ lS Hats; ( i i i ) H o n g K o n g Settlers' Corporat ion's rental flats; ( iv ) s ta f f quarters purpose ly 
bui l t /provided by government , hospitals , private c o m p a n i e s , e lc . ; (v ) vi l las , b u n g a l o w s / m o d e r n 
v i l l age houses ; and (v i ) s i m p l e s tone structures. 
(6 ) U p to 3 1 . 3 . 1 9 9 8 , the total private hous ing s tock w a s 1 , 0 3 0 , 0 0 0 units, ln 1 9 9 6 / 9 7 and 1997/98, 
o n l y 19 ,875 and 18 ,200 n e w private residential units were produced respect ive ly ( s e e Fig . 6.1). 
It is es t imated that lherc wil l be around 30,()()0 n c w private units for sa le in 1 9 9 8 / 9 9 . T h e n , 
starting l.Vom 1 9 9 9 / 2 0 0 0 , private sector wi l l prov ide 3 5 , 0 0 0 flats each year. A l s o , b e c a u s e o f t h e 
g o v e r n m e n t ' s po l i cy to promote h o m e ownersh ip , it is a s s u m e d that 9 0 % o f p r i v a t e units wi l l be 
for owner -occupat ion . 
Sources: (a) H K H A (1996a). 
(b) HKHS's correspondence dated 5 June 1997. 
a P u b l i c scctor • Private sector 
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Figure 7.2 Owner-occupied housing stock projection, 1986-2003. 
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market. O n the other hand, the current economic recession has eliminated smaller 
developers who in the past were very active in this sub-market. This reinforces the 
business concentration in the housing development industry — H K H A in the 
housing provision of lower-to-medium sized units while large developers in larger 
sized units. 
Furthermore, the high interest rate and the uncertainty of Hong Kong 
economy have induced large developers to change their operations. Since the 
Government announced the targetted annual production of85,000 flats in 1997, the 
glorious days of developers reaping super-normal profits have gradually passed. 
Despite developers having slowed construction to aim at stabilising housing prices, 
they cannot postpone completion indefinitely as they rely on progressive sales to 
raise as much money as possible to offset the downturn in the residential market. 
In order to minimise the risk in property development, some large developers, such 
as Cheung Kong and Sun Hung Kai, have shifted their investment to rental 
premises and increasingly diversified their businesses into other sectors. In future, 
Hong Kong's property industry will be just like other manufacturing industries that 
reap a moderate profit margin, that is just more than ten per cent a year {SCMP, 25 
February 1998). 
Overall, the deep involvement in housing provision by the Government has 
led to a decrease in flexibility, and to some extent, has contributed to widespread 
loss of government autonomy. The loss has forced the Government to pump more 
money into the housing market to save banks from bankruptcy, home buyers from 
defaulting and properties from negative equity'\ which in turn has exerted a heavy 
burden on the Government's fiscal policy. Also, given the Government's heavy 
commitment in promoting home ownership, house prices are unlikely to see a 
drastic increase in future. This reduces the attractiveness of home ownership. 
Together with factors described in detail below, the prospect of owner-occupied 
'4 Negative equity is defined as the situation in which the (estimated) market price of a property has 
fallen below the original mortgage advance that was used to buy that house. Hence, the owner finds 
that the size ofhis/her outstanding mortgage is larger than the value ofhis/her property. 
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housing to grow towards a mainstream housing tenure is beset by doubts and 
questions. 
Future prospects of home ownership 
Firstly, it seems unlikely that owner-occupied housing can expand to become a 
major new source of low-to-middle income housing without vastly increased 
government subsidies. Even in the current period of economical downturn, 
H K S A R government has managed to increase funding to housing. However, the 
effect of economic recession will diminish sources of government revenues, 
particularly those from land sales and property transactions. O n the other hand, 
Government has to maintain a huge financial reserve to protect it from any 
speculative activities against the Hong Kong dollar. Some commentators have 
already pointed out that investment in owner-occupied housing should not be at the 
expense ofthe construction of public housing (SCMP, 18 February 1998). In fact, 
the demand of public housing may increase due to new arrivals from Mainland 
Cliina'5, newly married couples, divorcees and returning migrants'^. In this 
respect, heavy commitment to promote home ownership will become a serious 
financial burden in future. 
Secondly, public demand for home ownership may drop. Even though the 
income of domestic households increased from $5,160 in 1986 to $9,964 in 1991 
and to $17,500 in 1996 (Census & Statistics Department 1996), the social, 
economic and demographic changes in coming years pose immense barriers for 
many people to become home owners, ln fact, the extensive employment shift 
from manufacturing to services industries'^  has produced a rising income 
丨5 At present, the quota oflegal entrants from the mainland stands at 150 per day or about 55,000 per 
year. 
16 In fact, many of the returned migrants were attracted by the territory's brighter prospects after 
mid-1997. This was reflected by a net inflow ofl58,800 people to Hong Kong between mid-1996 
and mid-1997, accounting for 83% of the population growth over the period (Hongkong Bank 
1998). 
口 The share of manufacturing workers in the total workforce was dropped from 41% in 1981 to 
28% in 1991, and will be estimated to reduce to 13.7% by 2001 (Education & Manpower Branch 
1994, p.24). On the other hand, the employment share ofthe services industries, which comprises 
of the distributive and catering trades, transport services, business services and community and 
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inequality. Meanwhile, the average labour earning in the manufacturing sector is 
declining. Table 7.3 shows that the wage indices for manufacturing sector and 
skilled labours were decreasing in real terms. Moreover, the average monthly 
salary of personal services was substantially below the average of all selected 
occupations. In consequence of these, the gap between the rich and the poor has 
been widening in the 1990s. 
Table 7.3 Wage indices (September 1992 = 100) and average wage rates by broad 
occupation group. 
Nominal Wage Real Wage Average 
Index(l) Index(2) Monthly Salary 
Sept ^ ^ ~ ~ ^ (Sept 1997) 
Broad Occupational Group 1996 1997 1996 1997 $ 
Manufacturing H 5 ^ 0 ~ ^ 2 ~ 1 ^ “ F O O 9jT] 
Wholesale, retail & import/export 
trades，restaurants&liotels 136.4 147.0 101.9 104.2 11,6% 
Transport services 139.9 149.7 104.5 106.2 13,062 
Financing, insurance, real estate & 
business services 143.2 153.8 106.9 109.1 11,134 
Personal services 141.0 149.0 105.3 105.7 6,942 
All selected industries 
Craftsmeii&operatives 131.4 140.3 98.1 99.5 379(3) 
Supervisory, technical, clerical 
&miscellaneousnon- 139.3 149.2 104.0 105.8 11,394 
production workers 
All selected occupations 137.6 147.3 102.8 104.5 11,113 
Notes: (1) Nominal wage index is measured by payroll per person. 
(2) Real wage index is the normal wage index after discounting changes in consumer 
prices. 
(3) The figure is an average daily wage. 
Source: Census and Statistics Department (1998a) Tables 2.7 and 2.8. 
As a result of economic restructuring, the incidence of shedding redundant 
labour has frequently occurred. Also, technological advancements de-skill and 
degrade some of the middle-income jobs. For example, the very well-paid and 
highly-skilled personal assistants in big corporations are replaced by lower-paid 
and less technical clerical workers using computers. At the same time, the labour 
personal services was increased from 47% in 1981 to 62% in 1990. By 2001, it is estimated that 
every 4 out of 5 workers will be engaged in services industries (ibid., p.26). 
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market is becoming more ‘flexible，，leading the growth of contractual staff and 
part-time employment. All these changes imply that some of the middle-income 
families slip into lower-income classes. In classifying all households in the form of 
decile distribution, Table 7.4 shows that the share of middle-income families is 
shrinking. It dropped from 36.1 per cent in 1981 to 33.6 per cent in 1996. 
Furthermore, the current Asian financial crisis has induced firms shedding a great 
number of middle managers. This means that not only the gap between the rich and 
the poor widens, but also the difference between middle- and higher-income 
families. 
Table 7.4 The distribution of lower-, middle- and higher-income households in Hong 
Kong, 1981-96. 
1981(''> 1986(1” 1991(i)> 1996作> Monthly household income 
Household group (%) (%) (%) (%) level as atl996 ($f> 
Lower-income 
(decile groups: 1-6) 28.7 28.8 26.8 24.6 less than 22,000 
Middle-income 
(decile groups: 7-9) 36.1 35.7 35.9 33.6 22,000 - 56,000 
Higher-income 
(decilegroup: 10) 35.2 35.5 37.3 41.8 over 56,000 
Sources: (a) Hong Kong Economic Times, 12 February 1997. 
(b) Census and Statistics Department(1996). 
Recently, unemployment and under-employment became prominent. The 
unemployment rate reached a 15-year high of 4.2 per cent between March and M a y 
1998, and the under-employment rate was 2.6 per cent. That was the highest since 
April-June 1984 when unemployment rate was 4.4 per cent {SCMP, 16June 1998). 
Because of the recent financial upheaval in the Asian region, the retrenchment in 
the financial services, retail, property and hospitality sectors will increase 
unemployment to 8 per cent by the end ofl998 (Sender 1998). 
Hence, the overall picture of the 1990s is an increasingly insecure 
environment with constant threats of unemployment, de-skilling and degrading in 
many lower- and middle-wagedjobs. ln the face of Asia's economic downturn, not 
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only households on lower incomes, but also middle-income families are more 
vulnerable to these changes in economic circumstances. Lately, there has been a 
large drop in the number of people applying to buy government-sponsored 
housingi8. Hong Kong people expect little or nothing in the way of salary increases 
and bonuses for the next couple of years. It may take them three to five years to 
recover their purchasing power and be able to buy flats. Even though Hong Kong 
economy will ultimately recover from its current crisis, given the long-term 
security of income is increasingly rare in all sectors of the labour market, the 
preference of home ownership will not return to its ‘normal’ state (Doling & Ford 
1996, p.l70). Because mass home ownership in Hong Kong has been predicated 
upon loans taken out against future income, the low expectations that the labour 
market will regain its former self mean that the potential risk ofdefault (and with it 
re-possession and financial loss for both buyer and lender) are likely to remain 
substantial. So, in the long run, the demand for owning will be muted. 
Thirdly, recent institutional development of financial markets and 
government's home ownership promotion policy may induce a change in the 
nature of demand for home purchase. To give more profoundity to the financial 
market in Hong Kong, the Government has started to promote bond markets in the 
late 1980s. This development may facilitate long-term investment in Hong Kong 
and encourage a transfer of funds from the property market. Moreover, the 
Government started the Mandatory Provident Fund") in 1998. The development of 
pension funds under the Fund will channel savings of households to the financial 
market, presumably out of property investment. Most importantly, the 
Government's emphasis on increasing both land and housing supplies means that 
property prices will not deviate much from the inflation rate. The superiority of 
real estate investment therefore diminishes. Under these circumstances, the nature 
of housing will gradually change from an investment asset to one for physical 
18 In the latest HOS Phase 19C, a total of77,028 applications received. The subscription rate was 
7.58 times the 10,156 flats put up for sale (http://www/info/gov.hk/hd/PressRel/00001670. htm). 
Compared with that of Phase 18C in January 1997, the subscription rate showed a 45% drop. 
…The Fund requires both employees and employers to contribute an amount equal to 5% of the 
employee's earnings. The earnings level subject to the Fund is from $4,000 to $20,000 on a 
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accommodation. Diversification to financial goods like bonds and pension funds 
will reduce the investment demand of owner-occupied housing. 
Fourthly, the previous section has illustrated the fact that there is aii 
increasingly clear demarcation between two forms of owner-occupied housing. 
While H K S A R government can control its production of public owner-occupied 
housing production, it cannot force private developers to bring a specified number 
of flats to the market. The year 1997 has already witnessed a large shortfall in 
private housing production — developers built about 18,000 private dwellings that 
was about 20 per cent less than anticipated {SCMP, 18 February 1998). In view of 
recent increases in iiiterest rates and the lack-lustre buying sentiment, the 
Government cannot have a clear projection on the number of flats developers will 
be able to produce. Over time, an increasing number o f P R H tenants turned home 
owners will be able to benefit from the appreciation in their units' value. They can 
sell their units to other P R H tenants two-year later or sell on the open market fWe 
years later, having paid a premium proportionate to the original discount. But, 
shortage in private housing units means that their channel to trade up the housing 
ladder is blocked. Also, the gap between the prices of owner-occupied housing in 
the public and private sectors will be further widened ifthe availability of the latter 
is diminishing. Such obstruction in trading up weakens the prospect ofpromoting 
home ownership to improve people's standard of living. 
Finally, the future of owner-occupied housing depends on the economic 
integration between Hong Kong and China, particularly the southern part ofChina. 
In the final executive report of the Territorial Development Strategy, H K S A R 
government has taken the development of the Pearl River Delta into full 
consideration. To accommodate the expected 8.1 million population in 2011, the 
Government will conduct studies to explore the development potential of the 
northeastern N e w Territories, northwestern N e w Territories, Hong Kong Island 
South and L a m m a island so that 95,000 housing units a year will be produced after 
monthly basis. It covers employees of aged from 18to 64, including self-employed persons. The 
benefits are fully vested, to be portable and to be paid in a lump sum at the age of65. 
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2001. This is an ambitious target. However, the expanded demand ofhousing may 
be over-estimated. Already, pockets ofresidential developments targeted at Hong 
Kong people have sprung up across the Pearl River Delta. There are now 100,000 
Hong Kong people living in Guangdong (Gilley 1997b). Most see these properties 
as holiday homes, and only a small number ofretirees live there to take advantage 
ofthe much lower costs ofliving. Given the economic activities of Hong Kong is 
gradually shifting to the north, there may be more retirees and managers with 
business in China move to the other side of the Shenzhen River. Currently, the 
question ofjurisdiction ofHong Kong citizens in China poses barriers in deterring 
massive migration from H K S A R to China. But in the long run, the economic 
boundary between Hong Kong and Guangdong will become blurred. Hong Kong 
will ultimately be integrated into the larger Chinese economy. More people will 
cross the border to find jobs and then establish their families there. There is also 
talk about developing 'satellite communities' for Hong Kong people straddling the 
border as land in H K S A R will ultimately be used up. As a whole, the long term 
demand ofhome ownership may not be as high as H K S A R government expects. 
Conclusion 
The structure ofowner-occupied housing provision in Hong Kong is changing. At 
the bottom end ofthe housing market, the supply of owner-occupied housing units 
is dominated by H K S A R government. At the opposite end, to avoid competition 
with the Government, private developers have shifted their energies in constructing 
larger and better-quality flats for sale. As home ownership expands and P R H 
limits to people in real need, Hong Kong, like Australia, Britain and the United 
States, will change the current dualised housing system in which owner occupation 
and public renting are dominant tenure alternatives to a mono-tenurial one 
(Kemeny 1983, p.73), in which owner occupation is the dominant tenure with both 
private and public renting as residual housing sectors. The major disadvantage of 
the mono-tenurial housing system is little or no real choice between comparable 
forms of tenure. 
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lt is clear that Hong Kong's housing, like other sectors, is facing a lot of 
challenges, such as the ageing of the population, immigration from China, the 
persistent unemployment rate, depressed earnings for unskilled labour and 
decreasedjob security for many middle-income households. Therefore, it is time 
for H K S A R government to question the sustainability of some of its housing 
policies. Pushing for higher rates of owner occupancy is questionable given the 
long-term labour market trends towards short-term and less-secure employment 
contracts. As such, the housing system is required to adapt the more ‘flexible’ 
labour market (Maclennan & Pryne 1996, p.l856). To provide more housing 
choices to suit the different requirements of families at different stages of the life 
cycle under an insecure economic environment, there is a need to have a large and 
efficient private rental sector. In achieving this, housing policies are required to 
promote private renting as a valuable source of cheap, flexible and popular urban 
housing. Tax incentives or even direct subsidies are required to encourage private 
landlords to stay in business. Overseas experiences, like Denmark, France and 
Germany (Power 1993, p.374) show that a large sector of private rental sector can 
facilitate employment flexibility and growth. To suit Hong Kong's buoyant 
economy, the right direction is to maintain the current dualised housing system 




The major objective of this dissertation has been to provide an introduction to the 
role of property developers in supplying owner-occupied housing, set within the 
context of the Hong Kong housing market, its political and socio-economic 
changes and its housing policy. It has employed Ball's 'Structure of Housing 
Provision' (SHP) as a means to organise and understand the complexity ofhousing 
productions and patterns that we observe in Hong Kong. It has also emphasised the 
analysis of housing development process and the ‘power’ of developers on Hong 
Kong society. In so doing, it may assist the reader in making sense of the 
complicated interaction among different agents in the housing market. 
Throughout the text, emphasis has also been placed on the importance of 
studying housing provision in its appropriate context, that is, the economic, 
historical, political and socio-cultural environments that define the external 
influences on government intervention in the housing development process. It was 
implemented in such a way that owner-occupied housing could be provided only 
by private developers. As large amounts of government revenues were extracted 
by land development, the former colonial government indirectly pushed up the 
housing prices by restricting the supply of residential land. Consequently, housing 
became an investment goods as people anticipated that its prices would rise faster 
than inflation since it was always in shortage. This artificial shortage induced 
developers to adopt a specific mechanism to acquire land, construct, finance and 
sell the private housing units. This, in turn, led to the identification of a number of 
internal rules, resources and ideologies each agent — home buyers, public and 
private housing developers, financial institutions and the government agencies who 
regulate the activities of the market ——draw upon in deciding what owner-occupied 
housing goes where and when. 
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Equally important, these contents are continually changing. The soaring 
housing prices led to a massive amount of intervention in the direct provision of 
owner-occupied housing, instead of increased effort to remove bottlenecks and 
obstacles in the housing development process so as to enhance the ability of the 
private sector to produce housing. Still, the high housing prices did not resolve, 
and became a political concern for the government of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region (HKSAR). In a way, the high housing costs have reduced 
the competitiveness of Hong Kong economy. To solve the problem, the H K S A R 
government took a new direction, and has introduced measure to increase land 
supply. 
Yet, the present collapse in real-estate values quickly ripples through the 
entire financial sector, causing troubles in financial institutions holding a large 
portfolio in property investment. This, in turn, has forced the H K S A R government 
changing its initial strategies to push down the sky-rocketing housing prices. In 
consequence, the changes of the external environment, either politically or 
economically, have induced fluctuations ofhousing policies altering both rules and 
resources used for investment in housing supply and the costs of occupying that 
housing. Ironically, developers had in the past strongly resisted governmentally 
imposed restrictions on supply, even though without them it became impossible to 
maintain high prices. Currently, they are strongly opposing government's efforts 
in increasing land supply. On the other hand, home buyers had in the past urged 
government to increase intervention in the market to lower housing prices. 
Currently, they are pushing government to further intervene the market by 
sustaining falling prices. Despite the drastic drop of prices, however, most people 
are still unable to afford buying private housing without government subsidies. 
Finally, the heavy commitment of government in promoting home ownership to 
fulfil the rising aspirations of the public has increasingly reinforced the dominance 
of large developers (both in public and private sectors) in the structure of owner-
occupied housing provision. Generally, there is a myriad of housing policies that 
are complicated, volatile, and at times, contradictory. 
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The above inconsistencies in housing policy in part reflect the undeniable 
complexity of the issues involved, and in part they mirror that there is no single 
solution to solve the housing problems. In fact, we often seem to solve one 
problem simply by creating others. Clearly, future housing policy depends on how 
each agent in the structure of owner-occupied housing provision reacts to the new 
housing policy, how new rules and resources are created to adjust to the changing 
investment atmosphere in the market and how our neighbours' economies perform. 
In addition, one must look at the critical effects on housing of a continued 
economic recession and low inflation, of changing preferences and cultural values, 
of employment re-distribution, migration shifts and population ageing and of re-
alignments in political ideologies (both H K S A R and Mainland China) regarding 
the degree of government intervention in housing and tightening fiscal constraints 
on public expenditure. 
Each of the earlier chapters has illustrated the nature of housing 
development industry, as well as the factors affecting property developers made on 
the method, location and timing of land purchase and housing development. 
However, detailed strategies developers used in deciding which type of housing is 
distributed in our society are not mentioned adequately. There is clearly a need for 
more research. 
First, there is considerable merit to conduct an intensive study of specific 
group(s) of developers over a longer time scale and in a greater depth than was 
possible in this study. Emphasis should be put to obtain feedback from those who 
are unwilling to participate in this study. In order to obtain their participation, it is 
advantageous to penetrate into their network, like working in the property-related 
business. In a way, being a member of property development industry can easily 
learn the internal rules that are often deliberately made obscure to an outsider 
Second, there is a need to conduct a longitudinal study ofdevelopers in the 
housing development industry. It has already witnessed a new change of the 
structure of owner-occupied housing provision in Hong Kong. In coping with the 
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anticipated social, economic, demographic and political transitions in Hong Kong, 
the structure of housing provision will continue to evolve. It would be interesting 
to see how developers operate after five years' time when the new form ofhousing 
provision proceeds to its more mature stage. 
Finally, the study has proved that the concept of SHP is valuable in 
studying the role of property developers in the provision of owner-occupied 
housing in Hong Kong. Given the extreme complexity of the interrelationships of 
agents involved in housing provision, the value of using SHP is obvious. Such an 
analysis ensures different theories are incorporated to explain the multifarious 
interactions among agents in producing and transforming the built environment in 
Hong Kong. As housing studies become more an integration ofvarious disciplines 
in social sciences, using SHP can provide a holistic view in understanding the 
behaviour of a particular agent and its outcome in a housing context. It also 
enriches our understanding of the nature of housing: its sheer enormity and 
intricacy. Yet, and in tandem with an improved base of housing information and 
descriptive studies, our existing theoretical frameworks and conceptual designs 
need to be modified and extended, and in some cases replaced, in the face of the 
new and different conditions affecting Hong Kong and its housing system, for 
example, ageing and slow growth, and unemployment problems. Apparently, there 
is no perfect housing theories for the simple reason that none exists. But, theories 
must be firmly grounded in the reality we observe around us if their purpose is to 
devise far more satisfactory systems of housing people and building their homes 
than currently available. 
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POSTSCRIPT 
As there are clear signs that H K S A R is plunging into its first recession for years, 
with negative economic growth imminent in the second quarter of 1998, H K S A R 
government announced its second rescue package on 22 June 1998 to relieve 
hardships and revive Hong Kong's economy. The package was designed to 
address the credit and liquidity crunch, falling property prices, business and 
domestic costs and declining public confidence. 
To stabilise property prices, all land sales by auction or public tender for the 
remainder of the 1998/99 financial year and private treaty grants for SCHS were 
suspended (see Table 7.1). Extra $3.6 billion was allocated for the HSLS so that 
the number of eligible families to be first-time home buyers was increased from 
6,000 to 12,000. Also, the 1998/99 quota for the HPLS would be increased from 
4,500 to 10,000. These measures were apparently designed to reduce land supply 
on the one hand and boost housing demand on the other. However, given that the 
85,000 flat production target each year remains unchanged, the measures can 
stabilise the market but are unlikely to help boost prices. In this sense, the 
scenarios suggested in Figures 7.1, 7.2 and Table 7.2 are still valid. Nevertheless, 
the structure of Hong Kong's owner-occupied housing provision and subsequently 
the behaviour of property developers will undergo a significant change as H K S A R 
government has adopted a new direction in its housing policy. 
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Appendix I 
List of individuals consulted in selected individuals interviews. 
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M s Chan Chung Ha M r Benny W.N. Yu 
Estate Surveyor Sales Manager (Tseung Kwan 0 ) 
Housing Department Hong Kong Property Services (Agency) 
Ltd. 
M r Lennon Choy 
Department ofBuilding & Real Estate 
Hong Kong Polytechnic University 
Dr Rebecca L.H. Chiu 
Centre of Urban Planning & 
Environmental Management 
University of Hong Kong 
M r Chung Si Ping 
Yau Yuen W a n Village 
Hang Hau, Tseung Kwan 0 
Dr Lawrence W.C. Lai 
Department of Surveying 
University of Hong Kong 
M r Daniel Lau 
Property Development Manager 
Hong Kong Housing Society 
MrHollyM.M.Lau 
Assistant Director, Corporate Relations 
Land Development Corporation 
M r R.A. Logan 
Senior Architect 
Housing Department 
M r Sze Wing Ching 
Manager Director 
Centraline Property Agency Ltd. 
M s Tam Sau Ngor, Vera 




The Real Estate Developers Association of 
Hong Kong 
M r Stephen Yip Moon Wah 
Chairman, General Practice Division 
Hong Kong Institute of Surveyors 
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Appendix II 
Corporate members iii the Real Estate Developers Association of H o n g 
Kong as in 1997. 
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Name of Companies Name of person in charge 
1 Alfaso Investment Ltd. Miss Cheung M i Ling 
2 Amoy Properties Ltd. Mr Yin Shang Shing 
3 Asia Standard International Group Limited Mr Fung, Clement Siu To 
4 Asiasec Properties Ltd. M r Leung, Jesse 
5 Beauty Plaza Ltd. M r Lee, Kent Wing Kam 
6 Better Chief Ltd. M r Ng, Robert 
7 Bonna Estates Co., Ltd. M r Li, Alfred Hung Kwan 
8 Cali Enterprises Ltd. Hon Tien, James P.C. 
9 Camleigh Investment Ltd. M r Lee Wooii King 
10 Cavendish International Holdings Ltd. M r Tso Kai Sum 
11 Central Development Ltd. M r Hui, Charles C.P. 
12 Cheer Result Ltd. M r Chen Hsi Yu 
13 Cheong K Co. Ltd. -
14 Cheong Sun Investment Ltd. Ms. Cheng Co Chine 
15 Chesterfield Realty Ltd. Dr. Li Ka Shing 
16 Cheuk Nang Properties (Holdings) Ltd. Mr, Chao, Cecil 
17 Cheung Kong (Holdings) Ltd. Dr. Li Ka Shing 
18 Chi Lam Investment Co., Ltd. M r Leung, Stewart Chi Kin 
19 Chi Pan Co., Ltd. M r Yuen, Nelson 
20 Chime Corporation Ltd. M r Kung Yan Sum 
21 China Overseas Land & Investment Ltd. Mr Sun Wen Jie 
22 Chinachem Investment Co., Ltd. M r Wang T.H. 
23 Chow Tai Fook Jewellery Co., Ltd. Dr Cheng Yu Tung 
24 Chuang's Properties Ltd. Mr Chuang, Alan Shaw-Swee 
25 Chung Shek Enterprises Co., Ltd. M r Chang E.M. 
26 Chung Yuen Enterprises Co., Ltd. M r Chan Him 
27 Chyau Fwu Properties Ltd. M r Wong, George Kin Wah 
28 CoLiraud Investment Ltd. -
29 Deland Investment Ltd. M r Lau Chi Keung 
30 Demig Trading (Far East) Co., Ltd. -
31 Dynamia Co., Ltd. M r Ho, Wilfred S 1 . 
32 E Man Construction Co., Ltd. -
33 E Wah Reality Ltd. M r Chung Kong Hoi 
34 Eastern Union Investment Corp. Ltd. M r Ko Kwok Yuen 
35 Eden Investment Co., Ltd. M r Pang Ying Hong 
36 Egeria Investment Ltd. M r Yen Ping Sei 
37 Evercot Enterprise Co., Ltd. -
38 Far East Holdings International Ltd. Mr David Chiu 
39 Five Oceans Land Investment Ltd. M r Sheung Chi Wing 
40 Fordluxe Development Ltd. M r Ng Chung Hong 
41 Friends & U Land Company -
42 Fu Fai Enterprises Ltd. M r Leung Moon Chuen 
43 Fu Investment Co., Ltd. M r Chan Chak Fu 
44 Full Speed Development Ltd. M r Yeo N a m Kok 
45 Fulton Corporation Ltd. M r Fok, lan 
46 Fung Kin Enterprise Co., Ltd. M r Pang Yin Hong 
47 Gammon Properties Ltd. M r Liu, Simon 
48 Gold Dragon Development Co., Ltd. M r Li Wai Keung 
49 Gold Union Land Development Co., Ltd. -
50 Golden Hill Land Development Co., Ltd. M r Wong, David Wai Chi 
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51 Golden LeafInvestment Ltd. Miss Fong, Doreen 
52 Greenlet Investment Ltd. -
53 Handsome Construction & Investment Co., Ltd. Mr Fong, Albert Man Ching 
54 Handsome Lift Investment Ltd. Mr Wong, Henry Gee Hang 
55 Hang Hing Construction Co., Ltd. Mr Ko, Herbert 
56 Hang Lung Development Co., Ltd. Mr Chan, Ronnie 
57 Hang M o w Investment Co., Ltd. -
58 Hang Tak Co., Ltd. Mr Lee Mee Yung 
59 Hanison Construction Co., Ltd. Mr Wong Sue Toa 
60 Harriman Realty Co., Ltd. Mr Tse, Ray 
61 Henderson Investment Ltd. Mr Li Ning 
62 Henderson Land Development Co., Ltd. Mr Lee King Yue 
63 Henry Fok Estate Ltd. Mr Fok, Henry Y.T. 
64 Henry Y T Fok Investment Ltd. Mr Fok, Henry Y.T. 
65 Hill Lee Investment Co., Ltd. Mr Lee, Thomas T.V. 
66 Hip Shing Hong Development Co., Ltd. Dr Fong, Henry Yun Wah 
67 HKR International Ltd. Mr Cha, Payson Mou Sing 
68 Hoi Shun Investment Co., Ltd. Mr Pun, Stephen 
69 Hon Fu Enterprises Ltd. Mr Fong Fu Wah 
70 Hon Kwok Land Investment Co., Ltd. Mr Fung, Herman Man Hei 
71 Hong Kong Island Development Ltd. Mr Leung, Stewart Chi Kin 
72 Hong Kong Resort Co., Ltd. Mr Marriott, Jeremy C.H. 
73 Hongkong & Whampao Dock Co., Ltd. Mr To, Peter 
74 Hooley Estates Ltd. Mr Yao Ling Sun 
75 Hopewell Holdings Ltd. Mr Yeung, Kevin Ka Yan 
76 Hopewell Housing Ltd. Ms Lee, Edith 
77 Hsin Chong Land Ltd. Mr Lo, Eric Kai Kin 
78 Hung Kong Investment Co., Ltd. Mr Fung Shun Wai 
79 Hutchison Properties Ltd. Mr Tso Kai Sum 
80 Hysan Development Co., Ltd. Dr H.C. Lee 
81 I-FengCompanyLtd. -
82 International Agencies Ltd. Mr Leung, Stewart Chi Kin 
83 International Hung Hsing Holdings Ltd. MrNg, Benjamin P.K. 
84 Jade Pine Ltd. Mr Yam, William 
85 Jannerson Ltd. Mr Kwan, Vincent 
86 Join Fortune Development Ltd. Mr Leung Sing 
87 Jumbo Funds Ltd. Ms Lo Yuk Ying 
88 K Wah Properties (Holdings) Ltd. Mr Alexander Y.W. Lui 
89 Kai Ming Investment Co., Ltd. Mr Kwan, Daniell 
90 Kam M o w Enterprises Co., Ltd. Mr Lau Kam M o w 
91 Kee Lee Co., Ltd. Mr Lee Shau Kee 
92 Keng Fong Sin Kee Con & lnv. Co., Ltd. Mr Lee, Johnny Ngau Chai 
93 Kerry Properties Ltd. Mr Steven Ho 
94 Kin Bon Investment Co., Ltd. Mr Pang Yin Hong 
95 Kin Kiu Enterprises Ltd. Mr Leung, Stewart Chi Kin 
96 Kin Yick Liong Co., Ltd. Mr Lee, Jimmy Yee Liong 
97 King Lee Investment Co., Ltd. Mr Leung, Stewart Chi Kin 
98 King's Road Development Co., Ltd. Dr Li Ka Shing 
99 Kiu Kwan Estate Ltd. Mr Sung Wen Ming 
100 Kiu Kwong Investment Corporation Ltd. Mr Wong Ming 
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101 Kiu Wing Investment Corporation Ltd. Mr Leung Kin Fun 
102 Ko Wan Co., Ltd. Mr Leung, Stewart Chi Kin 
103 Kotachi Ltd. Mr Ng, Robert 
104 Kowatex Investment Ltd. -
105 Lai Sun Development Co. Ltd. Mr Lau, Julius Shu Yan 
106 Land Development Corporation Mr Razack, Abraham 
107 Landwide Estate Co., Ltd. Mrs Cheng, Judy 
108 Lee Chow Kee Con & Iiiv. Co., Ltd. Mr Lee Chung Keung 
109 Lee Hing Investment Co., Ltd. -
110 Lee On Investment (Holdings) Ltd. Mr Fong Hin Yeung 
111 Lippo Limited Mr Jonathan M. Foxall 
112 Liu Chong Hing Investment Ltd. Mr Liu Lit Man 
113 Lo's Mee Kwong Land Investment Co., Ltd. -
114 Lon Kie Group Ltd. Mr Chau Yueh Jen 
115 Long Keen Development Co., Ltd. Mr Eddie Tam 
116 Luen Lee Enterprises Ltd. Mr Pang Yin Hong 
117 Liien Sun Investment Co., Ltd. Ms Cheng Co Chine 
118 Lynhall Land Investment Co., Ltd. -
119 Man Hing Investment Co., Ltd. -
120 Man Po Investment Co., Ltd. Mr Cheung On Tak 
121 MandarinDevelopmentCo. -
122 Manhattan China Investment Ltd. Hon. Tien, James P.C. 
123 Mass Transit Railway Corporation Mr Ho, Thomas H.K. 
124 Mee Wah Construction, Land Investment & Mortgage Co., Ltd -
125 Metro Realty Co., Ltd. Dr Ho, Stanley 
126 Mightypeaii Ltd. Mr Pun, Stephen Siu Ying 
127 Millap Ltd. Mr Chen, William Chien Yuan 
128 Moon Yik Co., Ltd. Mr Kan Tak Kwong 
129 Multipurpose Investment Ltd. Ms Pun Wai Kuen 
130 Murdoch Investment Inc. Mr Tan Geok Soo 
131 Nan Fung Development Ltd. Miss Chen, Vivien 
132 National Investment Co., Ltd. Dr. Fok, Henry Y.T. 
133 New Town (NT) Properties Ltd. Mr Chan Kui Yuen 
134 New Town Properties Holding Investment Ltd. Mr Lo, Clement Cliiu Chun 
135 New World Development Co., Ltd. Dr Cheng Yu Tung 
136 Newfoundland Housing Ltd. Mr Loong, Thomas Lik Kiu 
137 Newpont Development Co., Ltd. Mr Ho Sai Tsang 
138 Octerworth Enterprises Ltd. Mr Lee Tech Chee 
139 Overseas Associates Ltd. Mr Liu Hao Tsing 
140 Oxford Properties & Finance Co., Ltd. Mr Lee, James S 
141 Pacific Islands Shipbuilding Co., Ltd. Mr Pang Yin Hong 
142 Pentacontinental Land Investment Co., Ltd. -
143 Peregrine Investments Holdings Ltd. Mr Cheung, Edwin Hon Kit 
144 Po Sun Investment Co., Ltd. -
145 Po Wah Land Investment Co., Ltd. Mr Chan Ching Pew 
146 Pocaliton Ltd. Mrs Chu Lee Pao Chung 
147 Pofield Real Estate Co., Ltd. Mr Kwok Ping Sun 
148 Pridegate Ltd. Mr Chan Hung Ying 
149 Pudong Development Holdings Ltd. Mr Tong Cm Lin 
150 Real Maker Development Ltd. Mr Yeung, Albert Pak Hin 
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151 Rich Century Investment Ltd. M r Ng, Robert 
152 Rock Dale Investment Co., Ltd. M r Pang Yin Hong 
153 RoyaltelIe International Ltd. M r Lo, Clement Chiu Chun 
154 Ryoden Property Development Co., Ltd. M r Hu, Herman 
155 Saky Investment Ltd. Mr Lee, Thomas Kwok Wing 
156 San Kei Land Development Co., Ltd. M r Choi Koon Shum 
157 Seapower Consortium Co., Ltd. M r Choi Sai Leung 
158 Shang's Investment Co., Ltd. M r Shang Chi Ming 
159 Shiu Chung Enterprises Co., Ltd. M r Cho Siu Chung 
160 Shiu Kien Development Co., Ltd. Mr Wong, William Wing Lun 
161 Shu Shun Co., Ltd. M r Pang Yin Hong 
162 Shui On Properties Ltd. M r Lo, Vincent Hong Sui 
163 Shun Hop Nien Investment Co., Ltd. M r Pang Yin Hong 
164 Shun Tak Holdings Ltd. Mr Chan, Anthony Wai Lun 
165 Shung King Development Co., Ltd. M r Lee King Yue 
166 Sidak Investment Ltd. M r Cheung Wai Keung 
167 Singapore Trading Co., Ltd. M r Lam Chok Fai 
168 Siu Fu Co., Ltd. M r Ng, Timothy W.K. 
169 Sogea Ltd. M r Dessaigne Ragul 
170 Soundwill Investments Ltd. M r Wan Jarm Clieun 
171 Stanman Properties Ltd. M r Yuen, Nelson Wai Leung 
172 Sumitomo Investment Co., (HK) Ltd. -
173 Sun Cheong Investment & Construction Co. -
174 Sun Hey Investment Co., Ltd. M s Ma, Jennifer 
175 Sun Hung Kai Properties Holding Investments Ltd. M r Lo, Clement Chiu Chun 
176 Sun Hung Kai Properties Ltd. Mr Kwok, Thomas P.K. 
177 Sun King Fung Development Ltd. -
178 Sun Luen Land Investment Co., Ltd. -
179 Sunny Enterprises Ltd. M r Pun Sun On 
180 Swire Properties Ltd. Mr Kerr, Keith G. 
181 Tai Cheung Properties Ltd Mr Chan, David Pun 
182 Tak Hung (Holding) Co., Ltd. M r Ho Tim 
183 The Great Eagle Co., Ltd. Mr Mok, Terry 
184 The Hong Kong Chiap Hua Mty. Co., (1947) Ltd. M r Cheng, Albert S.L. 
185 The Hongkong Land Property Co., Lld. Mr Percy Weatherall 
186 The Kwong Sang Hong International Ltd. Mr Cheung, Edwin Hon Kit 
187 The Sun Co., Ltd. M r Lok, Hardy K.C. 
188 Timeshare Development Ltd. M r O w Sing Kau 
189 Verder & Co., (HK) Ltd. M r Wong M.Y. 
190 Victoria Amusement Co., Ltd. M r Pang Yin Hong 
191 WharfProperty Investment Ltd. M r Li, Gonzaga Wei-Jen 
192 Wheelock Properties Ltd. M r Tse, Ray 
193 Will Glory Co., Ltd. M r Lee Yiu Cheung 
194 Wing Hing Shing Co., Ltd. M r Pang Yin Hong 
195 Wing Kee Co., Ltd. -
196 Wing Shing Enterprises Ltd. M r Pang Yin Hong 
197 Wing W o Land Investment Co., Ltd. M r Lee Yiu Chee 
198 Wise Investment Co., Ltd. M r Wen Chi Hsuan 
199 Wong Che Keong Co. -
200 Y C Cheng & Sons Co., Ltd. M r Cheng She On 
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201 Y W Fong Continuation Ltd. M r Fong, David M a n Hung 
202 Yan Yin Company Ltd. M r Lui, Michael Cheung 
203 Yau Fook Hong Co., Ltd. M r Siu, Peter Yat N a m 
204 Y e m Brothers Co., Ltd. M r Y e m Ming 
205 Yeung Chi Shiiig Estates Ltd. -
206 Ying Ho Co., Ltd. M r N g Shung M o 
207 Ying Kong Enterprises Ltd. M r Chong Lap Fu 
208 Y u Tai Hing Co., Ltd. M r Lo Siu Tong 
209 Yuen Fung Investment Co., Ltd. Dr. Fok, Henry Y.T. 
210 Yuen Kee Construction Co., Ltd. M r Chang, Ning Ru 
211 Yuen Tack Hing Co., Ltd. M r Pang Yin Hong 
212 Yuet Cheong Co., Ltd. M r Pang Yin Hong  
italics: Public company 
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Appendix III 
Details of H O S and PSPS projects, 1978-97. 
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Application No. of No. of 
Phase period Projects blocks flats 
“ February 78 Shun Chi Court, East Kowloon 6 1,539 
Chun Man Court, Ho Man Tin 12 1,800 
Yue Fai Court, Phase I，Aberdeen 5 1,100 
Sui W o Court, Phase I, Sha Tin 6 2,334 
Yuet Lai Court, Lai King 4 704 
Shan Tsui Court, Chai Wan 4 896 
November 79 Yau Tong Centre, Yau Tong 9 506 
Chi Lok Fa Yuen, Tiien Mm 8 1,000 
Sub-total 9,879 
2A March 80 Yue Shing Court, Sha Tin 4 530 
Sui W o Court, Phase II, Sha Tin 3 1,167 
Yue Fai Court, Phase II, Aberdeen 1 220 
~lB August 80 Tsui Yiu Court, Kwai Chung i 292 
Ching Lai Court, Kwai Chung 7 970 
Ting Nga Court, Tai Po 3 395 
Sub-total 3,574" 
T K March 81 Siu On Court, Tuen Mun ui 1,311 
Yee Tsui Court, Chai Wan 3 600 
Hong Tin Court，Lam Tin 3 792 
Yee Kok Court, Phase 1’ Sham Shui Po 4 396 
December81 Walton Estate, Chai Wan 4 760 
"lB February 82 On Kay Court, Phase I, Ngau Tau Kok 2 464 
Sill Hong Court, Phase I, Tuen Mun 5 1,084 
Sub-total 5,407 
~ ^ June 82 Siu Hong Court, Phase II, Tuen Mun 4 960 
King Shan Court, Phase I, Hammer Hill 2 528 
Yue Tin Court, Shatin 7 1,704 
Kai Tai Court, East Kowloon 4 624 
Yuk Po Court, Shek W u Hui 8 1,248 
~4B January 83 King Shan Court, Phase II, Hammer Hill 4 1,056 
Wang Fuk Court, Tai Po 8 1,984 
Yan Tsui Court, Chai Wan 2 304 
March 83 Melody Garden, Tuen Mun 
(Middle Income Housing Scheme) 10 2,240 
Sub-total 10,648~ 
5A July 83 Siu Shan Court, Tuen Mun 12 1,872 
Yee Kok Court, Phase II, Sham Shui Po 3 298 
Lok Nga Court, Ngau Tau Kok 6 1,331 
King Tin Court, Sha Tin 6 1，424 
"lB February 84 Siu Hong Court, Phase III, Tuen Mun 5 1,200 
On Kay Court, Phase II, Ngau Tau Kok 2 456 
Cheung W o Court, Kwun Tong 6 1,584 
Sub-total 8,165 
" ^ June 84 Siu Hong Court, Phase IV’ Tuen Mun 6 1,432 
Choi Po Court, Phase 1’ Shek W u Hui 3 1,584 
May Shing Court, Sha Tin 3 2,192 
Tai Po Plaza, Tai Po 5 1,408 
6B October 84 Richland Gardens, Kowloon Bay 22 5,904 
Sub-total 12,520" 
231 
Application No. of No. of 
Phase period Projects blocks flats 
~ January 85 C h o i Po Court, Phase II, Shek W u Hui i 5 ^ 
Fung Shing Court, Sha Tin 3 2,448 
Ching Shing Court, Tsing Yi 1 800 
^ March 85 Prime View Garden, Tuen Mun 5 1,520 
Holford Gardens, Sha Tin 3 800 
Sun Lai Garden, Ngau Chi Wan 3 600 
Greenwood Terrace, Chai Wan 7 2,100 
~lC July 85 Neptune Terrace, Chai Wan 3 97S 
Siu Hei Court, Phase I, Tuen Mun 2 1,120 
Ming Nga Court, Tai Po 3 丨，680 
Sub-total 12,574 
8A November 85 Siw Hing Garden, Tai Po 5 1,460 
Ching Wah Court, Phase I, Tsing Yi 2 1,120 
Siu Hei Court, Phase II, Tuen Mun 3 1,680 
Tin Ma Court, Central Kowloon 5 2,800 
" ^ May 86 Kornhill, Quarry Bay Jo 2,180 
Lung Poon Court, Phase I, Diamond Hill 6 3,340 
Po Lai Court, Sham Shui Po 3 378 
" ^ September 86 Chevalier Garden, Phase I, Ma On Shan W 2,010 
Hong Wah Court, Lam Tin 3 1,680 
Sub-total 16，648 
~ M February 87 Ching Wah Court, Phase II, Tsing Yi 4 1,340 
Ka Tin Court, Sha Tin 6 1,680 
Kam On Court, Ma On Shan 3 1,050 
~ ^ i June 87 Chevalier Garden, Phase II, Ma On Shan 7 1,932 
Ching Tai Court, Tsing Yi 7 2,180 
9C November 87 King Ming Court, Tseung Kwan 0 3 1,050 
Kam Hay Court, Ma On Shan 3 1,050 
Yue On Court, Ap Lei Chau 7 1,960 
Sub-total 12,242_ 
10A April 88 Hong Shing Garden, Tseung Kwan 0 5 1,850 
Ying Ming Court, Phase I, Tseung Kwan 0 3 1,050 
Affluence Garden, Phase 1, Tuen Mun 3 1,332 
Po Nga Court, Phase 1’ Tai Po 1 816 
10B August 88 Tsui Chuk Garden, Phase I, Chuk Yuen 8 2,060 
Af]Juence Garden, Phase II, Tuen Mun 2 876 
Crandway Garden, Sha Tin 3 864 
Kwong Lam Court, Phase I, Sha Tin 1 610 
Ying Ming Court, Phase II, Tseung Kwan 0 2 700 
10C December 88 Tsui Chuk Garden, Phase II, Chuk Yuen 4 1,030 
San Wai Court, Phase 1, Tuen Mun 4 1,400 
Po Nga Court, Phase 11, Tai Po 2 1,627 
Kwong Lam Court, Phase 11’ Sha Tin 2 1,222 
Sub-total 15,437~ 
1 lA April 89 Carado Garden, Sha Tin 6 1,988 
Tsui Lai Garden, Phase I, Sheung Shui 3 1,006 
Hiu Tsui Court, Chai Wan 2 660 
King Lai Court, Ngau Chi Wan 2 700 
Ching Nga Court, Tsing Yi 1 814  
San Wai Court, Phase II, Tuen Mun 2 700 
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11B August 89 Fu Ning Garden, Phase I, Tseung Kwan 0 3 /,220 
Tsui Lai Garden, Phase II, Sheung Shui 3 1’ 006 
Yan Ming Court, Tseung Kwan 0 5 1,750 
Hong Lam Court, Sha Tin 3 1,050 
On Shing Court, Sheung Shui 1 611 
11C December 89 Fu Ning Garden, Phase II, Tseung Kwan 0 5 1,230 
Ho Ming Court, Tseung Kwan 0 1 814 
Chung Nga Court, Tai Po 3 2,036 
Siu Kwai Court, Tuen Mun 2 1,425 
Fu Keung Court, Phase 1, Wang Tau Hom 1 130 
Chun Wah Court, Ngau Tau Kok 1 232 
Sub-total 17,372 
12A April 90 On Ning Garden, Tseung Kwan 0 6 2,300 
Elegance Garden, Tai Po 4 1,060 
King Tsui Court, Chai Wan 1 607 
Hong Ying Court, Lam Tin 1 814 
Kam Ying Court, Phase I, Ma On Shan 3 1,050 
12B August 90 Tsui Chuk Garden, Phase III, Chuk Yuen 2 434 
Kam Ying Court, Phase II, Ma On Shan 7 2,450 
Yat Nga Court, Tai Po 2 1,224 
Yin Lai Court, Lai King 2 560 
Pang Ching Coiirt, Chuk Yuen 1 816 
12C December 90 Fu Fai Garden, Ma On Shan 2 520 
Serene Garden, Tsing Yi 3 840 
Ka Lung Court, Kellet Bay 4 1,402 
Siu Pong Court, Tuen Mun ] 612 
Sill Lung Court, Tuen Miin 1 612 
Siu Hin Court, Tuen Mun 2 1,224 
Sub-total 16,525 
13A April 91 Tsui Ning Garden, Phase I, Tuen Mun 4 1,400 
Fok On Garden, Ma On Shan 2 600 
Sunnin^dale Garden, Sheung Shui 4 830 
Fu Keung Court, Phase II, Wang Tau Hom 2 460 
Tin Wang Court, Chuk Yuen 3 630 
Lung Poon Court, Phase II’ Diamond Hill 1 340 
Yee Nga Court, Tai Po 5 1,750 
13B August 91 Tsui Ning Garden, Phase 1, Tuen Mun 2 700 
Hong Pak Court, Lam Tin 7 2,410 
Fung Chuen Court, Diamond Hill 1 612 
Kam Lung Court, Phase 1, M a On Shan 3 1,050 
King Nga Court, Tai Po 2 700 
Siu Lun Court, Phase 1, Tuen Mun 2 700 
13C December91 Fullview Garden, Phase I, Chai Wan 6 1,740 
Hong Nga Court, Phase 1’ Lam Tin 2 1,216 
Yee Ching Court, Sham Shui Po 3 672 
Tin Yau Court, Phase 1’ Tin Shui Wai 1 608 
Chung Ming Court, Phase I, Tseung Kwan 0 2 700 
Siu Lun Court, Phase II, Tuen Mun 2 700 
Tak Nga Court, Tai Po 1 816 
Sub-total 18,634 
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14A April 92 Fullview Garden, Phase 11, Chai Wan 5 1,500 
Saddle Ridge Garden, Phase I. Ma On Shan 6 2’ 100 
Tin Yau Court, Phase II, Tin Shui Wai 2 1,216 
Hong Nga Court, Phase II, Lam Tin 1 608 
Chung Ming Court, Phase 11’ Tseung Kwan 0 3 1,050 
14B August 92 Saddle Ridge Garden, Phase II, Ma On Shan 6 2,100 
Po Hei Court, Sham Shui Po 2 390 
Kai Tsui Court, Chai Wan 2 1,216 
Siu Lun Court, Phase III, Tuen Mun 4 1,400 
Kam Lung Court, Phase II, Ma On Shan 1 350 
Yan Shing Court, Phase 1’ Fanling 4 1,400 
14C December 92 Yuet Wu Villa, Phase I, Tuen Mun 7 1,95Q 
Wing Fok Centre, Fanling 6 1,680 
Fu Keung Court, Phase III, Wang Tau Hom 3 780 
Kwai Hong Court, Kwai Chung 2 701 
Kwai Yin Court, Tai W o Hau 2 700 
Yan Shing Court, Phase 11, Fanling 3 1,050 
Tin Oi Court, Phase 1, Tin Shui Wai 1 608 
14D January 93 Yu Ming Court, Phase I, Tseung Kwan 0 1 608 
Tin Oi Court, Phase 11, Tin Shui Wai 1 608 
Sub-total 22,015" 
15A April 93 Yuet Wu Villa, Phase II, Tuen Mun 8 1,940 
Lung Yan Court, Stanley 2 360 
Tsz On Court, Phase I, Tsz Wan Shan 1 608 
Ko Chun Court, Phase 1’ Yau Tong 3 960 
Yu Ming Court, Phase II, Tseung Kwan 0 1 608 
Ka Shing Court, Phase 1’ Fanling 2 1,216 
15B August 93 Tung Chun Court, Shau Kei Wan 2 1,216 
Ko Chun Court, Phase II, Yau Tong 2 656 
Ka Shing Court, Phase II, Fanling 2 1,216 
Siu Lun Court, Phase IV，Tuen Mun 4 1,400 
15C December 93 South Wave Court, Aberdeen 3 1,040 
Cheerful Garden, Phase I’ Chai Wan 3 1,080 
Po Pui Court, Kwun Tong 5 1,750 
King Shing Court, Phase 1, Fanling 1 608 
Sub-total 14,658~ 
16A April 94 Cheerful Garden, Phase I, Chai Wan 2 790 
Lok Hin Terrace, Chai Wan 5 1,550 
Kwai Chun Court, Kwai Chung 3 1,050 
King Shing Court, Phase II, Fanling 2 1,216 
16B September 94 Hiu Lai Court, Phase 1, Sau Mau Ping 4 2,432 
Tung Hei Court, Phase 1, Shau Kei Wan 4 1,216 
Mei Chung Court, Sha Tin 6 1,940 
Yuk Ming Court, Tseung Kwan 0 3 1,824 
Peng Lai Court, Ping Chau 1 148 
King Shing Court, Phase III, Fanling 1 608 
Sub-total 12,774 
17A April 95 Kam Fung Court, Phase 1, Ma On Shan 5 3,040 
Tsz Oi Court, Phase 1，Tsz Wan Shan 2 700 
Tung Hei Court, Phase II, Shau Kei Wan 2 1,216 
Hiu Lai Court, Phase II, Sau Mau Ping 3 1,824  
Wing Fai Centre, Fanling 4 1,350 
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17B November 95 Hin Ming Court, Tseung Kwan 0 1 759 
Tsz Oi Court, Phase II, Tsz Wan Shan 4 1,400 
Tsz On Court, Phase II, Tsz Wan Shan 1 364 
Kam Fung Court, Phase 11，Ma On Shan 1 608 
Hiu Lai Court, Phase 111, Sau Mau Ping 1 608 
Harmony Garden, Phase I, Chai Wan 3 920 
Sub-total 12,789" 
18A April 96 Choi Fung Court, Ngau Chi Wan 1 608 
Fung Lai Court, Diamond Hill 2 690 
Hang Tsui Court, Chai Wan 2 674 
Tung Lam Court, Shau Kei Wan 1 697 
Hannony Garden, Phase II, Chai Wan 2 1,420 
18B August 96 Hung Fuk Court, Tin Wan 2 700~ 
Ka Keung Court, Phase I, Wang Tau Hom 1 240 
I<,wong Ming Court, Phase 1，Tseung Kwan 0 6 3,648 
18C January 97 Tung Yan Court, Shau Kei Wan 2 1,050 
Tin Lai Court, Tin Shui Wai • 1 756 
Kwong Ming Court, Phase II, Tseung Kwan 0 1 608 
Yu Tung Court, Tung Chung 5 2,640 
Sub-total 13,731 
19A June 97 ^ " Yuet Chui Court, Chai Wan """^  1 354 
Yi Fung Court, ICwai Chung 2 700 
Tong Ming Court, Tseung Kwan 0 3 1,920 
Charming Garden, Phase I, Mong Kok 12 2,648 
Beverly Garden, Phase I, Tseung Kwan 0 3 1,170 
Lung Mun Oasis, Tuen Mun 16 3,800 
19B October 97 W o Ming Court, Phase 1, Tseung Kwan 0 2 1,280 
Tin Shing Court, Phase 1, Tin Shui Wai 3 1,920 
Charming Garden, Phase II, Mong Kok 6 1.260 
Beverly Garden, Phase II’ Tseung Kwan 0 7 2,796 
Fu Hong Garden, Tuen Mun 12 3,026 
19C April 98 Tung Shing Court, Shau Kei Wan i 370 
Hong Shui Court, Lam Tin 1 350 
Kam Tai Court, Ma On Shan 12 3,440 
W o Ming Court, Phase 11, Tseung Kwan 0 2 360 
Cheong Shing Court, Fanling 4 1,280 
Po Ming Court, Tseung Kwan 0 2 1,476 




Source: H K H A . 
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